Jason R. Casey, 26, of Greeley Street in West Salem, Ohio, was in front of Judge James Kimbler on three counts of Aggravated Vehicular Homicide. Two of the charges were second degree felonies and one charge was a third degree felony. Although three charges were filed, all three of them relate to the death of the same individual. Mr. Casey entered pleas of no contest to all three charges.
Mr. Casey can be charged with three separate offenses and can be convicted of all three offenses, but can only be sentenced on one of the charges. When Mr. Casey is sentenced, the State will have to select one of the three charges. Judge Kimbler will then sentence him on the charge selected by the State.
The charges arose out of a traffic accident on June 16, 2010. The State alleged in the first count of the indictment that Mr. Casey was driving while under the influence of alcohol. In the second count the State alleged that he was driving with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in his breath. In the third count the State alleged that he operated his truck recklessly.
The first two charges carry a mandatory prison sentence of between 2 and 8 years, and a mandatory lifetime revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. While a prison sentence is mandatory, the length of the sentence will be determined by Judge Kimbler.
Judge Kimbler accepted the three no contest pleas, found him guilty of all three charges and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Casey in about five weeks.
Monday, January 31, 2011
Wadsworth Man Pleads Guilty to Attempted Domestic Violence
Gregory A. Blackwood, 49, of South Boulevard in Wadsworth, Ohio, appeared in front of Judge James L. Kimbler on Tuesday, January 25, 2011, and entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Domestic Violence, a fifth degree felony. Originally charged with Domestic Violence, a fourth degree felony, Mr. Blackwood agreed to enter a guilty plea to the amended charge. Judge Kimbler accepted the plea, found him guilty, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentence will be imposed on March 10, 2011. Bond was continued pending sentencing.
Maple Heights Man Pleads to Drug Trafficking
Michael P. Gaebelein, 29, of Anthony Street in Maple Heights, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on Tuesday, January 25, 2011, and entered two pleas of guilty to two charges of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which were fourth degree felonies. Judge Kimbler accepted the pleas and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on March 10, 2011 at 8:30 am. Bond was continued pending sentencing
Friday, January 28, 2011
Barberton Man Sentenced to Prison for Wal-Mart Theft
Judge James Kimbler sentenced James M. Brienzo, III of First Street in Barberton, Ohio to six months in prison on one count of Complicity to Commit Theft, a fifth degree felony. Mr. Brienzo appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom in a wheelchair due to injuries he received in Lorain County when he allegedly was injured while hiding in a garbage dumpster. The dumpster was dumped into a garbage truck and he was injured while the truck was compacting the garbage.
Previously Judge Kimbler had issued revoked his bond and issued a warrant for his arrest for violating bond conditions and not appearing for a pre-sentence investigation interview. The bond conditions included not going onto property owned by Wal-Mart, who was the victim in the Complicity to Commit Theft case.
There are additional charges pending against Mr. Brienzo. Those charges are scheduled for trial in March of 2011.
Previously Judge Kimbler had issued revoked his bond and issued a warrant for his arrest for violating bond conditions and not appearing for a pre-sentence investigation interview. The bond conditions included not going onto property owned by Wal-Mart, who was the victim in the Complicity to Commit Theft case.
There are additional charges pending against Mr. Brienzo. Those charges are scheduled for trial in March of 2011.
Medina Woman Sentenced to Prison for Stealing from Mother
On Thursday, January 27, 2011,Judge Kimbler sentenced Amanda Howard, 33, of North Harmony Street in Medina, Ohio to one year in prison for one count of Theft and one count of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which were fourth degree felonies. The victim in the theft case was Ms. Howard's mother. Ms. Howard and three other defendants were charged with stealing over $19.000.00 of jewelry from Ms. Howard's mother. Judge Kimbler previously sentenced two of her co-defendants to prison. The third co-defendant is set for trial later this year.
Four Defendants Sentenced to Community Control Sanctions
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants were sentenced to community control sanctions by Judge Kimbler on Thursday, January 27, 2011:
David Daigle, 45, of Durling Drive in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a third-degree felony and one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Theresa Green, 42, of Pine Lane in Doylestown, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on four counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Michael Hilson, 21, of Miner Place in Akron, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony.
Scott Wilkes, 38, of Cherry Street in West Salem, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
David Daigle, 45, of Durling Drive in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a third-degree felony and one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Theresa Green, 42, of Pine Lane in Doylestown, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on four counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Michael Hilson, 21, of Miner Place in Akron, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony.
Scott Wilkes, 38, of Cherry Street in West Salem, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Judge Kimbler Arraignments for January 27, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, January 27, 2011 for arraignments on new charges:
Thomas Doughty, 28, of South Huntington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Daniel Garrison, 26, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 29.
Timmy Holcomb, 43, of North Buckeye Street in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol, both of which are third-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Sherisha Law, 28, of Ivy Hill Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Obstructing Justice, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 23.
Marc Morley, 42, of Hampton Drive in North Royalton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 20.
Charles Paxton, 53, of Spink Street in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 30.
Brandon Schoolcraft, 26, of Foster Road in Litchfield, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and one of which is a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Andrew Steele, 48, of South Dixie Highway in Middletown, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for February 22.
Matthew Tatro, 20, of Front Street in Berea, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, all of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 29.
Dayshawn Wheeler, 21, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Robbery, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Salena Zak, 29, of Lodi Road in West Salem, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Complicity to Commit Robbery, one of which is second-degree felony and one of which is third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Thomas Doughty, 28, of South Huntington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Daniel Garrison, 26, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 29.
Timmy Holcomb, 43, of North Buckeye Street in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol, both of which are third-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Sherisha Law, 28, of Ivy Hill Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Obstructing Justice, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 23.
Marc Morley, 42, of Hampton Drive in North Royalton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 20.
Charles Paxton, 53, of Spink Street in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 30.
Brandon Schoolcraft, 26, of Foster Road in Litchfield, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and one of which is a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Andrew Steele, 48, of South Dixie Highway in Middletown, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for February 22.
Matthew Tatro, 20, of Front Street in Berea, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, all of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 29.
Dayshawn Wheeler, 21, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Robbery, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Salena Zak, 29, of Lodi Road in West Salem, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Complicity to Commit Robbery, one of which is second-degree felony and one of which is third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 28.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Jury Finds Wadsworth Woman Guilty of Drug Possession
A jury returned a guilty verdict late Wednesday afternoon in Judge Kimbler's courtroom in a drug possession case. The defendant, Toni Amodio, 29, of Main Street in Wadsworth, Ohio, will be sentenced on March 17, 2011 following a pre-sentence investigation. Ms. Amodio will remain out of bond pending her sentencing. Besides ordering a pre-sentence investigation, Judge Kimbler added the condition that she provide weekly drug screens starting the week of January 31, 2011.
The jury trial started on Tuesday, January 25, 2011. The State called four witnesses and Ms. Amodio called one witness. She also testified in her own defense. The drug possession case arose out of the execution of a search warrant on July 22, 2010 by agents of the Med-Way Drug Task Force. This is Ms. Amodio's second conviction for a drug offense. She was earlier found guilty of Trafficking in Heroin in the Summit County Common Pleas Court.
The jury trial started on Tuesday, January 25, 2011. The State called four witnesses and Ms. Amodio called one witness. She also testified in her own defense. The drug possession case arose out of the execution of a search warrant on July 22, 2010 by agents of the Med-Way Drug Task Force. This is Ms. Amodio's second conviction for a drug offense. She was earlier found guilty of Trafficking in Heroin in the Summit County Common Pleas Court.
Ohio Supreme Court Puts Local Rules Online
The Ohio Supreme Court has a page which contains to links to all local rules of trial courts that have submitted them to the Ohio Supreme Court. In Medina County this includes all of the courts. You can click here to view the page and then click on the links on the pages to see the rules.
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for January 24, 2011
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in court January 24:
Robert Anders, 25, of Hazelwood Avenue in Barberton, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony.
Kyle Blackburn, 21, of North Park Drive in Fairview Park, was sentenced to 197 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Failure to Comply with a Police Officer, a third-degree felony.
Mandyll Dietrich, 28, of Ox Road in Wakeman, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Theft, a first-degree misdemeanor.
Andrew Fazenbaker, 26, of South Arlington Road in Akron, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Ashley Napholz, 20, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony.
James Nixon, 28, of East 4th Street in Ashland, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $450 restitution to the victim.
Matthew Paxton, 28, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions, with 180 days in jail, on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony and two counts of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to pay $571 in restitution to the victim.
Todd Rafuse, 34, of Rafuse Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fifth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor.
Anne Zevchek, 49, of Thorpe Circle in Brunswick, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Theft, a fourth-degree felony.
Robert Anders, 25, of Hazelwood Avenue in Barberton, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony.
Kyle Blackburn, 21, of North Park Drive in Fairview Park, was sentenced to 197 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Failure to Comply with a Police Officer, a third-degree felony.
Mandyll Dietrich, 28, of Ox Road in Wakeman, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Theft, a first-degree misdemeanor.
Andrew Fazenbaker, 26, of South Arlington Road in Akron, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Ashley Napholz, 20, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony.
James Nixon, 28, of East 4th Street in Ashland, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $450 restitution to the victim.
Matthew Paxton, 28, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions, with 180 days in jail, on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony and two counts of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to pay $571 in restitution to the victim.
Todd Rafuse, 34, of Rafuse Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fifth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor.
Anne Zevchek, 49, of Thorpe Circle in Brunswick, was sentenced to 180 days in jail for a probation violation on an original charge of Theft, a fourth-degree felony.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Online Edition of Ask the Judge: How Long Have There Been Jury Trials?
On this edition of the online version of Ask the Judge, Reporter Kate Feeks asks Judge James L. Kimbler this question: How long have there been jury trials? Click on the link below to hear Kate's question and the judge's answer:
Monday, January 24, 2011
Lodi Man Sentenced to Prison Following Change of Plea
Judge James Kimbler sentenced a Lodi man, David J. Scherman, 25, of River Street, to six months in prison on Wednesday, January 19, 2011, following a change of plea. Mr. Scherman was charged with one count of Possession of Drugs, (Heroin), and one count of Vandalism. The vandalism charge was based on his attempts to damage a Lodi police cruiser following his arrest on the drug possession charge.
Judge Kimbler gave Mr. Scherman credit for the 75 days he served in the Medina County Jail prior to his change of plea. Judge Kimbler also waived all court costs.
Judge Kimbler gave Mr. Scherman credit for the 75 days he served in the Medina County Jail prior to his change of plea. Judge Kimbler also waived all court costs.
Friday, January 21, 2011
Judge Kimbler Probation Violations for January 14, 2011
Medina County Chief Probation Officer reports that six probationers appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on Friday, January 14, 2011, on complaints filed by probation officers that they violated the terms of their supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced three defendants to jail for their violations; sent one defendant to prison; and continued the hearings for two defendants.
The defendants sent to jail were:
Anthony Zavesky, Case No. 09CR0415, sentenced to six months in jail with credit for 21 days served. At the completion of his jail sentence his supervision is terminated.
Heather Lovejoy, Case No. 09CR0127, sentenced to six months in jail with credit for 89 days served. At the completion of her jail sentence her supervision is terminated.
Heather Keener, Case No. 09CR179, sentenced to 82 days in jail with credit for 85 days. Her supervision continues and court costs for this violation were waived.
The defendant sent to prison was:
Marvin Waddle, Jr., Case No. 06CR0647 and 10CR0319, sentenced to two years in prison on the 2010 case and six months in prison on the 2006 case. The sentences are to run concurrent and he receives credit for 284 days served in the Medina County Jail. All outstanding court costs are waived and his supervision is terminated.
The defendants whose cases were continued were:
Jacob Bayless, Case No. 08CR0570, hearing continued until disposition of a new charge. The new charge is set for trial on March 16, 2011. He is report monthly to the Adult Probation Department while his new charge is pending.
James Justine, Case No. 10CR0325, hearing continued until January 20, 2011.
The defendants sent to jail were:
Anthony Zavesky, Case No. 09CR0415, sentenced to six months in jail with credit for 21 days served. At the completion of his jail sentence his supervision is terminated.
Heather Lovejoy, Case No. 09CR0127, sentenced to six months in jail with credit for 89 days served. At the completion of her jail sentence her supervision is terminated.
Heather Keener, Case No. 09CR179, sentenced to 82 days in jail with credit for 85 days. Her supervision continues and court costs for this violation were waived.
The defendant sent to prison was:
Marvin Waddle, Jr., Case No. 06CR0647 and 10CR0319, sentenced to two years in prison on the 2010 case and six months in prison on the 2006 case. The sentences are to run concurrent and he receives credit for 284 days served in the Medina County Jail. All outstanding court costs are waived and his supervision is terminated.
The defendants whose cases were continued were:
Jacob Bayless, Case No. 08CR0570, hearing continued until disposition of a new charge. The new charge is set for trial on March 16, 2011. He is report monthly to the Adult Probation Department while his new charge is pending.
James Justine, Case No. 10CR0325, hearing continued until January 20, 2011.
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket for January 20, 2011
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, January 20, 2011, for criminal cases:
Isaiah Castro, 23, of South Court Street in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Carrie Mohr, 49, of Akron Road in Marshalville, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Max Perino, 22, of Carsten Road in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on the following charges: one count of Possession of LSD, a fourth-degree felony, one count of Trafficking in Marijuana and one count of Possession of Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to forfeit cash and property to law enforcement.
Adam Crum, 37, of East Wood Street in Shreve, pleaded no contest to one count of Non-Support of Dependents, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for March 4.
Jason Garvin, 25, of Geauga Lake Road in Chagrin Falls, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 22.
Bryan Hathaway, 25, of Highland Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded no contest to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for March 4.
Christine Szylakowski, 41, of Skyview Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Theft from the Elderly, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Jodi Stokes, 42, of Sequoia Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 23.
Isaiah Castro, 23, of South Court Street in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Carrie Mohr, 49, of Akron Road in Marshalville, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Max Perino, 22, of Carsten Road in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on the following charges: one count of Possession of LSD, a fourth-degree felony, one count of Trafficking in Marijuana and one count of Possession of Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to forfeit cash and property to law enforcement.
Adam Crum, 37, of East Wood Street in Shreve, pleaded no contest to one count of Non-Support of Dependents, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for March 4.
Jason Garvin, 25, of Geauga Lake Road in Chagrin Falls, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 22.
Bryan Hathaway, 25, of Highland Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded no contest to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for March 4.
Christine Szylakowski, 41, of Skyview Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Theft from the Elderly, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Jodi Stokes, 42, of Sequoia Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 23.
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for January 18, 2011
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Collier’s courtroom on January 18, 2011 for criminal cases:
Richard Baldner, 26, of Illinois, was sentenced to two years in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Brandon Burgess, 18, of Manchester Road in Akron, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $1,121.38 in restitution to the victim.
Dirk Dowdley, 22, of Olympia Road in Cleveland, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Joseph Maenza, 33, of Amherst Lane in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Cynthia Vatilla-Amalkawi, 47, of Apple Court in Akron, was sentenced to six months in jail on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony.
James Brienzo III, 37, of First Street NW in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Theft, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Shirley Hammond, 51, of Chestnut Road in North Ridgeville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Kayla Ray, 26, of North Avon Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony, and one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Robert Swan, 45, of Merton Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Richard Baldner, 26, of Illinois, was sentenced to two years in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Brandon Burgess, 18, of Manchester Road in Akron, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $1,121.38 in restitution to the victim.
Dirk Dowdley, 22, of Olympia Road in Cleveland, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Joseph Maenza, 33, of Amherst Lane in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Cynthia Vatilla-Amalkawi, 47, of Apple Court in Akron, was sentenced to six months in jail on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony.
James Brienzo III, 37, of First Street NW in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Theft, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Shirley Hammond, 51, of Chestnut Road in North Ridgeville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Kayla Ray, 26, of North Avon Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony, and one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Robert Swan, 45, of Merton Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Three Defendants Change Plea in Judge Kimbler’s Courtroom
Three men entered changes of plea on Tuesday, January 18, 2011, in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom. Two of them were set for jury trial and one was previously scheduled for a change of plea. One of the men received a day jail sentence following his change of plea while the other two were referred for a pre-sentence investigation report.
Derrick Knapik, 24, of River Street in Lodi, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, (Heroin), a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler set his sentencing for February 24, 2011.
Dustin C. Niemann, 24, of Lincoln Avenue in Brunswick, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Cocaine), a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler will also sentence him on February 24, 2011. Judge Kimbler continued both Mr. Niemann’s bond and Mr. Knapik’s bond pending sentencing.
David C. Smith, 31, of Barrington Road in Akron, Ohio, entered a no contest plea to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Both the State and Mr. Smith waived a pre-sentence investigation report. Judge Kimbler then proceeded to impose sentence following the change of plea. Judge Kimbler ordered Mr. Smith to serve a 90 day jail sentence commencing on February 1, 2011.
Derrick Knapik, 24, of River Street in Lodi, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, (Heroin), a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler set his sentencing for February 24, 2011.
Dustin C. Niemann, 24, of Lincoln Avenue in Brunswick, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Cocaine), a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler will also sentence him on February 24, 2011. Judge Kimbler continued both Mr. Niemann’s bond and Mr. Knapik’s bond pending sentencing.
David C. Smith, 31, of Barrington Road in Akron, Ohio, entered a no contest plea to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Both the State and Mr. Smith waived a pre-sentence investigation report. Judge Kimbler then proceeded to impose sentence following the change of plea. Judge Kimbler ordered Mr. Smith to serve a 90 day jail sentence commencing on February 1, 2011.
Online Edition of Ask the Judge
This week's topic: The start of the system of trial by jury. Click on the link below to play the video.
Second Alleged Hell's Angel Arraigned on Assault Charge
Scott E. Stage, 46, of Dartmouth Drive in Parma, Ohio appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Friday, January 14, 2011, and entered a plea of not guilty to one charge of Felonious Assault, a second degree felony. His alleged co-defendant, Justin Seliskar of Sturbridge Drive in Medina, Ohio was arraigned on January 6, 2011, and entered a plea of not guilty to one count of Complicity to Commit Felonious Assault, also a second degree felony.
Mr. Stage's attorney made a motion for a bond reduction arguing that the one million dollar bond set was historically much higher than previous bonds set for Felonious Assault. Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman, representing the State, argued against the motion. He pointed out that additional charges may be forthcoming from the Medina County Grand Jury which could result in an additional prison sentence of ten years. After hearing from both attorneys, Judge Kimbler denied the motion for a bond reduction.
Judge Kimbler then set a trial date of March 14, 2011 and a pre-trial date of March 7, 2011. Based on statements made by Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman during both Mr. Seliskar's arraignment and Mr. Stage's arraignment, it is anticipated that the State will be filing a motion to consolidate the two trials.
Mr. Stage's attorney made a motion for a bond reduction arguing that the one million dollar bond set was historically much higher than previous bonds set for Felonious Assault. Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman, representing the State, argued against the motion. He pointed out that additional charges may be forthcoming from the Medina County Grand Jury which could result in an additional prison sentence of ten years. After hearing from both attorneys, Judge Kimbler denied the motion for a bond reduction.
Judge Kimbler then set a trial date of March 14, 2011 and a pre-trial date of March 7, 2011. Based on statements made by Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman during both Mr. Seliskar's arraignment and Mr. Stage's arraignment, it is anticipated that the State will be filing a motion to consolidate the two trials.
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Barberton Man Found Guilty of Attempted Theft
A jury in Judge Kimbler's courtroom returned a guilty verdict Thursday, January 13, 2010, against Virgile R. Snyder, 44, of Ashland Court in Barberton, on a charge of Attempted Theft. Although Mr. Snyder was originally indicted for a fifth degree felony, the jury also found that the value of the property involved in the attempted theft was less than $500.00. As a result of the that finding, the attempted theft became a second degree misdemeanor.
During the trial, Mr. Snyder maintained that he thought he had permission to take scrap material from a factory in Wadsworth. An employee of the company testified that while Mr. Snyder had been told that he could take scrap pallets, he was never given permission to take the property involved in the attempted theft. During the trial it came out that Mr. Snyder, who runs a business where he finds scrap and then resells it, had a conviction for theft for taking property in Walton Hills.
Following the jury's verdict, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation and will impose sentence at a later date. Judge Kimbler also continued Mr. Snyder's bond pending the completion of the pre-sentence investigation report.
During the trial, Mr. Snyder maintained that he thought he had permission to take scrap material from a factory in Wadsworth. An employee of the company testified that while Mr. Snyder had been told that he could take scrap pallets, he was never given permission to take the property involved in the attempted theft. During the trial it came out that Mr. Snyder, who runs a business where he finds scrap and then resells it, had a conviction for theft for taking property in Walton Hills.
Following the jury's verdict, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation and will impose sentence at a later date. Judge Kimbler also continued Mr. Snyder's bond pending the completion of the pre-sentence investigation report.
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket for January 14, 2011
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on January 14, 2011 for criminal cases:
Kevin Foy, 40, of Essex Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in jail on two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Dawn Hyde, 39, of Olive Street in Elyria, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Barbara Lee, 48, of Oak Court in Lodi, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
George Quinones, 31, of Miner Drive in Medina, was sentenced to six months in jail on two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Shaun Roland, 25, of 5th Street NE in Barberton, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions, with a period of time in a Community Based Correction Facility, on two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Kevin Scholz, 23, of Branch Road in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Jeffrey Starecheski, 36, of Carlisle Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in jail on one count of Trafficking in Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Marvin Waddle, 29, of Bank Street in Lodi, was sentenced to two years in prison on one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony.
Kerry Williams, 18, of William Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Jacob Bayless, 26, of Ivy Hill Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana and one count of Possession of Drugs, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A forfeiture specification is attached to all the charges. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Larry Daft, 40, of Richter Road in Columbus, pleaded not guilty to one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Robert Pandolph, 44, of Grafton Road in Valley City, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 8.
Catrina Perry, 25, of Miller Road in Sterling, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs and one count of Possession of Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 15.
Michelle Riggs, 26, of Mcallister Road in Akron, pleaded no contest to the following charges: one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony; two counts of Theft, both of which are fifth-degree felonies; and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for February 24.
Jamar Robinson, 33, of Meigs Boulevard in Brook Park, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Scott Stage, 46, of Dartworth Drive in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14. He remains in Medina County Jail on $1 million bond.
Michele Townsend, 45, of Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Tampering with Records, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 15.
Eric Walters, 32, of West Washington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Kevin Foy, 40, of Essex Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in jail on two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Dawn Hyde, 39, of Olive Street in Elyria, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Barbara Lee, 48, of Oak Court in Lodi, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
George Quinones, 31, of Miner Drive in Medina, was sentenced to six months in jail on two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Shaun Roland, 25, of 5th Street NE in Barberton, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions, with a period of time in a Community Based Correction Facility, on two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Kevin Scholz, 23, of Branch Road in Medina, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Jeffrey Starecheski, 36, of Carlisle Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in jail on one count of Trafficking in Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Marvin Waddle, 29, of Bank Street in Lodi, was sentenced to two years in prison on one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony.
Kerry Williams, 18, of William Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Jacob Bayless, 26, of Ivy Hill Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana and one count of Possession of Drugs, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A forfeiture specification is attached to all the charges. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Larry Daft, 40, of Richter Road in Columbus, pleaded not guilty to one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Robert Pandolph, 44, of Grafton Road in Valley City, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 8.
Catrina Perry, 25, of Miller Road in Sterling, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs and one count of Possession of Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 15.
Michelle Riggs, 26, of Mcallister Road in Akron, pleaded no contest to the following charges: one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony; two counts of Theft, both of which are fifth-degree felonies; and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for February 24.
Jamar Robinson, 33, of Meigs Boulevard in Brook Park, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Scott Stage, 46, of Dartworth Drive in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14. He remains in Medina County Jail on $1 million bond.
Michele Townsend, 45, of Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Tampering with Records, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 15.
Eric Walters, 32, of West Washington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Thursday, January 13, 2011
Five Defendants Change Plea in Judge Kimbler’s Courtroom
Five defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom from Monday, January 10,2010 through Wednesday, January 12, 2010 and entered changes of plea. Their names and charges are listed below:
Perry Hermansen, Jr., of Bronson Street in Medina, Ohio, entered a no contest plea to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a third degree felony. Judge Kimbler accepted the plea, found him guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Hermansen on February 24, 2011. His bond was continued pending the presentence investigation.
Michael J. Valentine,19, of South Main Street in Rittman, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty on the no contest plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler set a sentencing date of February 17, 2011. Judge Kimbler granted his attorney’s motion to reinstate the pretrial release order that allowed Mr. Valentine to be released on his own recognizance. The State of Ohio had no objection to the own recognizance bond being reinstated.
Daniel M. Kurtz, III, 20, of Renwood Street in Parma, Ohio, who entered a plea of no contest to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty on the no contest plea and ordered a presentence investigation. Sentence will be imposed on February 24, 2011. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Kurtz’s bond.
Jeffrey M. Holcomb, 30, of Sir Richard Avenue in North Royalton, Ohio, who entered a plea of no contest to two charges of Drug Trafficking. One of which was a fourth degree felony and one of which was a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty and ordered a presentence investigation. Sentence will be imposed on February 17, 2011.
Matthew M. Herndon, 28, of Overlook Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio, entered a guilty plea to one count of Attempted Improper Handling of Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a first degree misdemeanor. The guilty plea was entered in exchange for the State amending the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Herndon agreed to pay a $1,000.00 fine, give up his permit to carry a concealed weapon, and forfeit the firearm that he had in his car the night that he was stopped for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on February 17, 2011 following a presentence investigation.
Perry Hermansen, Jr., of Bronson Street in Medina, Ohio, entered a no contest plea to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a third degree felony. Judge Kimbler accepted the plea, found him guilty, and ordered a presentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Hermansen on February 24, 2011. His bond was continued pending the presentence investigation.
Michael J. Valentine,19, of South Main Street in Rittman, Ohio, entered a plea of no contest to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty on the no contest plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler set a sentencing date of February 17, 2011. Judge Kimbler granted his attorney’s motion to reinstate the pretrial release order that allowed Mr. Valentine to be released on his own recognizance. The State of Ohio had no objection to the own recognizance bond being reinstated.
Daniel M. Kurtz, III, 20, of Renwood Street in Parma, Ohio, who entered a plea of no contest to one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty on the no contest plea and ordered a presentence investigation. Sentence will be imposed on February 24, 2011. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Kurtz’s bond.
Jeffrey M. Holcomb, 30, of Sir Richard Avenue in North Royalton, Ohio, who entered a plea of no contest to two charges of Drug Trafficking. One of which was a fourth degree felony and one of which was a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler found him guilty and ordered a presentence investigation. Sentence will be imposed on February 17, 2011.
Matthew M. Herndon, 28, of Overlook Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio, entered a guilty plea to one count of Attempted Improper Handling of Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a first degree misdemeanor. The guilty plea was entered in exchange for the State amending the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Herndon agreed to pay a $1,000.00 fine, give up his permit to carry a concealed weapon, and forfeit the firearm that he had in his car the night that he was stopped for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on February 17, 2011 following a presentence investigation.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for January 10, 2011
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Collier's courtroom on January 10, 2011:
Kenneth Cummings, 32, of Triskett Road in Cleveland, was sentenced to one year in prison on the following charges: one count of Trafficking in Crack Cocaine, a fourth-degree felony; one count of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months and his vehicle was ordered forfeited to law enforcement.
Benjamin Eggert, 19, of Lawn Street in Valley City, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Ryan Fletcher, 26, of Jester Court in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on two counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Doneil Hamilton, 19, of Meadville, Pennsylvania, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a third-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Renee Kappele, 47, of Ethel Avenue in Lakewood, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on three counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth-degree felonies.
William Dillon, 19, of Brookland Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony; one count of Safecracking, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. In an unrelated case, he also pleaded not guilty to one count of Kidnapping, a first-degree felony, and one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Jaymes Gaines, 22, of West Friendship Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Michael Gomez, 21, of Johnland Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 9.
Eric Kreinbrook, 26, of Birch Hill Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for February 23.
Kim McNutt, 47, of Lafayette Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 11.
Terry Sense, 37, of Silvercreek Road in Doylestown, pleaded not guilty to 28 counts of Corrupting Another with Drugs, all of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for April 11.
Tabari Truss, 19, of 13th Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Crack Cocaine, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Alexandra Varney, 19, of Watrusa Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 7.
Sarah Vormelker, 27, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 18.
Reginald Williams, 31, of Drexel Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Heroin, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Michael Witten, 32, of Nestor Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Kenneth Cummings, 32, of Triskett Road in Cleveland, was sentenced to one year in prison on the following charges: one count of Trafficking in Crack Cocaine, a fourth-degree felony; one count of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months and his vehicle was ordered forfeited to law enforcement.
Benjamin Eggert, 19, of Lawn Street in Valley City, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Ryan Fletcher, 26, of Jester Court in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on two counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Doneil Hamilton, 19, of Meadville, Pennsylvania, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a third-degree felony. His driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Renee Kappele, 47, of Ethel Avenue in Lakewood, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on three counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth-degree felonies.
William Dillon, 19, of Brookland Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony; one count of Safecracking, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. In an unrelated case, he also pleaded not guilty to one count of Kidnapping, a first-degree felony, and one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 21.
Jaymes Gaines, 22, of West Friendship Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 20.
Michael Gomez, 21, of Johnland Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 9.
Eric Kreinbrook, 26, of Birch Hill Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Driving Under the Influence of Drugs or Alcohol, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for February 23.
Kim McNutt, 47, of Lafayette Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 11.
Terry Sense, 37, of Silvercreek Road in Doylestown, pleaded not guilty to 28 counts of Corrupting Another with Drugs, all of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for April 11.
Tabari Truss, 19, of 13th Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Crack Cocaine, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 16.
Alexandra Varney, 19, of Watrusa Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 7.
Sarah Vormelker, 27, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for April 18.
Reginald Williams, 31, of Drexel Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Heroin, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Michael Witten, 32, of Nestor Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 14.
Judge Kimbler's Probation Violations for January 6, 2011
Medina County Chief Probation Officer Veronica Perry reports that Judge Kimbler had four probation violations hearings scheduled for January 6, 2011, but only one went forward. The other three were continued until January 14, 2011. The one defendant whose probation violation hearing took place was Bradley Barnum who was on supervision in Case Number 09CR0066. Mr. Barnum entered an admission to the violation. Judge Kimbler ordered that he be transported to the community based correctional facility in Lorain County.
Alleged Hell's Angels Member Enters Not Guilty Plea
Justin Seliskar, 31, of Sturbridge Drive in Medina appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom by video arraignment on Monday, January 10, 2011, and entered a not guilty plea to one count of Complicity to Commit Felonious Assault, a second degree felony. During the arraignment Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman, representing the State of Ohio, stated that additional charges may be forthcoming. Judge Kimbler set a trial date of March 14, 2011 and continued the bond he had previously set at $1,000,000.00. Mr. Seliskar was represented by Attorney Ralph Buss of Painesville, Ohio.
Originally Mr. Seliskar's case was assigned to Judge Collier, but the Medina County Prosecutor's office filed a motion to transfer the case to Judge Kimbler's docket. The reason for the request was that there is an alleged co-defendant and his case was assigned to Judge Kimbler's docket. The State wanted both cases assigned to the same judge since it plans to file a motion to consolidate the cases for trial. Judge Collier who as administrative judge for the General Division of the Medina County Common Pleas Court for 2011 has the power to order such transfers granted the State's motion.
Originally Mr. Seliskar's case was assigned to Judge Collier, but the Medina County Prosecutor's office filed a motion to transfer the case to Judge Kimbler's docket. The reason for the request was that there is an alleged co-defendant and his case was assigned to Judge Kimbler's docket. The State wanted both cases assigned to the same judge since it plans to file a motion to consolidate the cases for trial. Judge Collier who as administrative judge for the General Division of the Medina County Common Pleas Court for 2011 has the power to order such transfers granted the State's motion.
Thursday, January 06, 2011
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket for January 6, 2011
Submitted by Dean Holman
Medina County Prosecutor
The following people appeared in court January 6:
Christopher Flaesgarten, 26, of Coon Club Road in Medina, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on one count of Theft, a fourth-degree felony.
Kyle Robison, 26, of Jacklin Drive in Hinckley, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Assault of a Police Officer, a fourth-degree felony and one count of Escape, a fifth-degree felony.
Mackenzie Vild, 21, of Substation Road in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Gilbert Yezbak, 55, of Raccoon Trail in Strongsville, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Michael Basford, 24, of South Broadway in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for February 11.
Matthew Clegg, 18, of Medina Street in Lodi, pleaded no contest to two counts of Trafficking in Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for February 17.
Judy Sheedy, 45, of Ridge Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 1.
Dwight Simpson, 54, of Lampson Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Having Weapons While Under Disability, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 7.
Ryan Ward, 22, of Ettle Drive in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 9.
Medina County Prosecutor
The following people appeared in court January 6:
Christopher Flaesgarten, 26, of Coon Club Road in Medina, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on one count of Theft, a fourth-degree felony.
Kyle Robison, 26, of Jacklin Drive in Hinckley, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Assault of a Police Officer, a fourth-degree felony and one count of Escape, a fifth-degree felony.
Mackenzie Vild, 21, of Substation Road in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Gilbert Yezbak, 55, of Raccoon Trail in Strongsville, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Michael Basford, 24, of South Broadway in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for February 11.
Matthew Clegg, 18, of Medina Street in Lodi, pleaded no contest to two counts of Trafficking in Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for February 17.
Judy Sheedy, 45, of Ridge Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 1.
Dwight Simpson, 54, of Lampson Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Having Weapons While Under Disability, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 7.
Ryan Ward, 22, of Ettle Drive in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for March 9.
Court Modifies Earlier Ruling on Resentencing When Required Postrelease Control Not Properly Imposed
Resentencing Hearing Limited to Proper Imposition of Postrelease Control
State v. Fischer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6238.
Summit App. No. 24406, 181 Ohio App.3d 758, 2009-Ohio-1491. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6238.pdf
(Dec. 23, 2010) In a decision that modifies its 2007 holding in State v. Bezak, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when a trial court that sentenced a criminal offender prior to July 11, 2006 failed to properly include a statutorily required term of postrelease control:
The sentence is void, is not precluded by the principle of res judicata from review by an appellate court, and may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.
The new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under State v. Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.
Although res judicata does not bar appellate review of a void sentence, it still applies to preclude review of other aspects of the merits of the offender’s conviction, including the determination of guilt and lawful elements of the sentence pronounced by the trial court.
Any appeal from a resentencing hearing at which a mandatory term of postrelease control is imposed is limited in scope to issues arising at the resentencing hearing.
The Court’s 5-1 majority opinion, which affirmed a decision of the 9th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor.
[NOTE: R.C. 2929.191, which took effect on July 11, 2006, authorizes the state’s trial courts to remedy a failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control by holding a hearing limited to the correction of that error and then making a “nunc pro tunc” (now for then) entry in the court’s journal without conducting a full resentencing hearing. However, in a 2009 decision, State v. Singleton, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that trial courts may apply the correction procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 only to cases in which an offender was sentenced on or after the effective date of the 2006 legislation.]
In this case, Londen K. Fischer of Summit County was sentenced in 2002 to an aggregate term of 14 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, felonious assault, having a weapon while under disability and two counts of aggravated burglary, all with firearms specifications. Fischer appealed, and his convictions were affirmed by the 9th District Court of Appeals in 2003. After the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its Bezak decision in 2007, Fischer successfully moved for resentencing on the basis that the law required a term of postrelease control to be included in his sentence, but the trial court had not properly notified him of his postrelease control obligations at the time he was sentenced. The trial court subsequently notified Fischer of those obligations and reimposed the remainder of his original sentence.
Fischer appealed, asserting that because his original sentence was void under Bezak, his 2003 appeal was “not valid” and therefore his current appeal of his resentencing was his “first direct appeal,” in which he was entitled to raise any and all issues relating to his convictions, not merely the absence of a proper postrelease-control notification. The court of appeals rejected his claim. Fischer sought Supreme Court review of the 9th District’s ruling. The Court agreed to review a single proposition of law: whether a direct appeal from a resentencing ordered pursuant to Bezak is a first appeal as of right.
In today’s decision, Justice O’Connor reviewed a line of Ohio Supreme Court decisions, starting with State v. Bezak, in which the Court has addressed the failure of a trial court to include a mandatory term of postrelease control in a criminal sentence that was imposed prior to the enactment of R.C. 2929.191. She noted that the majority in Bezak held that: 1) when a court fails to properly include postrelease control in an offender’s sentence, the sentence is void; and 2) the proper procedure to correct that error was to vacate the defendant’s entire sentence for the offense requiring postrelease control, and remand the case to the trial court for a complete new sentencing hearing for that offense.
Revisiting the Bezak decision, Justice O’Connor wrote: “The failure to impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control is more than an administrative or clerical error. It is an act that lacks both statutory and constitutional authority. No court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law. … We reaffirm that vital principle today and reiterate that a judge must conform to the General Assembly’s mandate in imposing postrelease-control sanctions as part of a criminal sentence.”
In reviewing Bezak’s holding about the scope of a resentencing hearing, however, Justice O’Connor quoted from a Nevada case (Edwards v. State, 1996) and a federal court decision (Allen v.United States, 1985) that addressed the issue. She wrote: “‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence “presupposes a valid conviction and may not, therefore be used to challenge alleged errors in proceedings that occur prior to the imposition of sentence.’ … The scope of relief based on a rule, like Fed.R.Crim.P. 35, is likewise constrained to the narrow function of correcting only the illegal sentence. It does not permit reexamination of all perceived errors at trial or in other proceedings prior to sentencing. … We similarly hold that when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside. Neither the Constitution nor common sense commands anything more.”
“This principle is an important part of the analysis of void sentences that we have not focused on in prior cases involving postrelease control, including Bezak. … Thus, we reaffirm the portion of the syllabus in Bezak that states ‘when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to one or more offenses and postrelease control is not properly included in a sentence for a particular offense, the sentence for that offense is void,’ but with the added proviso that only the offending part of the sentence is subject to review and correction. However we now modify the second sentence in the Bezak syllabus as ill-considered. That sentence states that the offender is entitled to a new sentencing hearing for the offense for which postrelease control was not imposed properly. … It does not recognize a principle that we overlooked in Bezak: when an appellate court concludes that a sentence imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may be vacated or otherwise amended. Therefore we hold that the new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.”
Applying that analysis to the question of whether Fisher’s appeal of his resentencing hearing should have been treated as a “first” direct appeal at which all aspects of his trial were open to review, Justice O’Connor wrote: “Like the court of appeals, we answer that question in the negative. The court of appeals correctly ruled that Fischer, having already had the benefit of one direct appeal, could not raise any and all claims of error in a second, successive appeal.”
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent stating her belief that, rather than affirming the portion of Bezak holding that postrelease-control errors render a defendant’s sentence “void,” it would be “more sensible” for the Court “to completely abandon Bezak and its progeny and instead hold that these (postrelease control) errors are correctable on direct appeal within the usual time for appellate review.”
Justice Lanzinger wrote: “Before the line of cases starting a mere three years ago with Bezak, this court repeatedly held that sentencing errors are nonjurisdictional and that these errors are properly corrected on appeal. … ”
“The real question here is: ‘What is the proper remedy when a judge makes a sentencing mistake?’ Our sentencing statutes recognize the possibility that a judge may err in sentencing by allowing parties 30 days to appeal sentences on grounds that they are contrary to law. Allowing for challenges to sentencing error on direct appeal gives the state and the defense ample opportunity to draw attention to any potential postrelease-control error, thus satisfying any constitutional concerns arising from an imperfect sentence. … ”
“The majority has elevated postrelease-control mistakes to the level of ‘super-error’ to allow untimely challenges to parts of the sentence that could very easily be brought on direct appeal and corrected as other sentencing errors are.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Heaven DiMartino, 330.643.7459, for the Summit County prosecutor's office.
Claire R. Cahoon, 614.466.5394, for Londen Fischer.
State v. Fischer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6238.
Summit App. No. 24406, 181 Ohio App.3d 758, 2009-Ohio-1491. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6238.pdf
(Dec. 23, 2010) In a decision that modifies its 2007 holding in State v. Bezak, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when a trial court that sentenced a criminal offender prior to July 11, 2006 failed to properly include a statutorily required term of postrelease control:
The sentence is void, is not precluded by the principle of res judicata from review by an appellate court, and may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.
The new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under State v. Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.
Although res judicata does not bar appellate review of a void sentence, it still applies to preclude review of other aspects of the merits of the offender’s conviction, including the determination of guilt and lawful elements of the sentence pronounced by the trial court.
Any appeal from a resentencing hearing at which a mandatory term of postrelease control is imposed is limited in scope to issues arising at the resentencing hearing.
The Court’s 5-1 majority opinion, which affirmed a decision of the 9th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor.
[NOTE: R.C. 2929.191, which took effect on July 11, 2006, authorizes the state’s trial courts to remedy a failure to properly impose a mandatory term of postrelease control by holding a hearing limited to the correction of that error and then making a “nunc pro tunc” (now for then) entry in the court’s journal without conducting a full resentencing hearing. However, in a 2009 decision, State v. Singleton, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that trial courts may apply the correction procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 only to cases in which an offender was sentenced on or after the effective date of the 2006 legislation.]
In this case, Londen K. Fischer of Summit County was sentenced in 2002 to an aggregate term of 14 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, felonious assault, having a weapon while under disability and two counts of aggravated burglary, all with firearms specifications. Fischer appealed, and his convictions were affirmed by the 9th District Court of Appeals in 2003. After the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its Bezak decision in 2007, Fischer successfully moved for resentencing on the basis that the law required a term of postrelease control to be included in his sentence, but the trial court had not properly notified him of his postrelease control obligations at the time he was sentenced. The trial court subsequently notified Fischer of those obligations and reimposed the remainder of his original sentence.
Fischer appealed, asserting that because his original sentence was void under Bezak, his 2003 appeal was “not valid” and therefore his current appeal of his resentencing was his “first direct appeal,” in which he was entitled to raise any and all issues relating to his convictions, not merely the absence of a proper postrelease-control notification. The court of appeals rejected his claim. Fischer sought Supreme Court review of the 9th District’s ruling. The Court agreed to review a single proposition of law: whether a direct appeal from a resentencing ordered pursuant to Bezak is a first appeal as of right.
In today’s decision, Justice O’Connor reviewed a line of Ohio Supreme Court decisions, starting with State v. Bezak, in which the Court has addressed the failure of a trial court to include a mandatory term of postrelease control in a criminal sentence that was imposed prior to the enactment of R.C. 2929.191. She noted that the majority in Bezak held that: 1) when a court fails to properly include postrelease control in an offender’s sentence, the sentence is void; and 2) the proper procedure to correct that error was to vacate the defendant’s entire sentence for the offense requiring postrelease control, and remand the case to the trial court for a complete new sentencing hearing for that offense.
Revisiting the Bezak decision, Justice O’Connor wrote: “The failure to impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control is more than an administrative or clerical error. It is an act that lacks both statutory and constitutional authority. No court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law. … We reaffirm that vital principle today and reiterate that a judge must conform to the General Assembly’s mandate in imposing postrelease-control sanctions as part of a criminal sentence.”
In reviewing Bezak’s holding about the scope of a resentencing hearing, however, Justice O’Connor quoted from a Nevada case (Edwards v. State, 1996) and a federal court decision (Allen v.United States, 1985) that addressed the issue. She wrote: “‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence “presupposes a valid conviction and may not, therefore be used to challenge alleged errors in proceedings that occur prior to the imposition of sentence.’ … The scope of relief based on a rule, like Fed.R.Crim.P. 35, is likewise constrained to the narrow function of correcting only the illegal sentence. It does not permit reexamination of all perceived errors at trial or in other proceedings prior to sentencing. … We similarly hold that when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside. Neither the Constitution nor common sense commands anything more.”
“This principle is an important part of the analysis of void sentences that we have not focused on in prior cases involving postrelease control, including Bezak. … Thus, we reaffirm the portion of the syllabus in Bezak that states ‘when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to one or more offenses and postrelease control is not properly included in a sentence for a particular offense, the sentence for that offense is void,’ but with the added proviso that only the offending part of the sentence is subject to review and correction. However we now modify the second sentence in the Bezak syllabus as ill-considered. That sentence states that the offender is entitled to a new sentencing hearing for the offense for which postrelease control was not imposed properly. … It does not recognize a principle that we overlooked in Bezak: when an appellate court concludes that a sentence imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may be vacated or otherwise amended. Therefore we hold that the new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled under Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control.”
Applying that analysis to the question of whether Fisher’s appeal of his resentencing hearing should have been treated as a “first” direct appeal at which all aspects of his trial were open to review, Justice O’Connor wrote: “Like the court of appeals, we answer that question in the negative. The court of appeals correctly ruled that Fischer, having already had the benefit of one direct appeal, could not raise any and all claims of error in a second, successive appeal.”
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent stating her belief that, rather than affirming the portion of Bezak holding that postrelease-control errors render a defendant’s sentence “void,” it would be “more sensible” for the Court “to completely abandon Bezak and its progeny and instead hold that these (postrelease control) errors are correctable on direct appeal within the usual time for appellate review.”
Justice Lanzinger wrote: “Before the line of cases starting a mere three years ago with Bezak, this court repeatedly held that sentencing errors are nonjurisdictional and that these errors are properly corrected on appeal. … ”
“The real question here is: ‘What is the proper remedy when a judge makes a sentencing mistake?’ Our sentencing statutes recognize the possibility that a judge may err in sentencing by allowing parties 30 days to appeal sentences on grounds that they are contrary to law. Allowing for challenges to sentencing error on direct appeal gives the state and the defense ample opportunity to draw attention to any potential postrelease-control error, thus satisfying any constitutional concerns arising from an imperfect sentence. … ”
“The majority has elevated postrelease-control mistakes to the level of ‘super-error’ to allow untimely challenges to parts of the sentence that could very easily be brought on direct appeal and corrected as other sentencing errors are.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Heaven DiMartino, 330.643.7459, for the Summit County prosecutor's office.
Claire R. Cahoon, 614.466.5394, for Londen Fischer.
Medina Man Loses Workers' Compensation Case
On April 1, 2007, Keith Garnes of Spencer Lake Road in Medina, Ohio was driving a truck for a company called Lucas Clark Trucking. Lucas Clark Trucking is a company located in West Salem, Ohio.
His job was to drive pallets of shingles from a warehouse at the Owens Corning plant in Medina, Ohio to another location at the plant. He was driving an 18 wheel truck and was paid by the load. He had been working for Lucas Clark Trucking for less than a week. On April 1, 2007, while at work, his ankle was run over by a tow motor operated by an employee of Lucas Clark Trucking.
That accident started a chain of events that led to a two day jury trial in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on January 4 and 5, 2010. While both Mr. Garnes and Lucas Clark Trucking agreed that Mr. Garnes was operating one of the company's trucks, they disagreed about his status on the day of the accident.
Mr. Garnes argued that he was an employee of the trucking company and therefore eligible to collect Workers' Compensation benefits. The company argued that he was an independent contractor and therefore the company did not have to cover him under Ohio's Workers' Compensation law. Complicating the case was the fact that the trucking company, which only had about three drivers, did not cover them under the Ohio's compensation program.
Under Ohio law, the job of the jury in such a case is to determine whether or not the person claiming coverage is entitled to participate in the Ohio program. The worker has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to participate.
In the Garnes case, the jury determined that he was not entitled to participate. In reaching that decision, the jury had to consider 28 factors that Ohio law uses to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. Although Judge Kimbler has had other workers' compensation trials, this was the first one in which the issue of employee versus independent contractor had to be determined by a jury.
His job was to drive pallets of shingles from a warehouse at the Owens Corning plant in Medina, Ohio to another location at the plant. He was driving an 18 wheel truck and was paid by the load. He had been working for Lucas Clark Trucking for less than a week. On April 1, 2007, while at work, his ankle was run over by a tow motor operated by an employee of Lucas Clark Trucking.
That accident started a chain of events that led to a two day jury trial in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on January 4 and 5, 2010. While both Mr. Garnes and Lucas Clark Trucking agreed that Mr. Garnes was operating one of the company's trucks, they disagreed about his status on the day of the accident.
Mr. Garnes argued that he was an employee of the trucking company and therefore eligible to collect Workers' Compensation benefits. The company argued that he was an independent contractor and therefore the company did not have to cover him under Ohio's Workers' Compensation law. Complicating the case was the fact that the trucking company, which only had about three drivers, did not cover them under the Ohio's compensation program.
Under Ohio law, the job of the jury in such a case is to determine whether or not the person claiming coverage is entitled to participate in the Ohio program. The worker has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to participate.
In the Garnes case, the jury determined that he was not entitled to participate. In reaching that decision, the jury had to consider 28 factors that Ohio law uses to determine whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. Although Judge Kimbler has had other workers' compensation trials, this was the first one in which the issue of employee versus independent contractor had to be determined by a jury.
Wednesday, January 05, 2011
Medina County Adult Probation Department Workload Increases in 2010
Medina County Chief Adult Probation Officer reports that the workload of her department increased in 2010 compared to 2009. The Adult Probation Department did 69 more pre-investigation reports in 2010 as compared to 2009; 22 more general supervision assignments; and 44 more intensive supervised probation assignments. The assignments and referrals for 2009 and 2010 are listed below:
Medina County Adult Probation Department 2009 Statistics
Pre-sentence investigation referrals: 307
General supervision assignments: 145
Intensive supervision assignments: 61
Community service referrals: 105
Home incarceration referrals: 29
Bond reporting assignments: 101
Intervention in lieu of conviction referrals: 24
Intervention granted: 19
Expungment report referrals: 53
Mental health docket referrals: 8
Mental health docket assignments: 2
Medina County Adult Probation Department 2010 Statistics
Pre-sentence investigation referrals: 376
General supervision assignments: 167
Intensive supervision assignments: 105
Community service referrals: 109
Home incarceration referrals: 23
Intervention in lieu of conviction referrals: 28
Intervention granted: 24
Expungment report referrals: 37
Mental health docket referrals: 10
Mental health docket assignments: 3
As can be seen from the above statistics, only two categories saw less activity in 2010 as compared to 2009. Those were home incarceration referrals and referrals for expungment reports.
Medina County Adult Probation Department 2009 Statistics
Pre-sentence investigation referrals: 307
General supervision assignments: 145
Intensive supervision assignments: 61
Community service referrals: 105
Home incarceration referrals: 29
Bond reporting assignments: 101
Intervention in lieu of conviction referrals: 24
Intervention granted: 19
Expungment report referrals: 53
Mental health docket referrals: 8
Mental health docket assignments: 2
Medina County Adult Probation Department 2010 Statistics
Pre-sentence investigation referrals: 376
General supervision assignments: 167
Intensive supervision assignments: 105
Community service referrals: 109
Home incarceration referrals: 23
Intervention in lieu of conviction referrals: 28
Intervention granted: 24
Expungment report referrals: 37
Mental health docket referrals: 10
Mental health docket assignments: 3
As can be seen from the above statistics, only two categories saw less activity in 2010 as compared to 2009. Those were home incarceration referrals and referrals for expungment reports.
Diverting Tobacco Use Prevention Fund Proceeds for Other Uses Not a Violation of Ohio Constitution
Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd. of Trustees v. Boyce, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6207.
Franklin App. Nos. 09AP-768, 09AP-769, 09AP-785, 09AP-786, 09AP-832, and 09AP-833, 185 Ohio App.3d 707, 2009-Ohio-6993. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, Acting C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Gallagher and Harsha, JJ., concur separately.
Sean C. Gallagher, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for Brown, C.J.
William H. Harsha, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for Cupp, J.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6207.pdf
(Dec. 22, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that diverting $230 million in tobacco use prevention fund proceeds to pay for non-tobacco related expenditures did not violate the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution and/or the contracts clauses of the U.S. and state constitutions.
The Court’s 7-0 decision, which affirmed a ruling by the 10th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer.
In 1998, Ohio and 45 other states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the nation’s leading tobacco manufacturers. The settlement resolved multiple lawsuits that had been filed against the tobacco companies by state attorneys general to recover health care expenses incurred by their states for tobacco-related disease. Under the MSA, Ohio was to receive about $10.1 billion in payments over a 25 year period.
In 2000, the 123rd General Assembly passed S.B. 192, which enacted R.C. Chapter 183. The new statute established eight new funds within the state treasury into which revenue from the tobacco settlement was to be appropriated to support different governmental purposes, among which were school construction, law enforcement, biomedical research and education technology.
S.B. 192 also created a separate fund identified as the “Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Endowment Fund” and specified that the endowment fund was “not part of the state treasury.” The bill appropriated $235 million from Ohio’s first allocation of MSA funds to the Ohio Department of Health, and instructed the department’s director to “disburse monies appropriated in this appropriation item to the Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Endowment Fund created by section 183.08 of the Revised Code.” The bill stated that the proceeds of the endowment were to be appropriated by an appointed board of trustees to “reduce tobacco use by Ohioans, with special emphasis on reducing the use of tobacco by youth, minority and regional populations, pregnant women, and others who may be disproportionately affected by the use of tobacco.” From 2000 to April 2008, moneys from the endowment fund and earnings on the fund’s unspent balance supported a variety of smoking prevention and cessation programs across the state.
On April 2, 2008, in response to a significant slowdown in the state’s economy, Gov. Ted Strickland announced a $1.5 billion stimulus plan that he said would be partially funded by diverting $230 million from the then-current $264 million balance of the tobacco use prevention endowment fund to pay for a non-tobacco related job creation program. Two days later, foundation trustees voted to encumber a significant amount of the current proceeds in the endowment fund for future tobacco cessation activities. On April 8, the trustees entered into a $190 million contract with American Legacy Foundation to provide continuing tobacco cessation programs in Ohio.
Later that same day, the 127th General Assembly passed emergency legislation diverting all but $40 million of the current balance of the endowment fund to a new “Jobs Fund” created in the state treasury. The tobacco fund trustees filed suit in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas challenging the constitutionality of the legislature’s action. Shortly thereafter, American Legacy intervened as a plaintiff in the case, asserting that the legislature’s diversion of funds from the endowment had unlawfully interfered with the contract it had entered into with the foundation on April 8. On May 6, 2008, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 544, which formally abolished the tobacco foundation, liquidated the endowment fund and diverted most of its proceeds to the state treasury for job creation.
In late May 2008, the trial court consolidated the trustees’ and American Legacy’s claims with a new suit that had been filed by Robert Miller and David Weinmann, two former smokers who had participated in foundation-funded smoking cessation programs. In June 2009 the trial court denied American Legacy’s contract impairment claim, but ruled that the legislation enacted in 2000 had intentionally created a permanent, dedicated endowment outside of the state treasury that could only be used to fund future smoking prevention and cessation programs. Based on that holding, the court found that the action of the 127th General Assembly diverting the proceeds of the endowment fund to non-smoking related programs violated Miller and Weinmann’s constitutional rights as vested beneficiaries of the tobacco trust fund.
The state appealed. On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appeals court held that the 127th General Assembly did not violate either the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution or the contracts clauses of the state or federal constitutions in enacting H.B. 544, because it had acted within the legislature’s plenary power to appropriate and reorganize state funds to meet changing fiscal needs and priorities. The appeals court also found that the endowment fund was not an irrevocable charitable trust and the appellees had no vested rights that could be violated. The plaintiffs sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the 10th District’s ruling.
In today’s decision, Justice Pfeifer noted that the case turns on whether the legislative action to liquidate the endowment fund is clearly prohibited by the Ohio Constitution. “No constitutional amendment was adopted in Ohio restricting the use of the tobacco settlement money,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. “In the absence of a constitutional provision, the General Assembly had the power to change the use of the settlement money by enacting H.B. 544 and S.B. 192.”
Justice Pfeifer also cited a 1939 Supreme Court case, State ex rel. Public Institutional Bldg. Auth. v. Griffith, concerning another limitation on the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, which he called “expansive” but not “all-inclusive” and noted it does not include the ability to bind future General Assemblies. “No General Assembly can guarantee the continuity of its legislation or tie the hands of its successors,” according to Griffith.
“In Griffith, we stated that although payments made by patients in state-run hospitals might be used by the Department of Public Welfare to run the hospitals it operated, those payments were ‘public funds, at all times subject to legislative control.’”
Appellants contended that Section 4 of H.B. 544 was intended to apply retroactively. The majority opinion referred to Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which states that the “General Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws,” and cited several Supreme Court cases that prevent a statute from applying retroactively unless specifically designated by the legislature. The majority opinion concluded that “Section 4 does not indicate that the General Assembly expressly intended the act to apply retroactively. Instead, the language demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention that the act by applied prospectively.”
Justice Pfeifer also addressed appellants’ argument that funds already appropriated by a General Assembly are beyond the reach of future legislation. “This argument makes sense only if the foundation is a trust, which we conclude it is not. It is axiomatic that an appropriation to a state agency is not an expenditure; thus appropriation of money to the foundation does not place the money beyond the reach of the General Assembly.”
The majority opinion concluded, with respect to the retroactivity question, “No irrevocable trust was created; indeed, no trust was created. Instead, we conclude that in 2000, a state agency was created that was abolished in 2008. We conclude that the law enacted in 2000 did not create a right that was terminated by H.B. 544 and, therefore, that H.B. 544 is not an unconstitutionally retroactive law.”
Appellants also argued that H.B. 544 violated the contract clause of the Ohio and federal constitutions. The court concluded that the contract clause was not violated because no contract was formed.
In conclusion, Justice Pfeifer wrote that: “The General Assembly has plenary legislative power. In the exercise of that power, the General Assembly evaluated Ohio’s budget priorities and enacted S.B. 192 and H.B. 544. It is not for us to judge the wisdom of the General Assembly but to determine whether the exercise of its power comports with or violates the Ohio Constitution. We conclude that S.B. 192 and H.B. 544 do not violate the Ohio Constitution.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger as well as Eighth District Court of Appeals Judge Sean C. Gallagher, sitting in place of Chief Justice Eric Brown, and Fourth District Court of Appeals Judge William H. Harsha III, sitting in place of Justice Robert R. Cupp. Judges Gallagher and Harsha issued separate concurring opinions.
Judge Gallagher noted that had the General Assembly properly established a trust with specific recipients in mind to benefit from the tobacco proceeds “no two-year encumbrance problem would exist.”
Judge Harsha pointed to Section 22, Article II of the Ohio Constitution as prohibiting “the legislature from subsequently creating an irrevocable public trust with those funds” once the tobacco proceeds were placed in the state treasury.
Contacts
John W. Zeiger, 614.365.9900, for Robert G. Miller, David W. Weinmann and American Legacy Foundation.
Alexandra T. Schimmer, 614.466.8980, for the state and Attorney General Richard Cordray.
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Franklin App. Nos. 09AP-768, 09AP-769, 09AP-785, 09AP-786, 09AP-832, and 09AP-833, 185 Ohio App.3d 707, 2009-Ohio-6993. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, Acting C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Gallagher and Harsha, JJ., concur separately.
Sean C. Gallagher, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for Brown, C.J.
William H. Harsha, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for Cupp, J.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6207.pdf
(Dec. 22, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that diverting $230 million in tobacco use prevention fund proceeds to pay for non-tobacco related expenditures did not violate the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution and/or the contracts clauses of the U.S. and state constitutions.
The Court’s 7-0 decision, which affirmed a ruling by the 10th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer.
In 1998, Ohio and 45 other states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the nation’s leading tobacco manufacturers. The settlement resolved multiple lawsuits that had been filed against the tobacco companies by state attorneys general to recover health care expenses incurred by their states for tobacco-related disease. Under the MSA, Ohio was to receive about $10.1 billion in payments over a 25 year period.
In 2000, the 123rd General Assembly passed S.B. 192, which enacted R.C. Chapter 183. The new statute established eight new funds within the state treasury into which revenue from the tobacco settlement was to be appropriated to support different governmental purposes, among which were school construction, law enforcement, biomedical research and education technology.
S.B. 192 also created a separate fund identified as the “Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Endowment Fund” and specified that the endowment fund was “not part of the state treasury.” The bill appropriated $235 million from Ohio’s first allocation of MSA funds to the Ohio Department of Health, and instructed the department’s director to “disburse monies appropriated in this appropriation item to the Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Endowment Fund created by section 183.08 of the Revised Code.” The bill stated that the proceeds of the endowment were to be appropriated by an appointed board of trustees to “reduce tobacco use by Ohioans, with special emphasis on reducing the use of tobacco by youth, minority and regional populations, pregnant women, and others who may be disproportionately affected by the use of tobacco.” From 2000 to April 2008, moneys from the endowment fund and earnings on the fund’s unspent balance supported a variety of smoking prevention and cessation programs across the state.
On April 2, 2008, in response to a significant slowdown in the state’s economy, Gov. Ted Strickland announced a $1.5 billion stimulus plan that he said would be partially funded by diverting $230 million from the then-current $264 million balance of the tobacco use prevention endowment fund to pay for a non-tobacco related job creation program. Two days later, foundation trustees voted to encumber a significant amount of the current proceeds in the endowment fund for future tobacco cessation activities. On April 8, the trustees entered into a $190 million contract with American Legacy Foundation to provide continuing tobacco cessation programs in Ohio.
Later that same day, the 127th General Assembly passed emergency legislation diverting all but $40 million of the current balance of the endowment fund to a new “Jobs Fund” created in the state treasury. The tobacco fund trustees filed suit in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas challenging the constitutionality of the legislature’s action. Shortly thereafter, American Legacy intervened as a plaintiff in the case, asserting that the legislature’s diversion of funds from the endowment had unlawfully interfered with the contract it had entered into with the foundation on April 8. On May 6, 2008, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 544, which formally abolished the tobacco foundation, liquidated the endowment fund and diverted most of its proceeds to the state treasury for job creation.
In late May 2008, the trial court consolidated the trustees’ and American Legacy’s claims with a new suit that had been filed by Robert Miller and David Weinmann, two former smokers who had participated in foundation-funded smoking cessation programs. In June 2009 the trial court denied American Legacy’s contract impairment claim, but ruled that the legislation enacted in 2000 had intentionally created a permanent, dedicated endowment outside of the state treasury that could only be used to fund future smoking prevention and cessation programs. Based on that holding, the court found that the action of the 127th General Assembly diverting the proceeds of the endowment fund to non-smoking related programs violated Miller and Weinmann’s constitutional rights as vested beneficiaries of the tobacco trust fund.
The state appealed. On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appeals court held that the 127th General Assembly did not violate either the retroactivity clause of the Ohio Constitution or the contracts clauses of the state or federal constitutions in enacting H.B. 544, because it had acted within the legislature’s plenary power to appropriate and reorganize state funds to meet changing fiscal needs and priorities. The appeals court also found that the endowment fund was not an irrevocable charitable trust and the appellees had no vested rights that could be violated. The plaintiffs sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the 10th District’s ruling.
In today’s decision, Justice Pfeifer noted that the case turns on whether the legislative action to liquidate the endowment fund is clearly prohibited by the Ohio Constitution. “No constitutional amendment was adopted in Ohio restricting the use of the tobacco settlement money,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. “In the absence of a constitutional provision, the General Assembly had the power to change the use of the settlement money by enacting H.B. 544 and S.B. 192.”
Justice Pfeifer also cited a 1939 Supreme Court case, State ex rel. Public Institutional Bldg. Auth. v. Griffith, concerning another limitation on the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, which he called “expansive” but not “all-inclusive” and noted it does not include the ability to bind future General Assemblies. “No General Assembly can guarantee the continuity of its legislation or tie the hands of its successors,” according to Griffith.
“In Griffith, we stated that although payments made by patients in state-run hospitals might be used by the Department of Public Welfare to run the hospitals it operated, those payments were ‘public funds, at all times subject to legislative control.’”
Appellants contended that Section 4 of H.B. 544 was intended to apply retroactively. The majority opinion referred to Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which states that the “General Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws,” and cited several Supreme Court cases that prevent a statute from applying retroactively unless specifically designated by the legislature. The majority opinion concluded that “Section 4 does not indicate that the General Assembly expressly intended the act to apply retroactively. Instead, the language demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention that the act by applied prospectively.”
Justice Pfeifer also addressed appellants’ argument that funds already appropriated by a General Assembly are beyond the reach of future legislation. “This argument makes sense only if the foundation is a trust, which we conclude it is not. It is axiomatic that an appropriation to a state agency is not an expenditure; thus appropriation of money to the foundation does not place the money beyond the reach of the General Assembly.”
The majority opinion concluded, with respect to the retroactivity question, “No irrevocable trust was created; indeed, no trust was created. Instead, we conclude that in 2000, a state agency was created that was abolished in 2008. We conclude that the law enacted in 2000 did not create a right that was terminated by H.B. 544 and, therefore, that H.B. 544 is not an unconstitutionally retroactive law.”
Appellants also argued that H.B. 544 violated the contract clause of the Ohio and federal constitutions. The court concluded that the contract clause was not violated because no contract was formed.
In conclusion, Justice Pfeifer wrote that: “The General Assembly has plenary legislative power. In the exercise of that power, the General Assembly evaluated Ohio’s budget priorities and enacted S.B. 192 and H.B. 544. It is not for us to judge the wisdom of the General Assembly but to determine whether the exercise of its power comports with or violates the Ohio Constitution. We conclude that S.B. 192 and H.B. 544 do not violate the Ohio Constitution.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger as well as Eighth District Court of Appeals Judge Sean C. Gallagher, sitting in place of Chief Justice Eric Brown, and Fourth District Court of Appeals Judge William H. Harsha III, sitting in place of Justice Robert R. Cupp. Judges Gallagher and Harsha issued separate concurring opinions.
Judge Gallagher noted that had the General Assembly properly established a trust with specific recipients in mind to benefit from the tobacco proceeds “no two-year encumbrance problem would exist.”
Judge Harsha pointed to Section 22, Article II of the Ohio Constitution as prohibiting “the legislature from subsequently creating an irrevocable public trust with those funds” once the tobacco proceeds were placed in the state treasury.
Contacts
John W. Zeiger, 614.365.9900, for Robert G. Miller, David W. Weinmann and American Legacy Foundation.
Alexandra T. Schimmer, 614.466.8980, for the state and Attorney General Richard Cordray.
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Court Rules Officers of Community Schools Are 'Public Officials,' Can be Personally Liable for Lost Public Funds
Not Sheltered by Corporation Laws from Personal Liability
Cordray v. Internatl. Preparatory School, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6136.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91912, 2009-Ohio-2364. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Pfeifer, Acting C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6136.pdf
View oral argument video of this case.
(Dec. 20, 2010) In a 6-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an officer, employee or duly authorized agent of a community school that receives public funds under R.C. Chapter 3314 falls within the statutory definition of a “public official,” and therefore such persons may be personally liable to the state for lost or misspent public funds.
Applying that holding to a civil lawsuit in which the state is attempting to recover funds from the treasurer of a now-defunct community school in Cleveland, the Court remanded the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.
The International Preparatory School (TIPS), a nonprofit corporation, operated as a community or “charter” school located in Cleveland. Hasina Shabazz and her now-deceased husband, Da’ud Abdul Malik Shabazz, were members of the board of TIPS. As a community school, TIPS received state funding based largely upon the number of students enrolled at the school as reported by the school to the Ohio Department of Education. On Oct. 18, 2005, TIPS ceased operating as a community school. On Oct. 20, 2005, the state petitioned the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for, among other relief, a temporary restraining order and the appointment of a receiver to secure TIPS’s assets. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that same day, and appointed a receiver in January 2006.
In January 2007, the state auditor issued a report of an audit of TIPS for the period of July 1, 2004, through Oct. 18, 2005. The auditor determined that TIPS had sought and received overpayments totaling $1,407,983 from the Department of Education by submitting inflated enrollment figures for the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years. The auditor issued a finding in favor of the Department of Education against TIPS as an entity and jointly and severally against Hasina Shabazz and the estate of her husband for the amount of the overpayments.
Pursuant to state law, the state filed a complaint in common pleas court initiating a civil lawsuit to convert the auditor’s finding to a court judgment awarding the state joint and several recovery from TIPS and Shabazz for $1,407,983. In her answer to the complaint, Shabazz asserted that she was not the treasurer of the school, but treasurer only of the board of directors of the non-profit corporation that operated the school. Shabazz and the state filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Shabazz argued that two statutes shielded her from liability: R.C. 1702.55, under which “members, the directors, and the officers of a corporation shall not be personally liable for any obligation of the corporation,” and R.C. 3314.071, which states that “[n]o officer, director, or member of the governing authority of a community school incurs any personal liability by virtue of entering into any contract on behalf of the school.” The trial court found Shabazz’s reliance on the statutes misplaced, found her personally liable for the public funds at issue, and granted the state’s motion for summary judgment against her.
Shabazz appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment. The court held that Shabazz was not a “public official” under the ordinary meaning of that term, and therefore could not be held personally, strictly liable for the overpayments to TIPS. The 8th District also held that, because the school was organized as a nonprofit corporation, Shabazz as a corporate officer could be held personally liable only if the state could prove that she had breached her fiduciary duty as a director of a publicly funded corporation, or that she had committed personal wrongdoing sufficient to strip her of the protection of the state’s corporation laws. Based on those holdings, the court of appeals vacated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the state and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The state sought and was granted review of the 8th District’s decision by the Supreme Court.
In today’s unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, the Court agreed that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In doing so, however, the Justices rejected the court of appeals’ holdings regarding Shabazz’s personal liability for the overpayments to TIPS, and held instead that 1) an officer of a community school is a “public official” as that term is defined in state law; and 2) the laws protecting corporate members and directors from personal liability for a corporation’s financial obligations do not protect a public official from strict liability for a loss of public funds.
Justice Pfeifer noted that R.C. 9.39 imposes the strict requirement that “(a)ll public officials are liable for all public money received or collected by them or their subordinates under color of office.” He then cited R.C. 117.01(E), which defines a “public official” as “any officer, employee, or duly authorized representative or agent of a public office.” Therefore, Justice Pfeifer wrote, “(A)n officer, employee, or duly authorized representative of a charter school is a public official only if a community school is a ‘public office.’”
“R.C. 117.01(D) defines ‘public office’ (as) ‘any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government.’ Community schools fall within the definition of public office because they are entities ‘established by the laws of this state for the exercise of [a] function of government.’”
“ ... (A)s entities ‘established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government,’ community schools are public offices pursuant to R.C. 117.01(D). In turn, an officer, employee, or duly authorized representative of a community school is a public official pursuant to R.C. 117.01(E). Under R.C. 117.01, public money received pursuant to the community school funding scheme set forth in R.C. 3314.08 would meet the R.C. 9.39 element of ‘public money received or collected ... under color of office.’ Those payments were made by the state to TIPS due to the requirements of Ohio’s community-school funding laws.”
“A factual question remains, however. In order for the state to establish Shabazz’s liability, it must show that she or her subordinates received or collected public money under color of office. Shabazz disputes that she was the treasurer of TIPS; she claims that she was the treasurer of the board of directors of TIPS. ... The label ‘treasurer’ is less important than the character of the position she held. We remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Shabazz’s responsibilities at TIPS included the receipt or collection of public money, or whether she supervised employees who received or collected public money under color of office.”
“Finally, we hold that R.C. 1702.55 offers no protection for public officials. Public officials are personally liable for public funds. Thus, R.C. 1702.55, which protects members, directors and officers of corporations from the debts of the corporation, does not protect public officials from liability for lost public funds. Liability attaches to a public official by virtue of the public office he or she holds. It is his or her own obligation to ‘account for and disburse according to law moneys that have come into his hands by virtue of his being such public officer’ ... Any liability that arises therefrom is not a corporate debt — it is the official’s own debt.”
“Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate, although for different reasons, and we remand the cause to the trial court.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray and the Ohio Dept. of Education.
Brett E. Horton, 216.589.9610, for Hasina Shabazz.
Cordray v. Internatl. Preparatory School, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6136.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91912, 2009-Ohio-2364. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Pfeifer, Acting C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6136.pdf
View oral argument video of this case.
(Dec. 20, 2010) In a 6-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an officer, employee or duly authorized agent of a community school that receives public funds under R.C. Chapter 3314 falls within the statutory definition of a “public official,” and therefore such persons may be personally liable to the state for lost or misspent public funds.
Applying that holding to a civil lawsuit in which the state is attempting to recover funds from the treasurer of a now-defunct community school in Cleveland, the Court remanded the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.
The International Preparatory School (TIPS), a nonprofit corporation, operated as a community or “charter” school located in Cleveland. Hasina Shabazz and her now-deceased husband, Da’ud Abdul Malik Shabazz, were members of the board of TIPS. As a community school, TIPS received state funding based largely upon the number of students enrolled at the school as reported by the school to the Ohio Department of Education. On Oct. 18, 2005, TIPS ceased operating as a community school. On Oct. 20, 2005, the state petitioned the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for, among other relief, a temporary restraining order and the appointment of a receiver to secure TIPS’s assets. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that same day, and appointed a receiver in January 2006.
In January 2007, the state auditor issued a report of an audit of TIPS for the period of July 1, 2004, through Oct. 18, 2005. The auditor determined that TIPS had sought and received overpayments totaling $1,407,983 from the Department of Education by submitting inflated enrollment figures for the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years. The auditor issued a finding in favor of the Department of Education against TIPS as an entity and jointly and severally against Hasina Shabazz and the estate of her husband for the amount of the overpayments.
Pursuant to state law, the state filed a complaint in common pleas court initiating a civil lawsuit to convert the auditor’s finding to a court judgment awarding the state joint and several recovery from TIPS and Shabazz for $1,407,983. In her answer to the complaint, Shabazz asserted that she was not the treasurer of the school, but treasurer only of the board of directors of the non-profit corporation that operated the school. Shabazz and the state filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Shabazz argued that two statutes shielded her from liability: R.C. 1702.55, under which “members, the directors, and the officers of a corporation shall not be personally liable for any obligation of the corporation,” and R.C. 3314.071, which states that “[n]o officer, director, or member of the governing authority of a community school incurs any personal liability by virtue of entering into any contract on behalf of the school.” The trial court found Shabazz’s reliance on the statutes misplaced, found her personally liable for the public funds at issue, and granted the state’s motion for summary judgment against her.
Shabazz appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment. The court held that Shabazz was not a “public official” under the ordinary meaning of that term, and therefore could not be held personally, strictly liable for the overpayments to TIPS. The 8th District also held that, because the school was organized as a nonprofit corporation, Shabazz as a corporate officer could be held personally liable only if the state could prove that she had breached her fiduciary duty as a director of a publicly funded corporation, or that she had committed personal wrongdoing sufficient to strip her of the protection of the state’s corporation laws. Based on those holdings, the court of appeals vacated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the state and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The state sought and was granted review of the 8th District’s decision by the Supreme Court.
In today’s unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, the Court agreed that the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In doing so, however, the Justices rejected the court of appeals’ holdings regarding Shabazz’s personal liability for the overpayments to TIPS, and held instead that 1) an officer of a community school is a “public official” as that term is defined in state law; and 2) the laws protecting corporate members and directors from personal liability for a corporation’s financial obligations do not protect a public official from strict liability for a loss of public funds.
Justice Pfeifer noted that R.C. 9.39 imposes the strict requirement that “(a)ll public officials are liable for all public money received or collected by them or their subordinates under color of office.” He then cited R.C. 117.01(E), which defines a “public official” as “any officer, employee, or duly authorized representative or agent of a public office.” Therefore, Justice Pfeifer wrote, “(A)n officer, employee, or duly authorized representative of a charter school is a public official only if a community school is a ‘public office.’”
“R.C. 117.01(D) defines ‘public office’ (as) ‘any state agency, public institution, political subdivision, other organized body, office, agency, institution, or entity established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government.’ Community schools fall within the definition of public office because they are entities ‘established by the laws of this state for the exercise of [a] function of government.’”
“ ... (A)s entities ‘established by the laws of this state for the exercise of any function of government,’ community schools are public offices pursuant to R.C. 117.01(D). In turn, an officer, employee, or duly authorized representative of a community school is a public official pursuant to R.C. 117.01(E). Under R.C. 117.01, public money received pursuant to the community school funding scheme set forth in R.C. 3314.08 would meet the R.C. 9.39 element of ‘public money received or collected ... under color of office.’ Those payments were made by the state to TIPS due to the requirements of Ohio’s community-school funding laws.”
“A factual question remains, however. In order for the state to establish Shabazz’s liability, it must show that she or her subordinates received or collected public money under color of office. Shabazz disputes that she was the treasurer of TIPS; she claims that she was the treasurer of the board of directors of TIPS. ... The label ‘treasurer’ is less important than the character of the position she held. We remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Shabazz’s responsibilities at TIPS included the receipt or collection of public money, or whether she supervised employees who received or collected public money under color of office.”
“Finally, we hold that R.C. 1702.55 offers no protection for public officials. Public officials are personally liable for public funds. Thus, R.C. 1702.55, which protects members, directors and officers of corporations from the debts of the corporation, does not protect public officials from liability for lost public funds. Liability attaches to a public official by virtue of the public office he or she holds. It is his or her own obligation to ‘account for and disburse according to law moneys that have come into his hands by virtue of his being such public officer’ ... Any liability that arises therefrom is not a corporate debt — it is the official’s own debt.”
“Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate, although for different reasons, and we remand the cause to the trial court.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray and the Ohio Dept. of Education.
Brett E. Horton, 216.589.9610, for Hasina Shabazz.
Tuesday, January 04, 2011
Valley City Woman Pleads Guilty to Theft from the Elderly
Danielle L. Telmanik, 30, of Myrtle Hill Road in Valley City, Ohio, entered a guilty plea to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth degree felony on Tuesday, January 4, 2011. After taking her guilty plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a presentence investigation and set a sentencing date of February 11, 2011. Judge Kimbler continued her bond until the date of the sentencing.
Brunswick Man Pleads Guilty to Theft
Alexander Tomovich, 36, of West 130th Street in Brunswick, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Tuesday, January 4, 2010 and entered a guilty plea to one count of Theft over $500.00, a fifth degree felony. Originally Mr. Tomovich had been indicted for one count of Breading and Entering in addition to the Theft charge. The State of Ohio agreed to dismiss the Breaking and Entering charge in exchange for a guilty plea to the Theft count.
After taking Mr. Tomovich's guilty plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a presentence investigation and set a sentencing date of February 11, 2011 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Tomovich's bond pending sentencing.
After taking Mr. Tomovich's guilty plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a presentence investigation and set a sentencing date of February 11, 2011 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Tomovich's bond pending sentencing.
Township Did Not Have Standing to Intervene in 'Single Subject' Court Challenge to Appropriations Bill
Despite Impact of Case on Township's Pending Lawsuit
Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6037.
Hamilton App. Nos. C-081097 and C-081119, 184 Ohio App.3d 135, 2009-Ohio-4888. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton and Cupp, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6037.pdf
(Dec. 16, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that: 1) a challenge to a legislative enactment under the Ohio Constitution’s “one-subject rule” is a challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact that bill, not a challenge to the statutory provisions of the bill itself; and 2) a township is not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to an enactment of the General Assembly under the one-subject rule.
Applying those holdings to a Hamilton County case, the Court ruled that, even though a township was the defendant in a pending zoning lawsuit filed by a landfill operator, the township did not have standing to intervene in a separate lawsuit filed by the same landfill operator challenging the constitutionality of state legislation that impacted townships’ zoning authority over private landfills.
The Court’s 4-3 majority decision, authored by Justice Terrence O’Donnell, affirmed a decision of the 1st District Court of Appeals.
The case involved an attempt by Rumpke Sanitary Landfill Inc., which owns and operates a solid waste landfill in Colerain Township near Cincinnati, to expand its existing facility. Rumpke and the owners of adjacent properties applied to the township trustees for a zoning change that would allow expansion of the landfill. The trustees denied the requested zoning.
Rumpke filed suit against the township in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Among other arguments, Rumpke asserted that it was a “public utility” and therefore was not subject to the township’s zoning restrictions.
While the zoning litigation remained pending, the 127th General Assembly passed and the governor signed Am. Sub. H.B. 562, an omnibus bill setting forth the state’s budget appropriations for the 2009-2010 fiscal years. In addition to making capital and other appropriations for the operation of state agencies and programs, the bill amended more than 300 sections of the Revised Code. Among those amendments, the bill made changes to R.C. 303.211 and 519.211 to specify that a privately owned solid waste facility does not fall within the definition of a “public utility” under those statutes.
On Sept. 2, 2008, before the effective date of H.B. 562, Rumpke filed a separate lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the provisions of the budget bill amending R.C. 303.211 and R.C. 519.211 were unconstitutional because they violated Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”
Colerain Township sought to intervene as an interested and necessary party in the declaratory judgment action, asserting that it had a special interest in the case because the outcome could affect the pending zoning litigation between Rumpke and the township. The state filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, asserting that Rumpke’s constitutional claim could not go forward because they had failed to join Colerain as a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action under R.C. 2721.12(A) and Civ.R. 19.
On Oct. 3, 2008, the common pleas court denied the township’s motion to intervene and the state’s motion to dismiss, and ordered that the provisions in H.B. 562 amending R.C. Sections 303.211 and 519.211 be “permanently enjoined from taking effect.” The trial court found that the provisions altering the definition of a “public utility” for zoning purposes were totally unrelated to the primary purpose of the budget bill, which was to make capital and other appropriations for the operation of state programs. On that basis, the trial court ruled that the challenged provisions were void because they violated the one-subject rule. On review, the 1st District Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Colerain’s motion to intervene, did not err in denying the state’s motion to dismiss for failure to join the township as a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action, and properly determined that the amendments to R.C. 303.211 and 519.211 violated the one-subject rule.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the legal question of whether “a township is an interested and necessary party to a constitutional challenge brought by a property owner within the township’s jurisdiction to a law passed by the General Assembly that directly affects the township’s police powers over that owner’s property and pending litigation.”
In today’s majority opinion affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, Justice O’Donnell wrote: “(W)hether a nonparty is a necessary party to a declaratory judgment action depends upon whether that nonparty has a legally protectable interest in rights that are the subject matter of the action. ... The one-subject rule ... is a constitutional limitation on the legislative power of the General Assembly. Thus, a constitutional challenge to an enactment of the General Assembly based on violation of the one-subject rule is a challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact the bill, not a challenge to the underlying statutory provisions of the bill. Because a township has no legally protectable interest in the authority of the General Assembly to enact a bill, a township is not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to the bill premised on a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, Colerain is not a necessary party to Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action.”
The Court also rejected arguments by the township that it should have been allowed to intervene in Rumpke’s declaratory judgment action pursuant to two provisions of the state’s rules of civil procedure. Justice O’Donnell wrote: “Civ.R.24(A)(2) permits intervention as of right only when an applicant has a legal interest in the action. ... Because Colerain has no legal interest in Rumpke’s action, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the township’s motion to intervene pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A).
“Civ.R. 19(A) provides that a person shall be joined as a party in an action if ‘(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.’ Because Colerain has no legal interest in the outcome of Rumpke’s challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, its absence did not prevent Rumpke or the state from being accorded complete relief in that action. Thus, the court of appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion to dismiss the case for failure to join Colerain as a necessary party pursuant to Civ.R. 19(A).”
Justice O’Donnell’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor and Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Justice Robert R. Cupp entered a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton. Justice Cupp noted that in its already-pending zoning case, Rumpke had argued that its landfill was a “public utility” within the meaning of R.C. 519.211 and therefore exempt from the township’s zoning authority, while in its declaratory judgment action Rumpke was challenging amendments to R.C. 519.211 that excluded a private landfill from the definition of a public utility.
He wrote: “Rumpke’s challenge to the township’s zoning authority in the zoning case raises a significant legal issue because, according to the township, Rumpke is only now, after 40 years of submitting to the township’s zoning resolution, asserting that it is not subject to the township’s zoning resolution. Consequently, the township’s authority to enforce its zoning resolution is squarely at issue in both the zoning case and in the intervention case. ... The presence of the same issues in both the intervention and zoning cases, and the interdependence of those issues on the two cases, substantiates the township’s legal interest in this intervention case consistently with the joinder rule of Civ.R. 19(A). ... The township has sufficiently demonstrated that its absence from the intervention case impairs its ability to protect its interest in maintaining its authority to regulate, control, and enforce land use within its boundaries. ... Permitting the township to intervene in this case would create no ‘unmanageable litigation,’ as the majority asserts. Rather, it would simply permit an entity that has a legal interest that would be affected in the proceedings to protect that interest.”
Contacts
Joseph L. Trauth Jr., 513.579.6515, for Rumpke Sanitary Landfill Inc.
Richard C. Brahm, 614.228.2030, for the Colerain Township Board of Trustees.
Craig A. Calcaterra, 614.466.2872, for the State of Ohio
Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6037.
Hamilton App. Nos. C-081097 and C-081119, 184 Ohio App.3d 135, 2009-Ohio-4888. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton and Cupp, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6037.pdf
(Dec. 16, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that: 1) a challenge to a legislative enactment under the Ohio Constitution’s “one-subject rule” is a challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact that bill, not a challenge to the statutory provisions of the bill itself; and 2) a township is not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to an enactment of the General Assembly under the one-subject rule.
Applying those holdings to a Hamilton County case, the Court ruled that, even though a township was the defendant in a pending zoning lawsuit filed by a landfill operator, the township did not have standing to intervene in a separate lawsuit filed by the same landfill operator challenging the constitutionality of state legislation that impacted townships’ zoning authority over private landfills.
The Court’s 4-3 majority decision, authored by Justice Terrence O’Donnell, affirmed a decision of the 1st District Court of Appeals.
The case involved an attempt by Rumpke Sanitary Landfill Inc., which owns and operates a solid waste landfill in Colerain Township near Cincinnati, to expand its existing facility. Rumpke and the owners of adjacent properties applied to the township trustees for a zoning change that would allow expansion of the landfill. The trustees denied the requested zoning.
Rumpke filed suit against the township in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Among other arguments, Rumpke asserted that it was a “public utility” and therefore was not subject to the township’s zoning restrictions.
While the zoning litigation remained pending, the 127th General Assembly passed and the governor signed Am. Sub. H.B. 562, an omnibus bill setting forth the state’s budget appropriations for the 2009-2010 fiscal years. In addition to making capital and other appropriations for the operation of state agencies and programs, the bill amended more than 300 sections of the Revised Code. Among those amendments, the bill made changes to R.C. 303.211 and 519.211 to specify that a privately owned solid waste facility does not fall within the definition of a “public utility” under those statutes.
On Sept. 2, 2008, before the effective date of H.B. 562, Rumpke filed a separate lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the provisions of the budget bill amending R.C. 303.211 and R.C. 519.211 were unconstitutional because they violated Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”
Colerain Township sought to intervene as an interested and necessary party in the declaratory judgment action, asserting that it had a special interest in the case because the outcome could affect the pending zoning litigation between Rumpke and the township. The state filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, asserting that Rumpke’s constitutional claim could not go forward because they had failed to join Colerain as a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action under R.C. 2721.12(A) and Civ.R. 19.
On Oct. 3, 2008, the common pleas court denied the township’s motion to intervene and the state’s motion to dismiss, and ordered that the provisions in H.B. 562 amending R.C. Sections 303.211 and 519.211 be “permanently enjoined from taking effect.” The trial court found that the provisions altering the definition of a “public utility” for zoning purposes were totally unrelated to the primary purpose of the budget bill, which was to make capital and other appropriations for the operation of state programs. On that basis, the trial court ruled that the challenged provisions were void because they violated the one-subject rule. On review, the 1st District Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Colerain’s motion to intervene, did not err in denying the state’s motion to dismiss for failure to join the township as a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action, and properly determined that the amendments to R.C. 303.211 and 519.211 violated the one-subject rule.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the legal question of whether “a township is an interested and necessary party to a constitutional challenge brought by a property owner within the township’s jurisdiction to a law passed by the General Assembly that directly affects the township’s police powers over that owner’s property and pending litigation.”
In today’s majority opinion affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, Justice O’Donnell wrote: “(W)hether a nonparty is a necessary party to a declaratory judgment action depends upon whether that nonparty has a legally protectable interest in rights that are the subject matter of the action. ... The one-subject rule ... is a constitutional limitation on the legislative power of the General Assembly. Thus, a constitutional challenge to an enactment of the General Assembly based on violation of the one-subject rule is a challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact the bill, not a challenge to the underlying statutory provisions of the bill. Because a township has no legally protectable interest in the authority of the General Assembly to enact a bill, a township is not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to the bill premised on a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, Colerain is not a necessary party to Rumpke’s declaratory-judgment action.”
The Court also rejected arguments by the township that it should have been allowed to intervene in Rumpke’s declaratory judgment action pursuant to two provisions of the state’s rules of civil procedure. Justice O’Donnell wrote: “Civ.R.24(A)(2) permits intervention as of right only when an applicant has a legal interest in the action. ... Because Colerain has no legal interest in Rumpke’s action, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the township’s motion to intervene pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A).
“Civ.R. 19(A) provides that a person shall be joined as a party in an action if ‘(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.’ Because Colerain has no legal interest in the outcome of Rumpke’s challenge to the authority of the General Assembly to enact Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, its absence did not prevent Rumpke or the state from being accorded complete relief in that action. Thus, the court of appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion to dismiss the case for failure to join Colerain as a necessary party pursuant to Civ.R. 19(A).”
Justice O’Donnell’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor and Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Justice Robert R. Cupp entered a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton. Justice Cupp noted that in its already-pending zoning case, Rumpke had argued that its landfill was a “public utility” within the meaning of R.C. 519.211 and therefore exempt from the township’s zoning authority, while in its declaratory judgment action Rumpke was challenging amendments to R.C. 519.211 that excluded a private landfill from the definition of a public utility.
He wrote: “Rumpke’s challenge to the township’s zoning authority in the zoning case raises a significant legal issue because, according to the township, Rumpke is only now, after 40 years of submitting to the township’s zoning resolution, asserting that it is not subject to the township’s zoning resolution. Consequently, the township’s authority to enforce its zoning resolution is squarely at issue in both the zoning case and in the intervention case. ... The presence of the same issues in both the intervention and zoning cases, and the interdependence of those issues on the two cases, substantiates the township’s legal interest in this intervention case consistently with the joinder rule of Civ.R. 19(A). ... The township has sufficiently demonstrated that its absence from the intervention case impairs its ability to protect its interest in maintaining its authority to regulate, control, and enforce land use within its boundaries. ... Permitting the township to intervene in this case would create no ‘unmanageable litigation,’ as the majority asserts. Rather, it would simply permit an entity that has a legal interest that would be affected in the proceedings to protect that interest.”
Contacts
Joseph L. Trauth Jr., 513.579.6515, for Rumpke Sanitary Landfill Inc.
Richard C. Brahm, 614.228.2030, for the Colerain Township Board of Trustees.
Craig A. Calcaterra, 614.466.2872, for the State of Ohio
Judge Kimbler Probation Violations for December 30, 2010
Medina County Chief Probation Officer Veronica Perry reports that the following probation violation hearings took place in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on December 30, 2010. The first line is the case number of the case; the second is the name of the probationer; the third is the name of the probation officer; the fourth line is the date; and the fifth line is the disposition.
10CR0148
Stefanko, Nathanael
B. Burcham
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - remain in MCJ and be assessed for CBCF
06CR0161
McCoy, Michael
L. Lesko
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Sentenced to 180 days MCJ w/credit for 154 days; Supervision to terminate upon release from jail; all outstanding costs waived.
07CR0454
Davis, Clark
H. Smith
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Sentenced to 6 days MCJ w/6 days credit; PV costs waived; complete Crossroads Program; no alcohol
08CR0566
Lyons, Troy
H. Smith
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Def. enters denial - Recall hearing in 90 days to see how def. is doing.
09CR0114
Simpson, Sharon
M. Liebler
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - IILOC - Convicted of underlying offense. PSI ordered. Sent. scheduled for 2/3/2011 at 8:30am. OR Bond granted.
10CR0148
Stefanko, Nathanael
B. Burcham
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - remain in MCJ and be assessed for CBCF
06CR0161
McCoy, Michael
L. Lesko
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Sentenced to 180 days MCJ w/credit for 154 days; Supervision to terminate upon release from jail; all outstanding costs waived.
07CR0454
Davis, Clark
H. Smith
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Sentenced to 6 days MCJ w/6 days credit; PV costs waived; complete Crossroads Program; no alcohol
08CR0566
Lyons, Troy
H. Smith
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - Def. enters denial - Recall hearing in 90 days to see how def. is doing.
09CR0114
Simpson, Sharon
M. Liebler
12/30/2010
PV Hearing - IILOC - Convicted of underlying offense. PSI ordered. Sent. scheduled for 2/3/2011 at 8:30am. OR Bond granted.
Intent to Use Item to Violate Federal Law Qualifies as Intent to Use 'Criminally' Under Ohio Statute
Court Holds ‘Criminal Tools’ Statute Not Limited to State Law Violations
State v Chappell, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5991.
Cuyahoga App. No. 92455, 2009-Ohio-5371. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, J., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-5991.pdf
(Dec. 15, 2010) In a decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that possession of an item with a purpose to use it to violate a federal law is sufficient to support a finding that a defendant intended to use that item “criminally” in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), Ohio’s “criminal tools” statute.
The Court’s 5-2 decision, authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor, reversed a ruling by the 8th District Court of Appeals.
The case involved Welton Chappell of Cleveland, who was indicted on two counts of criminal simulation, one count of receiving stolen property, and one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. The charges arose after police found in excess of 1,000 “bootleg” DVDs and CDs, other “sleeves,” computers, a laptop computer, and other items in Chappell’s vehicle while executing a search warrant.
The case proceeded to trial, and after granting Chappell’s motion for acquittal on the receiving-stolen-property count, the trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining counts after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Chappell subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, and the trial court dismissed all of the charges with the exception of possessing criminal tools.
Chappell then moved for a supplemental bill of particulars, requesting that the state identify the specific law or laws that Chappell intended to violate with the criminal tools. The prosecutor provided a supplemental bill of particulars specifying that the criminal conduct underlying the criminal tools charge was Chappell’s intent to violate criminal provisions of federal copyright laws.
Chappell moved to dismiss the criminal-tools count. Among other legal arguments, he asserted that only a defendant’s purpose to commit an offense defined in the Ohio Revised Code could support a finding under R.C. 2923.24(A) of intent to use materials “criminally.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the criminal tools charge, holding that because the indictment and bill of particulars alleged only an intended violation of federal law, the prosecution did not identify an underlying “criminal” act that Chappell intended to commit. On review, the 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The prosecutor sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 8th District’s decision.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice O’Connor noted that because the term “criminally” is not defined in R.C. 2923.24, the Court must determine the legislative intent underlying the statute by applying the plain and ordinary meaning of that term.
She wrote: “The term ‘criminally’ has varying definitions, including (1) according to criminal law, (2) in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law, and (3) reprehensively, disgracefully, or shamefully. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986). The most relevant of the three definitions in today’s case are ‘according to criminal law’ and ‘in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law.’ When either definition of ‘criminally’ is used in the context of possessing criminal tools under R.C. 2923.24(A), the statutory language is susceptible of only one interpretation: the ordinary meaning of ‘criminally’ is not limited to violations of Ohio law and plainly encompasses violations of any law, including offenses defined under Ohio law and federal law.”
“If the legislature had intended the narrow view advocated by Chappell, it could have so provided in R.C. 2923.24 by expressly stating that the tools must be possessed with the purpose to use them ‘in violation of Ohio law’ or ‘criminally in violation of Ohio law’ or ‘in violation of a criminal offense against the state.’ But the General Assembly did not do so. Because the language set forth by the General Assembly is clear and definite, we must apply it as written and hold that ‘criminally,’ as it is used in R.C. 2923.24, encompasses violations of all law, including federal law.”
“ ... (W)e hold that, in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘criminally,’ as the term is used in R.C. 2923.24(A), the purpose to use an item criminally can arise from an intended violation of federal law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this court’s opinion.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Chief Justice Eric Brown entered a dissent, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, stating that in his view the majority’s holding is contrary to unambiguous language in R.C. 2901.03(A) stating that “[n]o conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code.”
The Chief Justice wrote: “[T]he majority attempts to use R.C. 2901.04(D) to expand the definition of a crime to include violations of existing or former laws of this state, other states, the United States, and municipalities. Such an interpretation renders the actual language of R.C. 2901.03(A) meaningless and thwarts the clearly expressed intent of the General Assembly.”
Contacts
Thorin Freeman, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office.
Joseph T. McGinness, 216.525.0553, for Welton Chappell.
State v Chappell, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5991.
Cuyahoga App. No. 92455, 2009-Ohio-5371. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, J., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-5991.pdf
(Dec. 15, 2010) In a decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that possession of an item with a purpose to use it to violate a federal law is sufficient to support a finding that a defendant intended to use that item “criminally” in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), Ohio’s “criminal tools” statute.
The Court’s 5-2 decision, authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor, reversed a ruling by the 8th District Court of Appeals.
The case involved Welton Chappell of Cleveland, who was indicted on two counts of criminal simulation, one count of receiving stolen property, and one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24. The charges arose after police found in excess of 1,000 “bootleg” DVDs and CDs, other “sleeves,” computers, a laptop computer, and other items in Chappell’s vehicle while executing a search warrant.
The case proceeded to trial, and after granting Chappell’s motion for acquittal on the receiving-stolen-property count, the trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining counts after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Chappell subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, and the trial court dismissed all of the charges with the exception of possessing criminal tools.
Chappell then moved for a supplemental bill of particulars, requesting that the state identify the specific law or laws that Chappell intended to violate with the criminal tools. The prosecutor provided a supplemental bill of particulars specifying that the criminal conduct underlying the criminal tools charge was Chappell’s intent to violate criminal provisions of federal copyright laws.
Chappell moved to dismiss the criminal-tools count. Among other legal arguments, he asserted that only a defendant’s purpose to commit an offense defined in the Ohio Revised Code could support a finding under R.C. 2923.24(A) of intent to use materials “criminally.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the criminal tools charge, holding that because the indictment and bill of particulars alleged only an intended violation of federal law, the prosecution did not identify an underlying “criminal” act that Chappell intended to commit. On review, the 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The prosecutor sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 8th District’s decision.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice O’Connor noted that because the term “criminally” is not defined in R.C. 2923.24, the Court must determine the legislative intent underlying the statute by applying the plain and ordinary meaning of that term.
She wrote: “The term ‘criminally’ has varying definitions, including (1) according to criminal law, (2) in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law, and (3) reprehensively, disgracefully, or shamefully. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986). The most relevant of the three definitions in today’s case are ‘according to criminal law’ and ‘in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law.’ When either definition of ‘criminally’ is used in the context of possessing criminal tools under R.C. 2923.24(A), the statutory language is susceptible of only one interpretation: the ordinary meaning of ‘criminally’ is not limited to violations of Ohio law and plainly encompasses violations of any law, including offenses defined under Ohio law and federal law.”
“If the legislature had intended the narrow view advocated by Chappell, it could have so provided in R.C. 2923.24 by expressly stating that the tools must be possessed with the purpose to use them ‘in violation of Ohio law’ or ‘criminally in violation of Ohio law’ or ‘in violation of a criminal offense against the state.’ But the General Assembly did not do so. Because the language set forth by the General Assembly is clear and definite, we must apply it as written and hold that ‘criminally,’ as it is used in R.C. 2923.24, encompasses violations of all law, including federal law.”
“ ... (W)e hold that, in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘criminally,’ as the term is used in R.C. 2923.24(A), the purpose to use an item criminally can arise from an intended violation of federal law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this court’s opinion.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Chief Justice Eric Brown entered a dissent, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, stating that in his view the majority’s holding is contrary to unambiguous language in R.C. 2901.03(A) stating that “[n]o conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code.”
The Chief Justice wrote: “[T]he majority attempts to use R.C. 2901.04(D) to expand the definition of a crime to include violations of existing or former laws of this state, other states, the United States, and municipalities. Such an interpretation renders the actual language of R.C. 2901.03(A) meaningless and thwarts the clearly expressed intent of the General Assembly.”
Contacts
Thorin Freeman, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office.
Joseph T. McGinness, 216.525.0553, for Welton Chappell.
Court Upholds Most of Medical Board's Redactions from Requested Public Records
Requests for Statutory Damages, Attorney Fees Denied
State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Medical Bd. of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5995.
In Mandamus. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-5995.pdf
(Dec. 15, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio today partially granted and partially denied a writ of mandamus directing the State Medical Board to provide unredacted copies of some of the public records requested by Dr. Mahendra K. Mahajan, a Dayton psychiatrist, relating to a board investigation of Dr. Mahajan.
In a 7-0 per curiam opinion, the Court noted that the medical board provided more than 8,000 pages and several CDs of documents in response to Dr. Mahajan’s records request, and found that all but a handful of the redactions the board had made in documents it provided to Dr. Mahajan were required by law or authorized by exceptions to disclosure in the state’s Public Records Act.
The mandamus action arose from a May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan conducted by one of the medical board’s enforcement attorneys, David Katko. Following that deposition, Dr. Mahajan’s attorney sent a letter to the board’s director complaining that Katko’s conduct during the deposition had been “rude, unprofessional, threatening, and intimidating.”
Following a January 2009 hearing on the disciplinary charges filed against Dr. Mahajan, he requested copies of certain records, including the board’s personnel file for Katko. After the board had provided thousands of pages of documents in response to his initial request, Dr. Mahajan submitted a supplemental request specifically seeking any records received or created by board members or management-level personnel related to Katko’s May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan, and any similar incidents involving Katko.
The board forwarded copies of additional records responsive to the new request. Portions of seven of the documents had been redacted (blacked out or otherwise rendered unreadable). With regard to each of these documents, the board provided a written explanation of its reasons for the redactions. Dr. Mahajan objected to some of the redactions and asked the board to reconsider and provide him with unredacted copies of all of the documents. The board declined to do so, reiterating its prior reasons. Dr. Mahajan then filed an original action in mandamus, asking the Supreme Court to issue a writ requiring the board to provide unredacted copies of the specified documents.
In today’s decision, the Court found that, with very limited exceptions, the board’s redactions from the seven documents sought by Mahajan were proper under various exceptions to the Public Records Act, including exclusions for law enforcement investigatory records, board investigatory records, confidential employee medical records, and confidential board work product including assessments of evidence and discussions of investigative strategy.
The Court identified as error the medical board’s redaction of a an explanatory email sent by Katko to his supervisor on May 17, 2007 discussing Katko’s actions during the May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan. The Court held that the email was not exempt from disclosure as an investigative record because it addressed Katko’s conduct rather than any substantive content of the Mahajan investigation. The Court also found that the board erred by redacting Mahajan’s own name from several documents, on the basis that Mahajan had waived the confidentiality of that information when he initiated the public records request.
The Court concluded: “‘The Public Records Act serves a laudable purpose by ensuring that governmental functions are not conducted behind a shroud of secrecy. However, even in a society where an open government is considered essential to maintaining a properly functioning democracy, not every iota of information is subject to public scrutiny. Certain safeguards are necessary.’ ... The General Assembly has provided these safeguards by balancing competing concerns and providing for certain exemptions from the release of public records pursuant to R.C. 149.43. ... The state medical board has met its burden for establishing the applicability of several of these exemptions. The board acted diligently and appropriately in the vast majority of its redactions to the requested records.”
“Other redactions were not covered by an exemption. Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to provide access to an unredacted copy of the May 17, 2007 e-mail, the portions of the May 22, 2007 notes that refer to Mahajan’s name and Katko’s prior deposition of him, and the parts of the May 31, 2007 memorandum and June 2007 e-mails that note Mahajan’s name. In all other respects, we deny the writ. We also deny relator’s request for statutory damages, attorney fees, and oral argument.”
Contacts
Nicholas E. Subashi, 937.427.8800, for Dr. Mahendra K. Mahajan.
Katherine J. Bockbrader, 614.466.8600, for the State Medical Board of Ohio
State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Medical Bd. of Ohio, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5995.
In Mandamus. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-5995.pdf
(Dec. 15, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio today partially granted and partially denied a writ of mandamus directing the State Medical Board to provide unredacted copies of some of the public records requested by Dr. Mahendra K. Mahajan, a Dayton psychiatrist, relating to a board investigation of Dr. Mahajan.
In a 7-0 per curiam opinion, the Court noted that the medical board provided more than 8,000 pages and several CDs of documents in response to Dr. Mahajan’s records request, and found that all but a handful of the redactions the board had made in documents it provided to Dr. Mahajan were required by law or authorized by exceptions to disclosure in the state’s Public Records Act.
The mandamus action arose from a May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan conducted by one of the medical board’s enforcement attorneys, David Katko. Following that deposition, Dr. Mahajan’s attorney sent a letter to the board’s director complaining that Katko’s conduct during the deposition had been “rude, unprofessional, threatening, and intimidating.”
Following a January 2009 hearing on the disciplinary charges filed against Dr. Mahajan, he requested copies of certain records, including the board’s personnel file for Katko. After the board had provided thousands of pages of documents in response to his initial request, Dr. Mahajan submitted a supplemental request specifically seeking any records received or created by board members or management-level personnel related to Katko’s May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan, and any similar incidents involving Katko.
The board forwarded copies of additional records responsive to the new request. Portions of seven of the documents had been redacted (blacked out or otherwise rendered unreadable). With regard to each of these documents, the board provided a written explanation of its reasons for the redactions. Dr. Mahajan objected to some of the redactions and asked the board to reconsider and provide him with unredacted copies of all of the documents. The board declined to do so, reiterating its prior reasons. Dr. Mahajan then filed an original action in mandamus, asking the Supreme Court to issue a writ requiring the board to provide unredacted copies of the specified documents.
In today’s decision, the Court found that, with very limited exceptions, the board’s redactions from the seven documents sought by Mahajan were proper under various exceptions to the Public Records Act, including exclusions for law enforcement investigatory records, board investigatory records, confidential employee medical records, and confidential board work product including assessments of evidence and discussions of investigative strategy.
The Court identified as error the medical board’s redaction of a an explanatory email sent by Katko to his supervisor on May 17, 2007 discussing Katko’s actions during the May 2007 deposition of Dr. Mahajan. The Court held that the email was not exempt from disclosure as an investigative record because it addressed Katko’s conduct rather than any substantive content of the Mahajan investigation. The Court also found that the board erred by redacting Mahajan’s own name from several documents, on the basis that Mahajan had waived the confidentiality of that information when he initiated the public records request.
The Court concluded: “‘The Public Records Act serves a laudable purpose by ensuring that governmental functions are not conducted behind a shroud of secrecy. However, even in a society where an open government is considered essential to maintaining a properly functioning democracy, not every iota of information is subject to public scrutiny. Certain safeguards are necessary.’ ... The General Assembly has provided these safeguards by balancing competing concerns and providing for certain exemptions from the release of public records pursuant to R.C. 149.43. ... The state medical board has met its burden for establishing the applicability of several of these exemptions. The board acted diligently and appropriately in the vast majority of its redactions to the requested records.”
“Other redactions were not covered by an exemption. Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to provide access to an unredacted copy of the May 17, 2007 e-mail, the portions of the May 22, 2007 notes that refer to Mahajan’s name and Katko’s prior deposition of him, and the parts of the May 31, 2007 memorandum and June 2007 e-mails that note Mahajan’s name. In all other respects, we deny the writ. We also deny relator’s request for statutory damages, attorney fees, and oral argument.”
Contacts
Nicholas E. Subashi, 937.427.8800, for Dr. Mahendra K. Mahajan.
Katherine J. Bockbrader, 614.466.8600, for the State Medical Board of Ohio
Public Swearing-In Ceremonies for Chief Justice, Justices Scheduled for Early January
Swearing-in ceremonies involving three returning and one incoming member of the Supreme Court of Ohio will occur in early January. Here are the details.
Justice Maureen O’Connor will be sworn in as the first woman Chief Justice in Ohio history at a public ceremony on Friday, Jan. 7, 2011, at 3 p.m. The oath of office will be administered at the Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH, where there will be a reception immediately following the ceremony.
Former Judge Yvette McGee Brown will be sworn in as the first African-American woman Justice in Ohio history at a public ceremony on Saturday, Jan. 8, 2011, at 2 p.m. The oath of office will be administered at The King Arts Complex, 867 Mt. Vernon Ave., Columbus, OH, where there will be a reception immediately following the ceremony.
Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Judith Ann Lanzinger will be sworn in at a joint public ceremony in the Ohio Judicial Center on Tuesday, Jan. 18, 2011, at 3 p.m. with a reception to follow.
These events are open to the public. Seating is limited. Please RSVP by emailing events@sc.ohio.gov or calling 614.387.9250.
What: O’Connor Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 3 p.m., Jan. 7, 2011
Where: Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215
What: McGee Brown Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 2 p.m., Jan. 8, 2011
Where: The King Arts Complex, 867 Mt. Vernon Ave., Columbus, OH 43203
What: Pfeifer/Lanzinger Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 3 p.m., Jan. 18, 2011
Where: Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215
The ceremonies will be broadcast live at www.supremecourtofohio.gov. The ceremonies held at the Ohio Judicial Center (Chief Justice-elect O’Connor on Jan. 7 and Justices Pfeifer and Lanzinger on Jan. 18) will be carried live on cable television via The Ohio Channel. The McGee Brown event will be carried on the Ohio Channel by tape delay. Visit www.ohiochannel.org for channels and rebroadcast times.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250
Justice Maureen O’Connor will be sworn in as the first woman Chief Justice in Ohio history at a public ceremony on Friday, Jan. 7, 2011, at 3 p.m. The oath of office will be administered at the Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH, where there will be a reception immediately following the ceremony.
Former Judge Yvette McGee Brown will be sworn in as the first African-American woman Justice in Ohio history at a public ceremony on Saturday, Jan. 8, 2011, at 2 p.m. The oath of office will be administered at The King Arts Complex, 867 Mt. Vernon Ave., Columbus, OH, where there will be a reception immediately following the ceremony.
Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Judith Ann Lanzinger will be sworn in at a joint public ceremony in the Ohio Judicial Center on Tuesday, Jan. 18, 2011, at 3 p.m. with a reception to follow.
These events are open to the public. Seating is limited. Please RSVP by emailing events@sc.ohio.gov or calling 614.387.9250.
What: O’Connor Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 3 p.m., Jan. 7, 2011
Where: Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215
What: McGee Brown Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 2 p.m., Jan. 8, 2011
Where: The King Arts Complex, 867 Mt. Vernon Ave., Columbus, OH 43203
What: Pfeifer/Lanzinger Swearing-In Ceremony
When: 3 p.m., Jan. 18, 2011
Where: Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215
The ceremonies will be broadcast live at www.supremecourtofohio.gov. The ceremonies held at the Ohio Judicial Center (Chief Justice-elect O’Connor on Jan. 7 and Justices Pfeifer and Lanzinger on Jan. 18) will be carried live on cable television via The Ohio Channel. The McGee Brown event will be carried on the Ohio Channel by tape delay. Visit www.ohiochannel.org for channels and rebroadcast times.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250
Disciplinary Case Schedule for January
The following schedule of cases is set for hearings by the Supreme Court’s Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline in January. All hearings take place before a three-judge panel of the board and are open to the public. The hearings involve an individual attorney or judge who is charged with professional misconduct.
Hearings may be continued for good cause at any time. Interested persons should contact the board’s office at 614.387.9370 for more information about a case and to confirm that the hearing will be held as scheduled.
Members of the media seeking more information about a particular case may review the public file at the board’s office on the fifth floor of the Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215-3431.
Jan. 7
Geauga County Bar Association, Relator v. James G. Corrigan, Respondent
Case No. 10-034
Respondent’s address: 3134 Somerset Drive, Shaker Heights
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ninth District Court of Appeals, 161 S. High St., fifth floor, Akron
Jan. 10
Mahoning County Bar Association, Relator v. Brian P. Kish, Respondent
Case No. 10-020
Respondent’s address: 3202 Sunnybrook Drive, Youngstown
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 12
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Jeffrey R. Dundon, Respondent
Case No. 10-067
Respondent's address: 1783 Sandy Court, Springboro
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 13
Mahoning County Bar Association, Relator v. Warren "Bo" Pritchard, Respondent
Case No. 10-025
Respondent's address: 19 E. Front St., Youngstown
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, West Hearing Room 104
Jan. 13 & 14
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Nicholas M. Gallo, Respondent
Case No. 09-087
Respondent's address: 1633 Pleasantdale Road, Apt. 10, Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 14
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Jason T. Lorenzon, Respondent
Case No. 10-044
Respondent's address: 3150 Chester Ave., Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, West Hearing Room 104
Jan. 21
Disciplinary Counsel v. Edward R. Bunstine, Respondent
Case No. 10-065
Respondent's address: 32 S. Paint St., Chillicothe
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 26
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Gordon P. Shuler, Respondent
Case No. 10-077
Respondent's address: 3735 Carroll Southern Road, Carroll
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 27 & 28
Ohio State Bar Association, Relator v. Oscar Trivers, Respondent
Case No. 10-008
Respondent's address: 8608 Quincy Ave., Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Contact: Jon Marshall at 614.387.9370 or Chris Davey at 614.387.9250.
Hearings may be continued for good cause at any time. Interested persons should contact the board’s office at 614.387.9370 for more information about a case and to confirm that the hearing will be held as scheduled.
Members of the media seeking more information about a particular case may review the public file at the board’s office on the fifth floor of the Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215-3431.
Jan. 7
Geauga County Bar Association, Relator v. James G. Corrigan, Respondent
Case No. 10-034
Respondent’s address: 3134 Somerset Drive, Shaker Heights
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ninth District Court of Appeals, 161 S. High St., fifth floor, Akron
Jan. 10
Mahoning County Bar Association, Relator v. Brian P. Kish, Respondent
Case No. 10-020
Respondent’s address: 3202 Sunnybrook Drive, Youngstown
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 12
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Jeffrey R. Dundon, Respondent
Case No. 10-067
Respondent's address: 1783 Sandy Court, Springboro
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 13
Mahoning County Bar Association, Relator v. Warren "Bo" Pritchard, Respondent
Case No. 10-025
Respondent's address: 19 E. Front St., Youngstown
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, West Hearing Room 104
Jan. 13 & 14
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Nicholas M. Gallo, Respondent
Case No. 09-087
Respondent's address: 1633 Pleasantdale Road, Apt. 10, Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 14
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Jason T. Lorenzon, Respondent
Case No. 10-044
Respondent's address: 3150 Chester Ave., Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, West Hearing Room 104
Jan. 21
Disciplinary Counsel v. Edward R. Bunstine, Respondent
Case No. 10-065
Respondent's address: 32 S. Paint St., Chillicothe
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 26
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Gordon P. Shuler, Respondent
Case No. 10-077
Respondent's address: 3735 Carroll Southern Road, Carroll
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Jan. 27 & 28
Ohio State Bar Association, Relator v. Oscar Trivers, Respondent
Case No. 10-008
Respondent's address: 8608 Quincy Ave., Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Contact: Jon Marshall at 614.387.9370 or Chris Davey at 614.387.9250.
Governor Announces Appointments to 11 Judicial Vacancies
Outgoing Chief Justice Eric Brown has been appointed by Ohio Governor Ted Strickland to fill a vacant seat on the Franklin County Municipal Court. Brown was defeated for election to the office of Chief Justice by Justice Maureen O’Connor, who will begin the six-year term Jan. 1.
Brown’s appointment to the municipal court was one of 11 appointments announced by the governor today to fill judicial vacancies on courts in Clermont, Franklin, Lucas, Madison, Montgomery, Paulding and Putnam counties, and in the cities of Cleveland, Dayton and Sidney.
“It has been an honor and a privilege serving on the Supreme Court of Ohio,” Chief Justice Brown said. “I am grateful that Governor Strickland has given me an opportunity to continue to serve as a judge and to apply my legal experience in my local community. I look forward to working with the wonderful judges and staff of the Franklin County Municipal Court.”
Chief Justice Elect O’Connor said that she and her colleagues wish Chief Justice Brown well in his new position. “On behalf of the Court, I congratulate Chief Justice Brown on his appointment and wish him all the best in his future pursuits,” she said.
Other appointments announced today were:
Clermont County Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Kenneth Zuk to fill the vacancy on the Clermont County Municipal Court created by the election of Judge Thomas R. Herman to the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas. Zuk, a current Common Pleas Court judge and a former solo practitioner and assistant public defender, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Cleveland Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Lynn McLaughlin Murray to fill the vacancy on the Cleveland Municipal Court created by the election of Judge Kathleen Ann Keough to the 8th District Court of Appeals. Murray, a magistrate with the Cleveland Municipal Court and a former assistant director of law with the City of Cleveland Tax Division, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Dayton Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Christopher Roberts to fill the vacancy on the Dayton Municipal Court created by the death of Judge Dennis Greaney. Roberts, a magistrate for the Dayton Municipal Court and a former general practice attorney, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Lucas County Common Pleas Court
Governor Strickland appointed Myron Duhart to fill the vacancy on the Lucas County Common Pleas Court created by the December 17 resignation of Judge Charles J. Doneghy. Duhart, a general practice attorney and a small business owner, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Madison County Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Eric Schooley to fill the vacancy on the Madison County Municipal Court created by the announced resignation of Judge R. David Picken. Schooley, a private practice attorney with an emphasis on litigation and criminal law matters, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division
Governor Strickland appointed Timothy Wood to fill the vacancy on the Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division created by the resignation of Judge Judith A. King, effective December 31. Wood, a magistrate for the Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division and former managing attorney at Hyatt Legal Services specializing in domestic relations and bankruptcy, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Montgomery County Common Pleas, General Division
Governor Strickland appointed Steven Dankof to fill the vacancy on the Montgomery County Common Pleas, General Division created by the resignation of Judge AJ Wagner, effective Dec. 31. Dankof, a private practice attorney specializing in civil and criminal litigation, would take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011. In a letter dated Dec. 30, Judge Wagner has indicated that he now intends not to retire.
Paulding County Court
Governor Strickland appointed Suzanne Shuman Rister to fill the vacancy on the Paulding County Court created by the election of Judge Tiffany Beckman to the Paulding County Common Pleas Court. Rister, a private practice attorney, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2010.
Putnam County Common Pleas, Probate and Juvenile Division
Governor Strickland appointed Michael A. Borer to fill the vacancy on the Putnam County Common Pleas, Probate and Juvenile Division created by the resignation of Judge Daniel Gerschutz, effective Dec. 31. Borer, a private practice attorney and village solicitor for Leipsic, Pandora, Cloverdale, Dupont and Miller City, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Sidney Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Duane Goettemoeller to fill the vacancy on the Sidney Municipal Court created by the resignation of Judge Donald G. Luce, effective Dec. 31. Goettemoeller, a private practice attorney and an assistant prosecuting attorney in Shelby County, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250
Brown’s appointment to the municipal court was one of 11 appointments announced by the governor today to fill judicial vacancies on courts in Clermont, Franklin, Lucas, Madison, Montgomery, Paulding and Putnam counties, and in the cities of Cleveland, Dayton and Sidney.
“It has been an honor and a privilege serving on the Supreme Court of Ohio,” Chief Justice Brown said. “I am grateful that Governor Strickland has given me an opportunity to continue to serve as a judge and to apply my legal experience in my local community. I look forward to working with the wonderful judges and staff of the Franklin County Municipal Court.”
Chief Justice Elect O’Connor said that she and her colleagues wish Chief Justice Brown well in his new position. “On behalf of the Court, I congratulate Chief Justice Brown on his appointment and wish him all the best in his future pursuits,” she said.
Other appointments announced today were:
Clermont County Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Kenneth Zuk to fill the vacancy on the Clermont County Municipal Court created by the election of Judge Thomas R. Herman to the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas. Zuk, a current Common Pleas Court judge and a former solo practitioner and assistant public defender, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Cleveland Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Lynn McLaughlin Murray to fill the vacancy on the Cleveland Municipal Court created by the election of Judge Kathleen Ann Keough to the 8th District Court of Appeals. Murray, a magistrate with the Cleveland Municipal Court and a former assistant director of law with the City of Cleveland Tax Division, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Dayton Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Christopher Roberts to fill the vacancy on the Dayton Municipal Court created by the death of Judge Dennis Greaney. Roberts, a magistrate for the Dayton Municipal Court and a former general practice attorney, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Lucas County Common Pleas Court
Governor Strickland appointed Myron Duhart to fill the vacancy on the Lucas County Common Pleas Court created by the December 17 resignation of Judge Charles J. Doneghy. Duhart, a general practice attorney and a small business owner, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Madison County Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Eric Schooley to fill the vacancy on the Madison County Municipal Court created by the announced resignation of Judge R. David Picken. Schooley, a private practice attorney with an emphasis on litigation and criminal law matters, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division
Governor Strickland appointed Timothy Wood to fill the vacancy on the Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division created by the resignation of Judge Judith A. King, effective December 31. Wood, a magistrate for the Montgomery County Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division and former managing attorney at Hyatt Legal Services specializing in domestic relations and bankruptcy, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Montgomery County Common Pleas, General Division
Governor Strickland appointed Steven Dankof to fill the vacancy on the Montgomery County Common Pleas, General Division created by the resignation of Judge AJ Wagner, effective Dec. 31. Dankof, a private practice attorney specializing in civil and criminal litigation, would take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011. In a letter dated Dec. 30, Judge Wagner has indicated that he now intends not to retire.
Paulding County Court
Governor Strickland appointed Suzanne Shuman Rister to fill the vacancy on the Paulding County Court created by the election of Judge Tiffany Beckman to the Paulding County Common Pleas Court. Rister, a private practice attorney, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2010.
Putnam County Common Pleas, Probate and Juvenile Division
Governor Strickland appointed Michael A. Borer to fill the vacancy on the Putnam County Common Pleas, Probate and Juvenile Division created by the resignation of Judge Daniel Gerschutz, effective Dec. 31. Borer, a private practice attorney and village solicitor for Leipsic, Pandora, Cloverdale, Dupont and Miller City, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Sidney Municipal Court
Governor Strickland appointed Duane Goettemoeller to fill the vacancy on the Sidney Municipal Court created by the resignation of Judge Donald G. Luce, effective Dec. 31. Goettemoeller, a private practice attorney and an assistant prosecuting attorney in Shelby County, will take the bench effective Jan. 7, 2011.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250
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