Summit County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

State v. Furman, 2014-Ohio-20 affirmed Ms. Furman's conviction for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery by the Summit County Common Pleas Court. That court sentenced her to 18 years in prison, nine years on each count. In an earlier appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District ordered a new sentencing hearing so that the trial court could consider whether the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import under a State v. Johnson analysis. The trial conducted such an analysis and found that the offenses were not allied offenses under State v. Johnson and re-sentenced Ms. Furman to 18 years in prison. 

Ms. Furman raised two issues on appeal. The first issue was whether the trial court erred in determining the two offenses were not allied offenses. The second was whether the trial court erred in not giving her a minimum sentence. In both cases the appellate court found that the failure to enter the presentence investigation report into the record meant that the appellate court could not review the sentence and therefore has to presume regularity. Such a presumption meant that the trial court would be affirmed. 

State v. Nichols, 2014-Ohio-102 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying Nichols's motion for post-conviction relief. The appellate court found that he had not established that he was entitled to the relief and therefore affirmed the denial of his petition. 

State v. Rogers, 2014-Ohio-103 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court convicting Rodgers of a drug offense. Rodgers challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying him motion to suppress. He argued that the officer who arrested him did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was committing an offense. He also argued that the trial court relied on facts that were not proved by the hearing. 

In denying Rodger's assignment of error the appellate court noted that Rodgers was operating a motor vehicle with restricted license plates; that he was behind the wheel of a car in a high-crime area; that the car was idling; and that when he asked Rodgers about the restricted operator's license, Rodgers could not verify that he was operating the car for work-related purposes. While the appellate court said that the mere fact that a car has restricted license plates does not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable suspicion, in this case there were other corroborating factors. Therefore the conviction was affirmed. 

Haley v. Nomad Preservation, Inc., 2014-Ohio-181 affirmed a two decisions of the Summit County Common Pleas Court. In one decision the trial court had granted judgment to a defendant after converting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12 (B) into a motion for summary judgment so that it could consider evidence. In the other decision the trial court had granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the moving defendant. 

Haley argued that the trial court erred in considering material outside of the four corners of the motion which, in effect, converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In rejecting this argument the appellate court wrote the following: "Not only had the trial court considered other evidence the first time it ruled on the motion, this Court explained in its decision that it was proper for the trial court to consider other evidence so long as notice was given. In light of the procedural history of this particular case, we cannot say that the trial court’s consideration of Mr. Ayache’s affidavit was unexpected or that Mr. Haley did not have an adequate opportunity to oppose the evidence." 

The appellate court also found that granting the motion for dismissal because of a lack of personal jurisdiction was also proper. Haley argued that the defendant filing the motion had acted untimely. In rejecting this argument the appellate court wrote the following: "Mr. Haley has not cited any authority suggesting that a party forfeits his right to move to vacate a judgment that was rendered without personal jurisdiction merely because of the passage of time. See Civ.R. 12(H)(1) (setting out specific conditions under which a party waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person); Timekeeping Sys., Inc. v. Safety Protection Universal Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99714, 2013-Ohio-3919, ¶ 12."

State v. McDaniel, 2014-Ohio-183 affirmed Mr. McDaniel's convictions for murder and felonious assault. McDaniel argued that the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import and that the State should have been made to elect the offense for which it wanted McDaniel sentenced. The Court of Appeals rejected this assignment of error. It found that under the analysis dictated by State v. Johnson the two offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. 

Ramoso v. Ramoso, 2014-Ohio-28 overruled the assignment of error brought by Mrs. Ramoso. She argued that the Summit County Domestic Relations Court erred by dismissing her objections to a magistrate's decision without a hearing. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument noting that she did not file a transcript with the objections. It pointed out that Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) requires such a transcript and failure to file one allowed the trial court to dismiss the objections. 

State v. Reeves, 2014-Ohio-282 affirmed the conviction of Mr. Reeves for possession of heroin and affirmed the forfeiture of money claimed to be proceeds from the felony drug offense. It also affirmed his conviction for having weapons while under a disability. 

Reeves raised three assignments of error. The first was that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The second was that the guilty verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The third was that the trial court did not require the State to produce evidence that the order of forfeiture was proportional to the offense. All three assignments of error were overruled. In overruling the third assignment of error the appellate court noted that the law does not require a proportionality review when the property being forfeited is money derived from the offense.   

Lorain County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

State v. Powell, 2014-Ohio-63 affirmed Mr. Powell's conviction for one count of rape. Powell argued on appeal that the verdict, which came after a bench trial, was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Both assignments of error were rejected. 

State v. Thomas, 2014-Ohio-64 affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court denying his motion to "correct" a void decision of that court. Thomas argued that his conviction of aggravated murder was defective because the determination of his guilt wasn't made by a three judge panel. 

The appellate court pointed out that failure to have a three judge panel doesn't deprive a common pleas court of subject matter jurisdiction. If a common pleas court has erred in not having a three judge panel hear a defendant's case, that error must be brought up on a direct appeal, not in a post-conviction proceeding or in a motion for relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. 

Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Haupt, 2014-Ohio-348 reversed a decision by the Lorain County Common Pleas Court granting judgment to Third Federal Savings & Loan. Ms. Haupt argued that she had not been served a copy of the magistrate's decision and therefore didn't have the opportunity to file objections to the decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with her contention. There was also an interesting issue regarding whether the appeal was timely. By a 2-1 decision the Court of Appeals found that it was timely. The dissent believed that the appeal was not timely.  

Wayne County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

PNC Bank, Natl. Assn. v. West, 2014-Ohio-161 overruled the granting of a motion for summary judgment to the plaintiff by the Wayne County Common Pleas Court. The appellate court found that the "evidence" offered in support of the motion for summary judgment and was intended to establish that the bank had standing to bring the action wasn't admissible under Ohio's Rules of Evidence. Therefore the summary judgment was reversed and the cause remanded back to the trial court. 

State v. Raber, 2014-Ohio-249 affirmed an order of the Wayne County Common Pleas Court denying Mr. Raber's motion to expunge his record or seal his conviction. The basis for the trial court's ruling was that a conviction for the offense of sexual imposition, a third degree misdemeanor, is not one that can be expunged or sealed. The appellate court agreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. 

Medina County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

U.S. Bank v. Cooper, 2014-Ohio-61 reversed and remanded the case to the Medina County Common Pleas Court with instructions that the case was to be dismissed. The Coopers had filed a motion to set aside a default judgment that was granted to U.S. Bank by the Medina County Common Pleas Court. 

The trial court denied the Rule 60 (B) motion because the Coopers did not meet the requirements of GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976). In reversing the decision of the trial court the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Coopers were not required to file a motion under Rule 60 (B) because if the bank never had standing to bring the lawsuit then the judgment was void and not just voidable. Since it was void the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss. 

State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-62 affirmed Johnson's conviction for two counts of felonious assault and one count of breaking and entering. Johnson argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not giving the "castle doctrine" instruction and in answering questions posed by the jury. 

With respect to the "castle doctrine" Johnson argued that the instruction should have been given because Johnson was in his car and pursuant to R.C. 2901.09(B).  The trial court concluded that the defense wasn't available because under Johnson's version of events he was not in the car when he assaulted the victims. The appellate court found that it could not find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the instruction and so denied the appeal on that basis. 

With regard to the second assignment of error the appellate court found that Johnson's counsel had agreed to the instruction as given by the trial court. Therefore the assignment was reviewed under a plain error analysis. Under that standard the assignment of error overruled. 

Johnson also alleged that his attorney was ineffective in representing him a trial. The Court of Appeals also rejected that argument.