by Kate Feeks
The television show Law Talk hosted by John Celebrezze, Co-Founder of The Celebrezze/Zanghi Community Legal Education Program Inc., or CZ CLEP, is now available on Armstrong cable channel 4.
Law Talk is a function of CZ CLEP which is dedicated to legal education. For the past 2 years Law Talk has been aired on public broadcast stations across Medina County and now can also be viewed on another station - cable channel 4.
Mr. Celebrezze will be interviewing local judges on specific areas of interest in their courts. Some of the judges to watch for include: Judge James Kimbler of the Medina County Common Pleas Court on the topic of foreclosures, Judge Dale Chase of the Medina Municipal Court on his probation department as well as DUI convictions in his court, Judge Mary Kovack of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division on the workings the domestic relations court and the areas of family law that it handles, Judge Steve McIvaine of the Wadsworth Municipal Court on the programs his court uses to educate teens about underage drinking, and Judge Christopher Collier of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas on his Drug Court as a solution for defendants on how to find a way to get off drugs.
Watch for the show Law Talk on your local Armstrong cable channel 4 on Monday and Friday at 9:30am, Tuesday and Thursday 7:00pm, and Wednesday at 1:00pm.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
From the Archives of the Medina County Clerk of Courts
Medina County Clerk of Courts Kathy Fortney was kind enough to share with me some of the files she has in her archives. One thing that I didn't know was that the Clerk's office used to file documents relating to the naturalization of immigrants. A person living in Medina County wishing to become an American citizen would file a Declaration of Intent in the Clerk's office.
An image of one such Declaration of Intent appears below. It involves a Mr. Walter Vellenoweth who, in 1930, lived on Gordon Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio. He was married and had come to the United States from England. At the time he immigrated to America, he was 24 years old, if I have done correctly done the math. His wife was named Ruth and, at the time of his Declaration, they did not have any children. The application appears below:
An image of one such Declaration of Intent appears below. It involves a Mr. Walter Vellenoweth who, in 1930, lived on Gordon Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio. He was married and had come to the United States from England. At the time he immigrated to America, he was 24 years old, if I have done correctly done the math. His wife was named Ruth and, at the time of his Declaration, they did not have any children. The application appears below:
Friday, July 30, 2010
Judge Kimbler Sentences for July 29, 2010
Judge Kimbler sentenced Robert M. Krumwiede of Crestwood Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio on one count of Drug Possession, a fifth degree felony and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, also a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler ordered Mr. Krumwiede to serve a period of incarceration at the Lorain County Community Based Corrections Facility; be supervised by the Medina County Adult Probation Department for a three year period; and comply with all conditions of supervision in Case No. 10-CR-0057. He was given credit for 82 days served in the Medina County Jail pending sentencing. The credit would be applied to any future prison sentences, but does not apply to the incarceration ordered at the Lorain County CBCF.
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Nearly 1,200 Prospective Lawyers Took the Ohio Bar Exam This Week
About 1,200 (1,193 to be exact) prospective lawyers took the July 2010 Ohio Bar Examination Tuesday, Wednesday and today at Franklin County Veterans Memorial, 300 W. Broad St., according to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The bar exam features various components, including 12 essay questions covering 11 topics, the Multistate Performance Test and the Multistate Bar Examination.
Results from the exam will be announced on Oct. 29, and individuals who pass the exam and meet all other requirements for admission will be sworn in during a special session of the Supreme Court at the historic Ohio Theatre.
The bar exam is administered by the Supreme Court, which regulates the practice of law in Ohio, including the admission of new attorneys, the biennial registration of current attorneys, attorney discipline in cases of misconduct, and the administration of continuing legal education.
The bar exam features various components, including 12 essay questions covering 11 topics, the Multistate Performance Test and the Multistate Bar Examination.
Results from the exam will be announced on Oct. 29, and individuals who pass the exam and meet all other requirements for admission will be sworn in during a special session of the Supreme Court at the historic Ohio Theatre.
The bar exam is administered by the Supreme Court, which regulates the practice of law in Ohio, including the admission of new attorneys, the biennial registration of current attorneys, attorney discipline in cases of misconduct, and the administration of continuing legal education.
Arraignments and Changes of Plea in Judge Kimbler's Courtroom on July 29, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom for arraignments or for a change of plea hearing on July 29, 2010:
Daniel Akers, 41, of Kimmich Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Richard Boreman, 47, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Lisa Elfers, 23, of Brendan Lane in North Olmsted, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Passing Bad Checks, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Michelle Foglesong, 30, of West 81st Street in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Russell R. James, 26, of Boston Road in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Robert Krumwiede, 21, of Crestwood Avenue in Lakewood, pleaded guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count of Possession of Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. He was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions, with a period of time in a Community Based Correction Facility.
Darnell Milton, 40, of East 110th Street in Cleveland, pleaded no contest to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Marvin Neal, 23, of Bursley Road in Spencer, pleaded no contest to two counts of Felonious Assault, both of which are second-degree felonies. One of the counts carries the specification that the victim was pregnant at the time of the assault. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Michael Reddish, 36, of Imagine Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Use of a Minor in Nudity-Oriented Material or Performance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 20.
Michael Scott, 28, of Hadcock Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Kevin Taylor, 21, of South Medina Line Road in Wadsworth, pleaded no contest to one count of Failure to Comply with a Police Officer, a third-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Daniel Akers, 41, of Kimmich Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Richard Boreman, 47, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Lisa Elfers, 23, of Brendan Lane in North Olmsted, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Passing Bad Checks, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Michelle Foglesong, 30, of West 81st Street in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Russell R. James, 26, of Boston Road in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Robert Krumwiede, 21, of Crestwood Avenue in Lakewood, pleaded guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count of Possession of Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. He was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions, with a period of time in a Community Based Correction Facility.
Darnell Milton, 40, of East 110th Street in Cleveland, pleaded no contest to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Marvin Neal, 23, of Bursley Road in Spencer, pleaded no contest to two counts of Felonious Assault, both of which are second-degree felonies. One of the counts carries the specification that the victim was pregnant at the time of the assault. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Michael Reddish, 36, of Imagine Lane in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Use of a Minor in Nudity-Oriented Material or Performance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 20.
Michael Scott, 28, of Hadcock Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Kevin Taylor, 21, of South Medina Line Road in Wadsworth, pleaded no contest to one count of Failure to Comply with a Police Officer, a third-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 16.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Jury Returns Not Guilty Verdict for Burbank Woman
A Medina County jury returned a not guilty verdict in Judge Collier's court last Wednesday. Paula C. Finowski, of South Street in Burbank, had been charged with one count of Drug Possession, a fifth degree felony. The jury trial started on July 19 and the verdict was returned on July 21.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket for July 22, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, July 22, 2010, for criminal cases"
Xan McCarty, 22, of County Road 620 in Ashland, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony.
Kelly Shelton, 44, of Moore Street in Akron, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Danielle M. Hommell, 22, of Church Streeet in Lodi, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony.
Brant D. Kelling, 19, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions for Receiving Stolen Property, a first degree misdemeanor.
Lester A. Sanchez, 29, of Isbell Street in Lansing, Michigan, was sentenced to five days in jail and ordered to pay $1350.35 in restitution for one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony.
Robert K. Karlowicz of West 11th Street in Cleveland, Ohio, was sentenced to two years community control for one count of Unauthorized Use of Property, a first degree misdemeanor and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2639.15.
Michael Leskin, 38, of Laurel Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Brian McKee, 30, of Sunset Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 22.
Randall Weekly, 31, of Portage Street in Doylestown, pleaded no contest to three counts of Breaking and Entering and three counts of Vandalism, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 26.
Stacey Wilmington, 38, of Springbrook Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 21.
Xan McCarty, 22, of County Road 620 in Ashland, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony.
Kelly Shelton, 44, of Moore Street in Akron, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Danielle M. Hommell, 22, of Church Streeet in Lodi, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony.
Brant D. Kelling, 19, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions for Receiving Stolen Property, a first degree misdemeanor.
Lester A. Sanchez, 29, of Isbell Street in Lansing, Michigan, was sentenced to five days in jail and ordered to pay $1350.35 in restitution for one count of Theft, a fifth degree felony.
Robert K. Karlowicz of West 11th Street in Cleveland, Ohio, was sentenced to two years community control for one count of Unauthorized Use of Property, a first degree misdemeanor and was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2639.15.
Michael Leskin, 38, of Laurel Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Brian McKee, 30, of Sunset Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 22.
Randall Weekly, 31, of Portage Street in Doylestown, pleaded no contest to three counts of Breaking and Entering and three counts of Vandalism, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 26.
Stacey Wilmington, 38, of Springbrook Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 21.
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for July 25, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Collier's courtroom on July 26, 2010 for criminal cases:
Cassandra DeJesus, 28, of Homewood Drive in Lorain, was sentenced to three years in prison on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony and one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. She also was ordered to pay $2,000 in restitution to her victim.
Robert Neura, 44, of Boston Road in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Marla Trocchio, 22, of Wadsworth Road in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, a fifth-degree felony.
Aaron Borza, 27, of Front Street in Berea, pleaded not guilty to one count of Abduction, a third-degree felony and one count of Assault, a first-degree misdemeanor. A jury trial is scheduled for October 4.
Daniel Curtis, 36, of West Bergey Street in Wadsworth, pleaded guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 7.
Andrew Fazenbaker, 25, of South Arlington Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Steven Fletcher, 23, of Jester Court in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Ebrima Jallow, 41, of Tributary Lane in Reynoldsburg, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trademark Counterfeiting, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Ashley Krettler, 22, of Stone Road in Litchfield, pleaded not guilty to one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 7.
Brandon Paserk, 26, of Alice Avenue in Brunswick, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven months in prison on three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, all of which are fourth-degree felonies.
Gregory Spidell, 46, of Hamlin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Complicity to Commit Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Cassandra DeJesus, 28, of Homewood Drive in Lorain, was sentenced to three years in prison on one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony and one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. She also was ordered to pay $2,000 in restitution to her victim.
Robert Neura, 44, of Boston Road in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Marla Trocchio, 22, of Wadsworth Road in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, a fifth-degree felony.
Aaron Borza, 27, of Front Street in Berea, pleaded not guilty to one count of Abduction, a third-degree felony and one count of Assault, a first-degree misdemeanor. A jury trial is scheduled for October 4.
Daniel Curtis, 36, of West Bergey Street in Wadsworth, pleaded guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 7.
Andrew Fazenbaker, 25, of South Arlington Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Steven Fletcher, 23, of Jester Court in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 27.
Ebrima Jallow, 41, of Tributary Lane in Reynoldsburg, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trademark Counterfeiting, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Ashley Krettler, 22, of Stone Road in Litchfield, pleaded not guilty to one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 7.
Brandon Paserk, 26, of Alice Avenue in Brunswick, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven months in prison on three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, all of which are fourth-degree felonies.
Gregory Spidell, 46, of Hamlin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Complicity to Commit Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Monday, July 26, 2010
Tallmadge Man Pleads Guilty to 28 Counts
Shawn P. Schrubb of Southeast Avenue in Tallmadge, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Monday, July 26, and entered pleas of guilty to 28 separate charges. The charges included 24 second degree felonies and four fifth degree felonies. All of the second degree felonies were charges of the Illegal Use of a Minor in Nudity Oriented Material or Performance, as were three of the fifth degree felonies. The remaining fifth degree felony was a charge of Possessing Criminal Tools. Mr. Schrubb also agreed to forfeit property allegedly used in the commission of the offenses to the State of Ohio.
The indictment alleged that Mr. Schrubb committed the offenses during the spring and summer of 2009. The Medina County Grand Jury returned the indictment on April 7, 2010. Following the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing is scheduled for September 2, 2010 at 8:30 am. Mr. Schrubb remains out on bond pending imposition of sentence.
The indictment alleged that Mr. Schrubb committed the offenses during the spring and summer of 2009. The Medina County Grand Jury returned the indictment on April 7, 2010. Following the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing is scheduled for September 2, 2010 at 8:30 am. Mr. Schrubb remains out on bond pending imposition of sentence.
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Disappointed Bidder on Public Works Project May Recover Bid Preparation Costs Under Certain Conditions
If Timely Injunctive Relief Was Sought and Bid Rejection Later Found Improper
Meccon, Inc. v. Univ. of Akron, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3297.
Franklin App. No. 08AP-727, 182 Ohio App.3d 85, 2009-Ohio-1700. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed, and cause remanded to the Court of Claims.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3297.pdf
View oral argument video of this case.
(July 21, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when a rejected bidder establishes that a public authority violated state competitive-bidding laws in awarding a public-improvement contract, that bidder may recover reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages if the bidder promptly sought, but was denied, an injunction to suspend work on the project pending resolution of the bid dispute, and it is later determined that the bidder was wrongfully rejected and injunctive relief is no longer available.
The Court’s 6-0 decision, authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp, affirmed a ruling by the 10th District Court of Appeals.
In April 2008 the University of Akron invited bids for various phases of construction work on its football stadium. Meccon, Inc. submitted a bid for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) portion of the contract. In June 2008 the university awarded the HVAC contract and other portions of the project to another bidder, S.A. Communale. Meccon subsequently filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, alleging that the university had violated provisions of the state’s competitive bidding law and the terms of its own project bid proposal in making its contract awards to S.A. Communale. In its complaint, Meccon sought a temporary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctions preventing work on the project from going forward, and also asserted claims for money damages to compensate Meccon for the costs of preparing its bid and other damages resulting from the university’s failure to award the HVAC contract to Meccon.
The university moved to dismiss the entire action on the basis that the Court of Claims did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of Claims granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that a disappointed bidder on a public improvement contract may obtain only injunctive relief (as opposed to money damages), and the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear only cases in which a plaintiff’s complaint includes a justiciable claim for money damages against the state.
Meccon appealed the order dismissing its complaint. On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. In its decision, the 10th District concluded that a disappointed bidder can recover from the state for its bid-preparation costs, and that because such costs are monetary damages, the Court of Claims did have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all of Meccon’s claims.
The university sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 10th District’s ruling.
Writing for a unanimous Court in today’s decision, Justice Cupp rejected the university’s contention that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 2006 decision in Cementech Inc. v. Fairlawn precludes disappointed bidders on public improvement projects from recovering any money damages. He wrote: “In Cementech, a public authority solicited bids for a public project. In the process of awarding the contract, the public authority unlawfully rejected Cementech’s bid. The trial court awarded to Cementech bid-preparation costs but denied lost profits. Cementech appealed the trial court’s order limiting damages to the bid-preparation costs. The appellate court reversed and allowed the lost profits. In reversing the appellate court, this court held: ‘When a municipality violates competitive-bidding laws in awarding a competitively bid project, the rejected bidder cannot recover its lost profits as damages.’”
“The issue of whether bid-preparation costs could be recovered by a wrongfully rejected bidder was not answered in Cementech. Upon consideration of the arguments in this case on the availability of reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages, we decline to extend the holding in Cementech to this circumstance. We reach this conclusion because the reasons articulated in Cementech for denying recovery of lost profits as damages do not carry over to the circumstances in which bid-preparation costs are sought after denial of a timely application for injunctive relief. A significant distinguishing factor in those circumstances is the lack of any other remedy for a public authority’s wrongful conduct.”
“If, for instance, a rejected bidder alleges that a public authority failed to comply with competitive-bidding laws and promptly seeks injunctive relief to delay the public-improvement project pending resolution of the dispute, denial of the requested injunctive relief means that determination of the allegation of wrongful conduct by the public authority will not take place until much later in the litigation. Under our precedent, once the public-improvement work commences or is completed, the rejected bidder will not be able to perform the public contract even if the bidder demonstrates that its bid was wrongfully rejected. In such circumstances, the wrongfully rejected bidder is left with no remedy for the public authority’s unlawful conduct, and injunctive relief will no longer serve to deter the public authority’s unlawful conduct. Thus, we hold that when a rejected bidder establishes that a public authority violated state competitive-bidding laws in awarding a public-improvement contract, that bidder may recover reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages if that bidder promptly sought, but was denied, injunctive relief and it is later determined that the bidder was wrongfully rejected and injunctive relief is no longer available.”
Because neither the Court of Claims nor the 10th District Court of Appeals reached the disputed issue of whether Meccon’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief was filed in a “timely” manner, and that question could determine whether or not Meccon met the requirements to later seek recovery of its bid preparation costs, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims to address the timeliness issue.
Justice Cupp’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for the University of Akron.
Peter D. Welin, 614.469.3200, for Meccon, Inc.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Meccon, Inc. v. Univ. of Akron, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3297.
Franklin App. No. 08AP-727, 182 Ohio App.3d 85, 2009-Ohio-1700. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed, and cause remanded to the Court of Claims.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3297.pdf
View oral argument video of this case.
(July 21, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when a rejected bidder establishes that a public authority violated state competitive-bidding laws in awarding a public-improvement contract, that bidder may recover reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages if the bidder promptly sought, but was denied, an injunction to suspend work on the project pending resolution of the bid dispute, and it is later determined that the bidder was wrongfully rejected and injunctive relief is no longer available.
The Court’s 6-0 decision, authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp, affirmed a ruling by the 10th District Court of Appeals.
In April 2008 the University of Akron invited bids for various phases of construction work on its football stadium. Meccon, Inc. submitted a bid for the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) portion of the contract. In June 2008 the university awarded the HVAC contract and other portions of the project to another bidder, S.A. Communale. Meccon subsequently filed suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, alleging that the university had violated provisions of the state’s competitive bidding law and the terms of its own project bid proposal in making its contract awards to S.A. Communale. In its complaint, Meccon sought a temporary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctions preventing work on the project from going forward, and also asserted claims for money damages to compensate Meccon for the costs of preparing its bid and other damages resulting from the university’s failure to award the HVAC contract to Meccon.
The university moved to dismiss the entire action on the basis that the Court of Claims did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court of Claims granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that a disappointed bidder on a public improvement contract may obtain only injunctive relief (as opposed to money damages), and the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear only cases in which a plaintiff’s complaint includes a justiciable claim for money damages against the state.
Meccon appealed the order dismissing its complaint. On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. In its decision, the 10th District concluded that a disappointed bidder can recover from the state for its bid-preparation costs, and that because such costs are monetary damages, the Court of Claims did have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all of Meccon’s claims.
The university sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 10th District’s ruling.
Writing for a unanimous Court in today’s decision, Justice Cupp rejected the university’s contention that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 2006 decision in Cementech Inc. v. Fairlawn precludes disappointed bidders on public improvement projects from recovering any money damages. He wrote: “In Cementech, a public authority solicited bids for a public project. In the process of awarding the contract, the public authority unlawfully rejected Cementech’s bid. The trial court awarded to Cementech bid-preparation costs but denied lost profits. Cementech appealed the trial court’s order limiting damages to the bid-preparation costs. The appellate court reversed and allowed the lost profits. In reversing the appellate court, this court held: ‘When a municipality violates competitive-bidding laws in awarding a competitively bid project, the rejected bidder cannot recover its lost profits as damages.’”
“The issue of whether bid-preparation costs could be recovered by a wrongfully rejected bidder was not answered in Cementech. Upon consideration of the arguments in this case on the availability of reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages, we decline to extend the holding in Cementech to this circumstance. We reach this conclusion because the reasons articulated in Cementech for denying recovery of lost profits as damages do not carry over to the circumstances in which bid-preparation costs are sought after denial of a timely application for injunctive relief. A significant distinguishing factor in those circumstances is the lack of any other remedy for a public authority’s wrongful conduct.”
“If, for instance, a rejected bidder alleges that a public authority failed to comply with competitive-bidding laws and promptly seeks injunctive relief to delay the public-improvement project pending resolution of the dispute, denial of the requested injunctive relief means that determination of the allegation of wrongful conduct by the public authority will not take place until much later in the litigation. Under our precedent, once the public-improvement work commences or is completed, the rejected bidder will not be able to perform the public contract even if the bidder demonstrates that its bid was wrongfully rejected. In such circumstances, the wrongfully rejected bidder is left with no remedy for the public authority’s unlawful conduct, and injunctive relief will no longer serve to deter the public authority’s unlawful conduct. Thus, we hold that when a rejected bidder establishes that a public authority violated state competitive-bidding laws in awarding a public-improvement contract, that bidder may recover reasonable bid-preparation costs as damages if that bidder promptly sought, but was denied, injunctive relief and it is later determined that the bidder was wrongfully rejected and injunctive relief is no longer available.”
Because neither the Court of Claims nor the 10th District Court of Appeals reached the disputed issue of whether Meccon’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief was filed in a “timely” manner, and that question could determine whether or not Meccon met the requirements to later seek recovery of its bid preparation costs, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Claims to address the timeliness issue.
Justice Cupp’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Benjamin C. Mizer, 614.466.8980, for the University of Akron.
Peter D. Welin, 614.469.3200, for Meccon, Inc.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Defendant May Plead Guilty to Amended Indictment That Changes Identity of Crime
When Defendant Was Represented by Counsel and Bargained for Change
State v. Rohrbaugh, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3286.
Logan App. No. 8-07-28, 2008-Ohio-4781. Certified question answered in the affirmative, judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the court of appeals.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3286.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to change the name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is represented by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced by the change.
The court’s 6-0 decision, authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, reversed a ruling by the 3rd District Court of Appeals.
A Logan County grand jury indicted John Rohrbaugh on eight felony counts including breaking and entering, theft and drug possession. As the result of a plea bargain, the prosecutor amended the first count of the indictment from breaking and entering to receiving stolen property, and dismissed all other counts in the indictment except the drug possession charge. The prosecutor did not seek a written or oral waiver of indictment from Rohrbaugh on the receiving stolen property charge. On the same day the indictment was amended, Rohrbaugh entered guilty pleas to both the receiving stolen property and drug possession charges. He was convicted and sentenced to eleven months in prison on each count, with those terms to be served concurrently, and ordered to pay restitution.
Rohrbaugh subsequently appealed the restitution portion of his sentence. On review, the 3rd District Court of Appeals ruled that, because Rohrbaugh had not been indicted by the grand jury for the crime of receiving stolen property, and had not formally waived his constitutional right to indictment before being charged with that felony offense, the trial court had committed plain error by accepting a guilty plea to an indictment that had been amended to change the name or identity of a charged crime. Based on that ruling, the court of appeals ordered that Rohrbaugh’s guilty plea be vacated and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 3rd District’s decision. The Court also determined that there was a conflict between the court of appeals’ ruling in this case and a 2008 decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice Pfeifer acknowledged that Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and Rule 7(A) of the state’s rules of criminal procedure require that all felonies, absent proper waiver, must be prosecuted by indictment, and noted that Crim. R.7(D) permits the amendment of an indictment before, during or after trial ... provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged. He also noted, however, that because Rohrbaugh failed to object to the change in his indictment before or during his trial, he waived all but “plain error,” meaning error so serious that it affected the outcome of his trial and requires reversal “to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Applying that standard to the facts of Rohrbaugh’s case, Justice Pfeifer wrote: “We conclude that although there was error in this case, it was not reversible plain error, because there was no miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Rohrbaugh cannot take advantage of an error that he invited through the plea negotiations.”
“The trial court erred because the amendment to the indictment changed the name or identity of the crime charged in count one. ... The error was plain because Crim.R. 7(D) clearly bans such amendments. The error also ‘affected the outcome of the trial’ because if not for the amendment, Rohrbaugh could not have pleaded guilty to the crime of receiving stolen property. In State v. Davis (2008) ... we found plain error when a trial court amended an indictment to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a higher degree of a crime. In that case, there was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution was attempting to ‘increase the penalty or degree of the offense’ charged. ... Unlike the defendant in Davis, Rohrbaugh was not prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment; to the contrary, he gained a benefit when the prosecution dismissed six charges against him. In Davis, the crime was amended from a felony of the fourth degree to a felony of the second degree. ... In this case, the amended charge of receiving stolen property and the original charge of breaking and entering are both felonies of the fifth degree. Moreover, Rohrbaugh was represented by counsel and signed a statement that he had reviewed and understood the amended indictment. We conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice in this case.”
“This case also differs from Davis in that Rohrbaugh invited the alleged error. We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not ‘take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced.’... In Davis, there was no invited-error issue because the prosecution acted unilaterally during trial. ... In this case, Rohrbaugh negotiated for the amended indictment and agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge. He cannot now argue that the amendment is plain error. Rohrbaugh argues that he was not indicted and did not properly waive the right to indictment under the rule, even though Crim.R. 7(A) requires that a crime be prosecuted by indictment unless the indictment is properly waived. We conclude that Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by an indictment and that he was sufficiently informed of the charges in the indictment. ... Because Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by indictment, Crim.R. 7(A) and its waiver requirements are not applicable to this case.”
Based on that analysis, Justice Pfeifer concluded, “We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals so that it may reach the error concerning restitution that Rohrbaugh alleged in his appeal.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Eric C. Stewart, 937.599.7272, for the Logan County prosecutor’s office.
Marc S. Triplett, 937.593.6591, for John Rohrbaugh.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
State v. Rohrbaugh, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3286.
Logan App. No. 8-07-28, 2008-Ohio-4781. Certified question answered in the affirmative, judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the court of appeals.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3286.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a defendant may plead guilty to an indictment that was amended to change the name or identity of the charged crime when the defendant is represented by counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced by the change.
The court’s 6-0 decision, authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, reversed a ruling by the 3rd District Court of Appeals.
A Logan County grand jury indicted John Rohrbaugh on eight felony counts including breaking and entering, theft and drug possession. As the result of a plea bargain, the prosecutor amended the first count of the indictment from breaking and entering to receiving stolen property, and dismissed all other counts in the indictment except the drug possession charge. The prosecutor did not seek a written or oral waiver of indictment from Rohrbaugh on the receiving stolen property charge. On the same day the indictment was amended, Rohrbaugh entered guilty pleas to both the receiving stolen property and drug possession charges. He was convicted and sentenced to eleven months in prison on each count, with those terms to be served concurrently, and ordered to pay restitution.
Rohrbaugh subsequently appealed the restitution portion of his sentence. On review, the 3rd District Court of Appeals ruled that, because Rohrbaugh had not been indicted by the grand jury for the crime of receiving stolen property, and had not formally waived his constitutional right to indictment before being charged with that felony offense, the trial court had committed plain error by accepting a guilty plea to an indictment that had been amended to change the name or identity of a charged crime. Based on that ruling, the court of appeals ordered that Rohrbaugh’s guilty plea be vacated and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 3rd District’s decision. The Court also determined that there was a conflict between the court of appeals’ ruling in this case and a 2008 decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice Pfeifer acknowledged that Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and Rule 7(A) of the state’s rules of criminal procedure require that all felonies, absent proper waiver, must be prosecuted by indictment, and noted that Crim. R.7(D) permits the amendment of an indictment before, during or after trial ... provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged. He also noted, however, that because Rohrbaugh failed to object to the change in his indictment before or during his trial, he waived all but “plain error,” meaning error so serious that it affected the outcome of his trial and requires reversal “to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
Applying that standard to the facts of Rohrbaugh’s case, Justice Pfeifer wrote: “We conclude that although there was error in this case, it was not reversible plain error, because there was no miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, Rohrbaugh cannot take advantage of an error that he invited through the plea negotiations.”
“The trial court erred because the amendment to the indictment changed the name or identity of the crime charged in count one. ... The error was plain because Crim.R. 7(D) clearly bans such amendments. The error also ‘affected the outcome of the trial’ because if not for the amendment, Rohrbaugh could not have pleaded guilty to the crime of receiving stolen property. In State v. Davis (2008) ... we found plain error when a trial court amended an indictment to allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a higher degree of a crime. In that case, there was a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution was attempting to ‘increase the penalty or degree of the offense’ charged. ... Unlike the defendant in Davis, Rohrbaugh was not prejudiced by the amendment to the indictment; to the contrary, he gained a benefit when the prosecution dismissed six charges against him. In Davis, the crime was amended from a felony of the fourth degree to a felony of the second degree. ... In this case, the amended charge of receiving stolen property and the original charge of breaking and entering are both felonies of the fifth degree. Moreover, Rohrbaugh was represented by counsel and signed a statement that he had reviewed and understood the amended indictment. We conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice in this case.”
“This case also differs from Davis in that Rohrbaugh invited the alleged error. We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not ‘take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced.’... In Davis, there was no invited-error issue because the prosecution acted unilaterally during trial. ... In this case, Rohrbaugh negotiated for the amended indictment and agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge. He cannot now argue that the amendment is plain error. Rohrbaugh argues that he was not indicted and did not properly waive the right to indictment under the rule, even though Crim.R. 7(A) requires that a crime be prosecuted by indictment unless the indictment is properly waived. We conclude that Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by an indictment and that he was sufficiently informed of the charges in the indictment. ... Because Rohrbaugh was prosecuted by indictment, Crim.R. 7(A) and its waiver requirements are not applicable to this case.”
Based on that analysis, Justice Pfeifer concluded, “We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals so that it may reach the error concerning restitution that Rohrbaugh alleged in his appeal.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp. Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in this case.
Contacts
Eric C. Stewart, 937.599.7272, for the Logan County prosecutor’s office.
Marc S. Triplett, 937.593.6591, for John Rohrbaugh.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Flight to Avoid Prosecution Stops Running of Legal Time Limit for Prosecuting All Crimes by Defendant
Not Just Crimes For Which Accused Had Been Charged at Time of Flight
State v. Bess, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3292.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91429, 182 Ohio App.3d 364, 2009-Ohio-2254. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., dissent.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3292.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a state law that “tolls” (stops the running of) statutes of limitations for prosecuting a criminal defendant during a period in which the accused purposely avoids prosecution applies to all crimes committed by the accused, regardless of whether an indictment for those crimes had been returned or the underlying criminal activity had been discovered at the time the accused fled.
The Court’s 4-2 majority opinion, which reversed a decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals, was written by Justice Terrence O’Donnell.
In the early 1980s, Larry Bess began living with Theresa Ogden, and the couple married in 1986. Theresa had two children from a prior relationship: a son and a daughter. In 1989, Bess learned that he was under investigation for the alleged sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter. Before he was charged, Bess fled to Georgia and assumed a false identity in order to escape prosecution. In November 1989, Bess was indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury on three counts of rape and seven counts of gross sexual imposition involving Theresa’s daughter. He remained in Georgia and avoided prosecution until 2007, when he was apprehended and returned to Ohio. In the course of preparing its 2007 case against Bess for the sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office interviewed Theresa’s son, who disclosed for the first time that he also had been sexually molested by Bess between 1982 and 1989. Based on his statements, the state sought and obtained a second indictment charging Bess with additional counts of rape and other criminal offenses for his sexual conduct with Theresa’s son.
The trial court tried Bess for the offenses committed against Theresa’s daughter, which were not time-barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to those offenses because of a provision of state law, R.C. 2901.13(G) that tolls the running of a limitations period for any period of time during which a defendant flees the court’s jurisdiction or otherwise “purposely avoids prosecution.” A jury subsequently found Bess guilty of those charges, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions.
Bess moved to dismiss the indictment that charged crimes against Theresa’s son, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations applicable to those charges had expired. The state objected, contending that R.C. 2901.13(G) had tolled the statute of limitations during the period when Bess had purposely avoided prosecution. The trial court granted Bess’s motion and dismissed the indictment relating to charges involving crimes against Theresa’s son, finding that Bess had not purposely avoided prosecution for those alleged crimes.
On appeal, the 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Relying on the 8th District’s 1994 ruling in State v. McGraw, the author of the appellate court’s decision concluded that Bess’s flight and his concealment from prosecution for the sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter tolled the statute of limitations for those crimes, but did not toll the statute of limitations for charges related to the sexual abuse of Theresa’s son, which the state learned about after Bess’s apprehension.
The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 8th District’s decision.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice O’Donnell observed that there are alternative definitions of the term “prosecution” that the legislature could have intended in drafting the statute: a narrow definition referring to the trial and punishment of a specific criminal offense, and a broader definition encompassing the general process of bringing those who commit crimes to justice. In this case, he wrote: “The context in which the word ‘prosecution’ is used in R.C. 2901.13(G) reveals that the word refers to the more general process by which an accused is tried and punished for alleged criminal activity, not a specific proceeding against an accused, and the statute of limitations is tolled when an accused acts to purposely avoid being prosecuted for any offense.”
While he noted the absence of prior Ohio case law interpreting the disputed statutory language, Justice O’Donnell cited decisions of three different U.S. circuit courts of appeals interpreting a similar federal statute, all of which he said applied a general definition of the term “prosecution.” He wrote: “These courts have explained that Section 1073, which criminalizes crossing state lines with the intent to avoid prosecution, does not require the existence of a pending prosecution, but rather ‘[i]t is sufficient if the fleeing felon is ‘subject to prosecution.’”
“Notably, R.C. 2901.13(G) contains no language suggesting that its application should be limited only to those cases where the accused sought to avoid a particular prosecution. Nor is there language suggesting a limitation to only those prosecutions that had been commenced before the accused absconded or to those cases where the state can prove that the accused intended to avoid prosecution for a specific crime. The lack of any qualifying or limiting language reveals the legislature’s intent to toll the statute of limitations with respect to all offenses during the time when an accused purposely avoids prosecution for any offense. Moreover, the manifest purpose of R.C. 2901.13(G) is to prevent the accused from benefitting from the statute of limitations when he or she has purposely acted to avoid being prosecuted, thereby causing the state to fail to commence a timely prosecution. Importantly, it is the actions of the accused in avoiding prosecution, not the actions of the state in commencing a prosecution, that triggers the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the General Assembly did not intend to limit tolling to only those offenses that authorities knew about at the time the accused absconded while allowing the statute of limitations to run on undiscovered crimes.”
“ ... The legislature has mandated that the period of limitations shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. The word ‘prosecution’ means the process of bringing those who commit crimes to justice, and in the context of the statute, that definition is not limited to the crimes of which the authorities are aware or which have been indicted. In this case, if Bess committed the alleged crimes against Theresa’s son, then he knew that when he fled, but his motivations in fleeing the jurisdiction are known only to him. The General Assembly, however, did not intend to require the state to prove the accused’s specific intent in absconding, nor did it intend to toll the statute of limitations as to crimes known to the state but not toll it as to crimes unknown to the state. ... Because the court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations had expired in this case notwithstanding Bess’s conduct in avoiding prosecution, that judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.”
Justice O’Donnell’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, stating that in her view the majority’s broad reading of R.C. 2901.13(G) violates the “rule of lenity” set forth in R.C. 2901.04(A), which requires that when courts interpret criminal statutes, the language chosen by the legislature must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of defendants.
In this case, she wrote: “R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations when ‘the accused purposely avoids prosecution.’ The word ‘accused’ implies that the person already has been implicated in a crime by someone. The mental state of ‘purposely’ is defined in R.C. 2901.22(A): ‘A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result ... ’. The statute of limitations also explains when a ‘prosecution’ begins: ‘A prosecution is commenced on the date an indictment is returned or an information filed, or on the date a lawful arrest without a warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, summons, citation, or other process is issued, whichever occurs first. ...’”
“This language chosen by the General Assembly comports with the position advanced by the defense: tolling occurs when a person avoids prosecution for specific charges. Although a case may be, and has been, made for the state’s alternative theory, I cannot subscribe to the idea that the limitations period is tolled for all crimes that an accused may have committed before the period that an accused avoids prosecution for a specific charge.”
Contacts
T. Allan Regas, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County Prosecutor.
David L. Doughten, 216.361.1112, for Larry Bess.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
State v. Bess, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3292.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91429, 182 Ohio App.3d 364, 2009-Ohio-2254. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., dissent.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3292.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a state law that “tolls” (stops the running of) statutes of limitations for prosecuting a criminal defendant during a period in which the accused purposely avoids prosecution applies to all crimes committed by the accused, regardless of whether an indictment for those crimes had been returned or the underlying criminal activity had been discovered at the time the accused fled.
The Court’s 4-2 majority opinion, which reversed a decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals, was written by Justice Terrence O’Donnell.
In the early 1980s, Larry Bess began living with Theresa Ogden, and the couple married in 1986. Theresa had two children from a prior relationship: a son and a daughter. In 1989, Bess learned that he was under investigation for the alleged sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter. Before he was charged, Bess fled to Georgia and assumed a false identity in order to escape prosecution. In November 1989, Bess was indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury on three counts of rape and seven counts of gross sexual imposition involving Theresa’s daughter. He remained in Georgia and avoided prosecution until 2007, when he was apprehended and returned to Ohio. In the course of preparing its 2007 case against Bess for the sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office interviewed Theresa’s son, who disclosed for the first time that he also had been sexually molested by Bess between 1982 and 1989. Based on his statements, the state sought and obtained a second indictment charging Bess with additional counts of rape and other criminal offenses for his sexual conduct with Theresa’s son.
The trial court tried Bess for the offenses committed against Theresa’s daughter, which were not time-barred by the statutes of limitations applicable to those offenses because of a provision of state law, R.C. 2901.13(G) that tolls the running of a limitations period for any period of time during which a defendant flees the court’s jurisdiction or otherwise “purposely avoids prosecution.” A jury subsequently found Bess guilty of those charges, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions.
Bess moved to dismiss the indictment that charged crimes against Theresa’s son, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations applicable to those charges had expired. The state objected, contending that R.C. 2901.13(G) had tolled the statute of limitations during the period when Bess had purposely avoided prosecution. The trial court granted Bess’s motion and dismissed the indictment relating to charges involving crimes against Theresa’s son, finding that Bess had not purposely avoided prosecution for those alleged crimes.
On appeal, the 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Relying on the 8th District’s 1994 ruling in State v. McGraw, the author of the appellate court’s decision concluded that Bess’s flight and his concealment from prosecution for the sexual abuse of Theresa’s daughter tolled the statute of limitations for those crimes, but did not toll the statute of limitations for charges related to the sexual abuse of Theresa’s son, which the state learned about after Bess’s apprehension.
The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 8th District’s decision.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice O’Donnell observed that there are alternative definitions of the term “prosecution” that the legislature could have intended in drafting the statute: a narrow definition referring to the trial and punishment of a specific criminal offense, and a broader definition encompassing the general process of bringing those who commit crimes to justice. In this case, he wrote: “The context in which the word ‘prosecution’ is used in R.C. 2901.13(G) reveals that the word refers to the more general process by which an accused is tried and punished for alleged criminal activity, not a specific proceeding against an accused, and the statute of limitations is tolled when an accused acts to purposely avoid being prosecuted for any offense.”
While he noted the absence of prior Ohio case law interpreting the disputed statutory language, Justice O’Donnell cited decisions of three different U.S. circuit courts of appeals interpreting a similar federal statute, all of which he said applied a general definition of the term “prosecution.” He wrote: “These courts have explained that Section 1073, which criminalizes crossing state lines with the intent to avoid prosecution, does not require the existence of a pending prosecution, but rather ‘[i]t is sufficient if the fleeing felon is ‘subject to prosecution.’”
“Notably, R.C. 2901.13(G) contains no language suggesting that its application should be limited only to those cases where the accused sought to avoid a particular prosecution. Nor is there language suggesting a limitation to only those prosecutions that had been commenced before the accused absconded or to those cases where the state can prove that the accused intended to avoid prosecution for a specific crime. The lack of any qualifying or limiting language reveals the legislature’s intent to toll the statute of limitations with respect to all offenses during the time when an accused purposely avoids prosecution for any offense. Moreover, the manifest purpose of R.C. 2901.13(G) is to prevent the accused from benefitting from the statute of limitations when he or she has purposely acted to avoid being prosecuted, thereby causing the state to fail to commence a timely prosecution. Importantly, it is the actions of the accused in avoiding prosecution, not the actions of the state in commencing a prosecution, that triggers the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the General Assembly did not intend to limit tolling to only those offenses that authorities knew about at the time the accused absconded while allowing the statute of limitations to run on undiscovered crimes.”
“ ... The legislature has mandated that the period of limitations shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. The word ‘prosecution’ means the process of bringing those who commit crimes to justice, and in the context of the statute, that definition is not limited to the crimes of which the authorities are aware or which have been indicted. In this case, if Bess committed the alleged crimes against Theresa’s son, then he knew that when he fled, but his motivations in fleeing the jurisdiction are known only to him. The General Assembly, however, did not intend to require the state to prove the accused’s specific intent in absconding, nor did it intend to toll the statute of limitations as to crimes known to the state but not toll it as to crimes unknown to the state. ... Because the court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations had expired in this case notwithstanding Bess’s conduct in avoiding prosecution, that judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.”
Justice O’Donnell’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, stating that in her view the majority’s broad reading of R.C. 2901.13(G) violates the “rule of lenity” set forth in R.C. 2901.04(A), which requires that when courts interpret criminal statutes, the language chosen by the legislature must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of defendants.
In this case, she wrote: “R.C. 2901.13(G) tolls the statute of limitations when ‘the accused purposely avoids prosecution.’ The word ‘accused’ implies that the person already has been implicated in a crime by someone. The mental state of ‘purposely’ is defined in R.C. 2901.22(A): ‘A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result ... ’. The statute of limitations also explains when a ‘prosecution’ begins: ‘A prosecution is commenced on the date an indictment is returned or an information filed, or on the date a lawful arrest without a warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, summons, citation, or other process is issued, whichever occurs first. ...’”
“This language chosen by the General Assembly comports with the position advanced by the defense: tolling occurs when a person avoids prosecution for specific charges. Although a case may be, and has been, made for the state’s alternative theory, I cannot subscribe to the idea that the limitations period is tolled for all crimes that an accused may have committed before the period that an accused avoids prosecution for a specific charge.”
Contacts
T. Allan Regas, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County Prosecutor.
David L. Doughten, 216.361.1112, for Larry Bess.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Court Rules Alleged Sex Abuse Victim Entitled to Redacted Copies of Police Records from Investigation
In Case Where Accused Priest Was Not Indicted by Grand Jury
State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3288.
Guernsey App. No. 09-CA-4, 2009-Ohio-6336. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the court of appeals.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton and O'Donnell, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3288.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that some of the investigatory records compiled or accessed by the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office during its investigation of a 2008 complaint alleging sexual abuse of a child by a priest in the 1990s are not exempt from disclosure under the Ohio Public Records Act, and those documents must therefore be provided in redacted form to the person who filed the complaint.
In a 5-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that, if names, places of employment and other identifying information were redacted (blacked out) from some of the requested documents, they would not fall under an exemption in the Public Records Act that bars disclosure of law enforcement investigatory records if their release would create a high probability of disclosing the identity of a suspect who was not charged with a criminal offense.
In 2008, Beth Rocker filed a report with the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office alleging that she had been sexually assaulted in the early 1990s, when she was a child. Rocker claimed that the priest of the church she had attended as a child was the perpetrator of the crime. The sheriff’s office conducted an investigation and the county prosecutor submitted information obtained through that investigation to a grand jury. No indictment was returned. After the investigation had concluded, Rocker, through counsel, made a public-records request “for the entire contents of the investigative file and any documents reviewed during or related to the investigation.” The sheriff’s office provided Rocker with a copy of the incident report, but denied her access to the remaining investigative records.
A few months later, Rocker filed a complaint in the 5th District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the sheriff’s office to provide her with access to “all documents reviewed during, related to, or prepared concerning the criminal investigation” of the suspect. After the sheriff’s office filed a response, the court ordered the office to submit copies of all the requested records under seal for an in-camera inspection. Pursuant to the court’s order, the parties submitted briefs on whether the various categories of investigative records withheld by the sheriff’s office are disclosable under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. On Dec. 2, 2009, the court of appeals denied the writ. Rocker exercised her right to appeal the 5th District’s ruling to the Supreme Court.
In today’s majority opinion, the Court wrote: “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. ... The sheriff’s office claimed, and the court of appeals determined, that the remaining requested records are exempt from disclosure as confidential-law enforcement investigatory records under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and (2). ... (T)he court of appeals held that the release of the investigative records would probably reveal the identity of an uncharged suspect under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a). The claimed perpetrator of the sexual assault is an uncharged suspect because he has never been charged with a criminal offense.”
“(T)his exception applies only to those portions of records that, if released, would create a high probability of disclosure of the suspect’s identity. We have held that records are exempt under the uncharged-suspect exception when ‘the protected identities of uncharged suspects are inextricably intertwined with the investigatory records.’ ... The court of appeals determined, in effect, that every part of the requested records was inextricably intertwined with the identity of the priest accused of sexual assault and that the records were thus not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43. ... We have reviewed the sealed records and conclude that some of the withheld records are subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act because they are not inextricably intertwined with the suspect’s protected identity. For most of these records, if the sheriff’s office redacts the priest’s name, the name, location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific identifying information, the disclosure of the records will not create a high probability of disclosure of the priest’s identity.”
“Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that all the withheld investigative records were covered by a blanket uncharged-suspect exemption. ... Based on our independent review of the sealed investigative records, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause so that the court can review the sealed records and order the disclosure of those records following the redaction of those portions of the record that are subject to the uncharged-suspect exemption, e.g., the priest’s name, his address, the name, location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific, identifying information. By so holding, we adhere to our strict construction of exceptions to the Public Records Act as well as our duty to resolve any doubt in favor of access to public records.”
The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Terrence O’Donnell. Justice Stratton wrote that in her view the majority holding weakens the uncharged suspect exception to the Public Records Act, and makes it more difficult for trial courts to determine which parts of particular records are exempt from disclosure.
She wrote: “The majority’s decision to attempt to redact the suspect’s name, address, and place and dates of employment creates a new standard that is not only onerous to trial courts but, as in this case, as a practical matter, is unworkable. The reality is that just redacting the uncharged suspect’s name, place of employment, dates he or she worked for the organization, and other specific identifying information will not prevent the high probability of disclosure of the uncharged suspect’s identity in a less populous county such as the one in this case, where the suspect involved may be the only person in the county during the time in question to have held the position of leadership he or she held and may have been employed at the only organization of its kind in that county.”
“ ... The court of appeals has already reviewed the disputed ten sealed documents and found them to be confidential law enforcement investigatory records, each of which is exempt from disclosure, concluding that release of the disputed records would ‘undoubtedly reveal the identity of the uncharged suspect.’ ... Absent an abuse of discretion, we should not second-guess these findings and substitute our own opinion for that of the lower courts.”
Contacts
Konrad Kircher, 513.229.7996, for Beth Rocker.
Daniel Padden, 740.432.6322, for the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3288.
Guernsey App. No. 09-CA-4, 2009-Ohio-6336. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the court of appeals.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer, O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton and O'Donnell, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3288.pdf
(July 20, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that some of the investigatory records compiled or accessed by the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office during its investigation of a 2008 complaint alleging sexual abuse of a child by a priest in the 1990s are not exempt from disclosure under the Ohio Public Records Act, and those documents must therefore be provided in redacted form to the person who filed the complaint.
In a 5-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that, if names, places of employment and other identifying information were redacted (blacked out) from some of the requested documents, they would not fall under an exemption in the Public Records Act that bars disclosure of law enforcement investigatory records if their release would create a high probability of disclosing the identity of a suspect who was not charged with a criminal offense.
In 2008, Beth Rocker filed a report with the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office alleging that she had been sexually assaulted in the early 1990s, when she was a child. Rocker claimed that the priest of the church she had attended as a child was the perpetrator of the crime. The sheriff’s office conducted an investigation and the county prosecutor submitted information obtained through that investigation to a grand jury. No indictment was returned. After the investigation had concluded, Rocker, through counsel, made a public-records request “for the entire contents of the investigative file and any documents reviewed during or related to the investigation.” The sheriff’s office provided Rocker with a copy of the incident report, but denied her access to the remaining investigative records.
A few months later, Rocker filed a complaint in the 5th District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the sheriff’s office to provide her with access to “all documents reviewed during, related to, or prepared concerning the criminal investigation” of the suspect. After the sheriff’s office filed a response, the court ordered the office to submit copies of all the requested records under seal for an in-camera inspection. Pursuant to the court’s order, the parties submitted briefs on whether the various categories of investigative records withheld by the sheriff’s office are disclosable under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. On Dec. 2, 2009, the court of appeals denied the writ. Rocker exercised her right to appeal the 5th District’s ruling to the Supreme Court.
In today’s majority opinion, the Court wrote: “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception. ... The sheriff’s office claimed, and the court of appeals determined, that the remaining requested records are exempt from disclosure as confidential-law enforcement investigatory records under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and (2). ... (T)he court of appeals held that the release of the investigative records would probably reveal the identity of an uncharged suspect under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a). The claimed perpetrator of the sexual assault is an uncharged suspect because he has never been charged with a criminal offense.”
“(T)his exception applies only to those portions of records that, if released, would create a high probability of disclosure of the suspect’s identity. We have held that records are exempt under the uncharged-suspect exception when ‘the protected identities of uncharged suspects are inextricably intertwined with the investigatory records.’ ... The court of appeals determined, in effect, that every part of the requested records was inextricably intertwined with the identity of the priest accused of sexual assault and that the records were thus not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43. ... We have reviewed the sealed records and conclude that some of the withheld records are subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act because they are not inextricably intertwined with the suspect’s protected identity. For most of these records, if the sheriff’s office redacts the priest’s name, the name, location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific identifying information, the disclosure of the records will not create a high probability of disclosure of the priest’s identity.”
“Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that all the withheld investigative records were covered by a blanket uncharged-suspect exemption. ... Based on our independent review of the sealed investigative records, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause so that the court can review the sealed records and order the disclosure of those records following the redaction of those portions of the record that are subject to the uncharged-suspect exemption, e.g., the priest’s name, his address, the name, location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific, identifying information. By so holding, we adhere to our strict construction of exceptions to the Public Records Act as well as our duty to resolve any doubt in favor of access to public records.”
The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Terrence O’Donnell. Justice Stratton wrote that in her view the majority holding weakens the uncharged suspect exception to the Public Records Act, and makes it more difficult for trial courts to determine which parts of particular records are exempt from disclosure.
She wrote: “The majority’s decision to attempt to redact the suspect’s name, address, and place and dates of employment creates a new standard that is not only onerous to trial courts but, as in this case, as a practical matter, is unworkable. The reality is that just redacting the uncharged suspect’s name, place of employment, dates he or she worked for the organization, and other specific identifying information will not prevent the high probability of disclosure of the uncharged suspect’s identity in a less populous county such as the one in this case, where the suspect involved may be the only person in the county during the time in question to have held the position of leadership he or she held and may have been employed at the only organization of its kind in that county.”
“ ... The court of appeals has already reviewed the disputed ten sealed documents and found them to be confidential law enforcement investigatory records, each of which is exempt from disclosure, concluding that release of the disputed records would ‘undoubtedly reveal the identity of the uncharged suspect.’ ... Absent an abuse of discretion, we should not second-guess these findings and substitute our own opinion for that of the lower courts.”
Contacts
Konrad Kircher, 513.229.7996, for Beth Rocker.
Daniel Padden, 740.432.6322, for the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Court Rules Police Not Required to Convert Records Submitted on File Cards to Other Format
Under State Public Records Act
State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3267.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91831, 2009-Ohio-5688. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and O'Donnell and Cupp, JJ., concur separately.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3267.pdf
(July 15, 2010) In a 7-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the Cleveland Division of Police did not violate the Ohio Public Records Act by maintaining its archive of the daily reports it receives from local pawnbrokers on 3-by-5 inch index cards – the format in which those reports are submitted by the pawnbrokers.
The Court’s per curiam decision left in place a writ of mandamus and award of $1,000 in statutory damages against the city for failing to promptly provide a complete list of pawnbrokers in response to a public records request by a private citizen, Brian Bardwell. However, the Court reversed a ruling by 8th District Court of Appeals that the city had also violated its duty under a separate provision of the Public Records Act that requires government agencies “to organize and maintain public records in a manner that allows them to be made available for inspection and copying.”
The Court wrote: “R.C. 4727.09 requires that pawnbrokers provide to police chiefs on a daily basis (1) a description of all property pledged with or purchased by the pawnbroker and (2) the number of the form used to document the pledge or purchase, but the statute does not require that the information be supplied in any particular form. Pawnbrokers have submitted this information on both sides of preprinted index cards. There is no evidence that the city requires that pawnbrokers submit the information on these cards. Once these cards are received by the police chief, they are public records. Although R.C. 149.43(B)(2) imposes a duty on appellants to ‘organize and maintain public records in a manner that they can be made available for inspection and copying,’ there is no duty imposed on public offices and officials to store the records in a different form than the form in which they were received. There is also ‘no duty to create or provide access to nonexistent records.’”
“ ... Although from a policy standpoint, appellants could reduce delays in satisfying public-records requests in the future by requesting pawnbrokers to submit this information on an 8½- by 11-inch, one-sided paper form, there is no requirement under R.C. 149.43(B)(2) that appellants do so, and the court of appeals was not authorized to create such a duty. ... Under these circumstances, the court of appeals erred in holding that appellants violated R.C. 149.43(B)(2). Appellants did not fail to organize and maintain the index cards they received from pawnbrokers in such a manner that they could be made available for inspection and copying.”
Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor and Judith Ann Lanzinger joined the Court’s opinion.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell entered a separate concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Robert R. Cupp, in which he wrote: “(A)lthough I agree that the city did not violate R.C. 149.43(B)(2) in this case, R.C. 149.43(B)(1) mandates that public records be ‘promptly prepared and made available.’ Accordingly, when its budget allows, the city could take advantage of technological advances to upgrade its public-records system to minimize any delay in responding to public-records requests.”
Contacts
Jerome A. Payne Jr., 216.664.2800, for the City of Cleveland.
Brian Bardwell did not oppose the city’s appeal.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3267.
Cuyahoga App. No. 91831, 2009-Ohio-5688. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed.
Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and O'Donnell and Cupp, JJ., concur separately.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3267.pdf
(July 15, 2010) In a 7-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the Cleveland Division of Police did not violate the Ohio Public Records Act by maintaining its archive of the daily reports it receives from local pawnbrokers on 3-by-5 inch index cards – the format in which those reports are submitted by the pawnbrokers.
The Court’s per curiam decision left in place a writ of mandamus and award of $1,000 in statutory damages against the city for failing to promptly provide a complete list of pawnbrokers in response to a public records request by a private citizen, Brian Bardwell. However, the Court reversed a ruling by 8th District Court of Appeals that the city had also violated its duty under a separate provision of the Public Records Act that requires government agencies “to organize and maintain public records in a manner that allows them to be made available for inspection and copying.”
The Court wrote: “R.C. 4727.09 requires that pawnbrokers provide to police chiefs on a daily basis (1) a description of all property pledged with or purchased by the pawnbroker and (2) the number of the form used to document the pledge or purchase, but the statute does not require that the information be supplied in any particular form. Pawnbrokers have submitted this information on both sides of preprinted index cards. There is no evidence that the city requires that pawnbrokers submit the information on these cards. Once these cards are received by the police chief, they are public records. Although R.C. 149.43(B)(2) imposes a duty on appellants to ‘organize and maintain public records in a manner that they can be made available for inspection and copying,’ there is no duty imposed on public offices and officials to store the records in a different form than the form in which they were received. There is also ‘no duty to create or provide access to nonexistent records.’”
“ ... Although from a policy standpoint, appellants could reduce delays in satisfying public-records requests in the future by requesting pawnbrokers to submit this information on an 8½- by 11-inch, one-sided paper form, there is no requirement under R.C. 149.43(B)(2) that appellants do so, and the court of appeals was not authorized to create such a duty. ... Under these circumstances, the court of appeals erred in holding that appellants violated R.C. 149.43(B)(2). Appellants did not fail to organize and maintain the index cards they received from pawnbrokers in such a manner that they could be made available for inspection and copying.”
Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor and Judith Ann Lanzinger joined the Court’s opinion.
Justice Terrence O’Donnell entered a separate concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Robert R. Cupp, in which he wrote: “(A)lthough I agree that the city did not violate R.C. 149.43(B)(2) in this case, R.C. 149.43(B)(1) mandates that public records be ‘promptly prepared and made available.’ Accordingly, when its budget allows, the city could take advantage of technological advances to upgrade its public-records system to minimize any delay in responding to public-records requests.”
Contacts
Jerome A. Payne Jr., 216.664.2800, for the City of Cleveland.
Brian Bardwell did not oppose the city’s appeal.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Copley Man Changes Plea, Sentenced to Six Months in Prison
Lawrence Miller, II of Caleb Road in Copley, Ohio appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Tuesday, July 21 and entered a plea of "no contest" to one charge of Identity Theft, a fourth degree felony. Pursuant to an agreement with the State of Ohio, Mr. Miller waived a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler then imposed a six month prison sentence with credit for 127 days that Mr. Miller served in jail waiting trial.
Mr. Miller was charged with Identity Theft because he gave his brother's name to a police officer when he was stopped for operating while under the influence of alcohol. While he was still at the Medina County Jail for the under the influence charge, the arresting officer learned his true identity and charged Mr. Miller with the felony offense.
Mr. Miller was charged with Identity Theft because he gave his brother's name to a police officer when he was stopped for operating while under the influence of alcohol. While he was still at the Medina County Jail for the under the influence charge, the arresting officer learned his true identity and charged Mr. Miller with the felony offense.
Judge Kimbler's Court Schedule for July 21 through July 27, 2010
Click here to see the schedule for Judge Kimbler's courtroom for the dates of July 21 through July 27, 2010.
Judge Collier's Civil Case Report for June, 2010
At the beginning of June, Judge Christopher Collier had 658 civil cases pending on his docket. During the month, there were 110 new civil cases assigned to his docket and there were six cases either transferred to his docket, reassigned to his docket, or redisignated to his docket. This meant that at some point during June, Judge Collier had 774 cases pending on his docket.
During June, Judge Collier disposed of 175 civil cases. Of the cases disposed, three were disposed by jury trials; 85 were settled or dismissed; 25 were disposed by default judgments; 43 were assigned to Magistrate James Leaver, eight were transferred to another judge or court; and 11 were stayed due to a bankruptcy or interlocutory appeal. This meant that at the end of June, Judge Collier had 599 civil cases pending on his docket.
During June, Judge Collier disposed of 175 civil cases. Of the cases disposed, three were disposed by jury trials; 85 were settled or dismissed; 25 were disposed by default judgments; 43 were assigned to Magistrate James Leaver, eight were transferred to another judge or court; and 11 were stayed due to a bankruptcy or interlocutory appeal. This meant that at the end of June, Judge Collier had 599 civil cases pending on his docket.
Arraignment Schedule for Judge Kimbler's Courtroom for Thursday, July 22
The following defendants are scheduled to appear in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, July 22, 2010 for arraignments:
Brian R. McKee of Sunset Drive in Medina, Ohio on three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, a felony of the fifth degree.
Michael Leskin of Laurel Lane in Brunswick, Ohio on one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth degree felony.
David M. Hinz of Boston Road in Brunswick, Ohio on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, (Motor Vehicle), a fourth degree felony.
Michael A. Reddish of Imagine Lane in Medina, Ohio, on one count of Illegal Use of Minor in Nudity Oriented Material or Performance, a fifth degree felony.
Stacey K. Wilmington of Springbrook in Medina, Ohio, on one count of Theft (Over $500.00), a fifth degree felony.
Brian R. McKee of Sunset Drive in Medina, Ohio on three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, a felony of the fifth degree.
Michael Leskin of Laurel Lane in Brunswick, Ohio on one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth degree felony.
David M. Hinz of Boston Road in Brunswick, Ohio on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, (Motor Vehicle), a fourth degree felony.
Michael A. Reddish of Imagine Lane in Medina, Ohio, on one count of Illegal Use of Minor in Nudity Oriented Material or Performance, a fifth degree felony.
Stacey K. Wilmington of Springbrook in Medina, Ohio, on one count of Theft (Over $500.00), a fifth degree felony.
Medina County Adult Probation Department's June Report
Veronica Perry, Chief Probation Officer for the Medina County Common Pleas Court, reports that Judge Collier and Judge Kimbler made the following assignments and referrals to her department in June:
Two defendants were referred to the Department for intensive supervision, both by Judge Collier.
10 defendants were referred to the Department for general supervision, four by Judge Kimbler and six by Judge Collier.
Two defendants were referred to the Department for community service work, both by Judge Kimbler.
Each judge assigned one defendant to home incarceration.
26 defendants were referred to the Department for pre-sentence investigation reports, 11 by Judge Kimbler and 15 by Judge Collier.
Judge Kimbler referred three defendants to see if they were eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction and Judge Collier referred three defendants to see if they were eligible to have their convictions expunged.
Judge Kimbler referred one defendant to see if that defendant qualified for his mental health docket.
Two defendants were referred to the Department for intensive supervision, both by Judge Collier.
10 defendants were referred to the Department for general supervision, four by Judge Kimbler and six by Judge Collier.
Two defendants were referred to the Department for community service work, both by Judge Kimbler.
Each judge assigned one defendant to home incarceration.
26 defendants were referred to the Department for pre-sentence investigation reports, 11 by Judge Kimbler and 15 by Judge Collier.
Judge Kimbler referred three defendants to see if they were eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction and Judge Collier referred three defendants to see if they were eligible to have their convictions expunged.
Judge Kimbler referred one defendant to see if that defendant qualified for his mental health docket.
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman's Report on Judge Colliers' Criminal Docket for July 19
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Collier's Court on July 19, 2010, for criminal cases:
Joseph Bowes, 20, of West North Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to two years in prison on two counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. He also was classified as a Tier II Sex Offender.
Freddious McCline, 33, of Anderson Street in Akron, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Improperly Handling a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony.
Joseph Bowes, 20, of West North Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to two years in prison on two counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. He also was classified as a Tier II Sex Offender.
Freddious McCline, 33, of Anderson Street in Akron, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Improperly Handling a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Split Verdict in Criminal Jury Trial
A Medina County Common Pleas jury entered returned split verdicts in a criminal case in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, July 15. The defendant in the case, Mr. William R. Carson, Jr., of Akron, Ohio, was charged with seven counts. At the end of the State's case, Judge Kimbler granted Mr. Carson's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal made pursuant to Criminal Rule 29. Judge Kimbler granted the motion as to two counts of Burglary and Attempted Burglary. On two other counts of Breaking and Entering, Judge Kimbler allowed them to proceed as charges of Criminal Trespass.
As a result of Judge Kimbler's ruling, the jury was given job of deciding whether Mr. Carson was guilty of Burglary, Attempted Burglary, two counts of Criminal Trespass, and one count of Possession of Criminal Tools. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charge of Attempted Burglary and on the two charges of Criminal Trespass. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty of the charge of Burglary and Possession of Criminal Tools.
Mr. Carson was remanded back to the Medina County jail and a pre-sentence investigation was ordered. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Carson on August 26, 2010 at 8:30 am.
As a result of Judge Kimbler's ruling, the jury was given job of deciding whether Mr. Carson was guilty of Burglary, Attempted Burglary, two counts of Criminal Trespass, and one count of Possession of Criminal Tools. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charge of Attempted Burglary and on the two charges of Criminal Trespass. The jury returned verdicts of not guilty of the charge of Burglary and Possession of Criminal Tools.
Mr. Carson was remanded back to the Medina County jail and a pre-sentence investigation was ordered. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Carson on August 26, 2010 at 8:30 am.
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman's Report on Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Kimbler's court on July 15 for criminal cases:
William Beck, 34, of High Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on four counts of Breaking and Entering and four counts of Vandalism, all of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Raymond Gunderman, 30, of Manitoulin Pike in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony, and one count of Unlicensed Manufacturing of Fireworks, a third-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $3,875.75 in restitution to the Medina Police Department and to forfeit a television and a computer.
Julie Holderbaum, 44, of Knox Boulevard in Akron, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Michael Kirby, 44, of Grant Street in Medina, was sentenced to 180 days in jail on one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony.
Ryan Porter, 21, of Bank Street in Lodi, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a third-degree felony. He was ordered to forfeit $3,625 to law enforcement.
Farrin Bratcher, 54, of North State Street in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 22.
Nichole Fenick, 32, of Valley Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fourth-degree felony, and five counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for August 23.
Randall Finkel, 25, of state Route 58 in Wellington, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Edward Greathouse, 39, of Jefferson Street in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 21.
Lisa Ispan, 22, of Gleason Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 31.
Luke Rufener, 21, of Heritage Lane in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Burglary, two of which are second-degree felonies and one of which is a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 7.
Robert Shattuck, 44, of Stanford Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 20.
Stephen Simpkins, 20, of Chevrolet Boulevard in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Mackenzie Vild, 20, of Substation Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Ryan Walter, 31, of Peterson Road in Mansfield, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
William Beck, 34, of High Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on four counts of Breaking and Entering and four counts of Vandalism, all of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Raymond Gunderman, 30, of Manitoulin Pike in Brunswick, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony, and one count of Unlicensed Manufacturing of Fireworks, a third-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $3,875.75 in restitution to the Medina Police Department and to forfeit a television and a computer.
Julie Holderbaum, 44, of Knox Boulevard in Akron, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Michael Kirby, 44, of Grant Street in Medina, was sentenced to 180 days in jail on one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony.
Ryan Porter, 21, of Bank Street in Lodi, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a third-degree felony. He was ordered to forfeit $3,625 to law enforcement.
Farrin Bratcher, 54, of North State Street in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 22.
Nichole Fenick, 32, of Valley Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fourth-degree felony, and five counts of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for August 23.
Randall Finkel, 25, of state Route 58 in Wellington, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Edward Greathouse, 39, of Jefferson Street in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 21.
Lisa Ispan, 22, of Gleason Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 31.
Luke Rufener, 21, of Heritage Lane in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Burglary, two of which are second-degree felonies and one of which is a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 7.
Robert Shattuck, 44, of Stanford Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 20.
Stephen Simpkins, 20, of Chevrolet Boulevard in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of a School or Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Mackenzie Vild, 20, of Substation Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 14.
Ryan Walter, 31, of Peterson Road in Mansfield, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
Expert Affidavit That Contradicts Prior Deposition Does Not Create Factual Issue to Prevent Summary Judgment
Unless Expert Sufficiently Explains Reason for the Contradiction
Pettiford v. Aggarwal, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3237.
Montgomery App. No. 22736, 2009-Ohio-3642. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Pfeifer, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3237.pdf
(July 14, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when the affidavit of a retained nonparty expert is submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment, and statements in the affidavit contradict testimony given by the same expert during a prior deposition, the affidavit does not create a “genuine issue of material fact” that prevents summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.
Applying that holding to a Montgomery County medical malpractice case, the Court reversed a decision of the 2nd District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court’s 5-2 majority decision was written by Justice Maureen O’Connor.
The case involved a suit filed by Barbara Pettiford of Dayton against Dr. Rajendra Aggarwal. Pettiford alleged that in analyzing a chest x-ray taken in 1999, Dr. Aggarwal negligently failed to detect a benign tumor in her lung.
Pettiford identified Dr. Trent Sickles as an expert witness to provide testimony in support of her claim. In responding to questions posed by Dr. Aggarwal’s attorneys during a pretrial deposition, Dr. Sickles indicated that he did not have an opinion regarding whether Dr. Aggarwal’s acts or omissions had resulted in Pettiford’s injuries, and did not plan to testify with regard to the issue of causation. Dr. Aggarwal subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Pettiford’s complaint, arguing that because she had not provided expert testimony attesting that her injuries were the result of the doctor’s acts or omissions, Pettiford had not met the requirements for her malpractice claim to proceed to trial.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Pettiford submitted an affidavit signed by Dr. Sickles stating that in his opinion Dr. Aggarwal’s failure to detect the tumor in 1999 was responsible for subsequent medical treatment that Pettiford received. Dr. Aggarwal filed a motion to strike the affidavit, citing a 2006 Supreme Court of Ohio decision, Byrd v. Smith, which held that an affidavit submitted by a party opposing summary judgment that contradicted the same person’s earlier deposition testimony, without a sufficient explanation for the contradiction, did not prevent an award of summary judgment. Without ruling on the motion to strike or stating the legal rationale for its decision, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Aggarwal.
Pettiford appealed. On review, the 2nd District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals held that the Supreme Court’s Byrd decision was not applicable because Byrd addressed only contradictory affidavits submitted by self-interested parties in a case, whereas the source of the disputed affidavit in this case was a third-party expert witness. The Supreme Court agreed to review the 2nd District’s decision and determine whether the legal reasoning of its Byrd decision also applies in cases where an affidavit submitted by a retained expert witness in opposition to a summary judgment motion contradicts testimony by that same expert in a prior deposition.
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor noted that a retained expert witness in a civil action has a close working relationship with the party on whose behalf he or she offers testimony, and also with that party’s attorney. Because of this and other parallels between a party and a retained expert witness, the majority determined that the rationale supporting the Byrd rule is germane in the case of a contradictory affidavit of a retained expert witness. Justice O’Connor wrote: “The retained expert witness is engaged to review the facts and offer opinion testimony on the essential, material elements of the claim at issue. In essence, the expert is an extended voice of the party and the proponent of the party’s claims. ... Unlike an attorney’s limited contact with a fact witness or a treating physician, an attorney’s direction of a retained, nonparty expert is significant, akin to the attorney’s direction of a party. The attorney directs the expert as to the subject matter upon which an opinion is needed, helps to determine what evidence the expert reviews, and works closely with the expert throughout the litigation to prove or defend against the causes of action.”
“ ... While the attorney technically does not represent the expert during the expert’s deposition, the attorney customarily prepares the expert for the deposition and supports the expert during the deposition just as he or she would with a party. And the attorney often acts during an expert’s deposition as he or she would act during a party’s deposition, objecting to opposing counsel’s questioning and rehabilitating the expert if necessary. If the attorney is dissatisfied with the expert’s deposition testimony or believes that a misstatement has been made, the attorney has the ability to clarify the deposition on the record. ... The numerous parallels between the degree of control an attorney has over a party and over a retained, nonparty expert lead us to the conclusion that Byrd’sruling should apply to contradictory affidavits of retained, nonparty experts to prevent the use of a self-serving affidavit to defeat summary judgment. If a retained, nonparty expert is permitted to defeat summary judgment at the eleventh hour by changing his or her opinions without a sufficient explanation, summary judgment will be rendered meaningless.”
“We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.”
Applying that holding to the disputed affidavit in this case, Justice O’Connor wrote: “The determination of whether Dr. Sickles’ affidavit contradicted his deposition without a sufficient explanation for the alleged contradiction is a factual determination that is properly made by the trier of fact. The trial court did not expound on its reasoning for granting Dr. Aggarwal’s motion for summary judgment and never ruled on the motion to strike Dr. Sickles’ affidavit, and the appellate court declined to apply the Byrd analysis. In light of our clarification of Byrd’sapplicability, the appropriate course is to remand this matter to the trial court to apply the analysis set forth herein. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court to now engage in that analysis.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Chief Justice Eric Brown entered a separate opinion in which he agreed with the majority’s remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings, but dissented from its expansion of the Byrd decision to cases involving retained experts. He wrote: “From the record, it is clear that the nature of Dr. Sickles’s affidavit and deposition testimony has not been addressed explicitly by the lower courts. I agree with the majority that the determination of whether a contradiction exists should be made by the trial court. Therefore, I would remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of whether a contradiction exists. I find that no discussion of whether to extend the holding of Byrd to retained, nonparty experts is warranted until there has been a clear determination that the affidavit contradicts, not merely supplements, the deposition testimony.”
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer dissented without opinion, stating that he would affirm the ruling of the court of appeals.
Contacts
Lawrence J. White, 937.294.5800, for Barbara Pettiford.
Kevin W. Popham, 614.485.1800, for Dr. Rajendra K. Aggarwal.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Pettiford v. Aggarwal, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3237.
Montgomery App. No. 22736, 2009-Ohio-3642. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Pfeifer, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3237.pdf
(July 14, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when the affidavit of a retained nonparty expert is submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment, and statements in the affidavit contradict testimony given by the same expert during a prior deposition, the affidavit does not create a “genuine issue of material fact” that prevents summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.
Applying that holding to a Montgomery County medical malpractice case, the Court reversed a decision of the 2nd District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court’s 5-2 majority decision was written by Justice Maureen O’Connor.
The case involved a suit filed by Barbara Pettiford of Dayton against Dr. Rajendra Aggarwal. Pettiford alleged that in analyzing a chest x-ray taken in 1999, Dr. Aggarwal negligently failed to detect a benign tumor in her lung.
Pettiford identified Dr. Trent Sickles as an expert witness to provide testimony in support of her claim. In responding to questions posed by Dr. Aggarwal’s attorneys during a pretrial deposition, Dr. Sickles indicated that he did not have an opinion regarding whether Dr. Aggarwal’s acts or omissions had resulted in Pettiford’s injuries, and did not plan to testify with regard to the issue of causation. Dr. Aggarwal subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Pettiford’s complaint, arguing that because she had not provided expert testimony attesting that her injuries were the result of the doctor’s acts or omissions, Pettiford had not met the requirements for her malpractice claim to proceed to trial.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Pettiford submitted an affidavit signed by Dr. Sickles stating that in his opinion Dr. Aggarwal’s failure to detect the tumor in 1999 was responsible for subsequent medical treatment that Pettiford received. Dr. Aggarwal filed a motion to strike the affidavit, citing a 2006 Supreme Court of Ohio decision, Byrd v. Smith, which held that an affidavit submitted by a party opposing summary judgment that contradicted the same person’s earlier deposition testimony, without a sufficient explanation for the contradiction, did not prevent an award of summary judgment. Without ruling on the motion to strike or stating the legal rationale for its decision, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Aggarwal.
Pettiford appealed. On review, the 2nd District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. In a divided opinion, the court of appeals held that the Supreme Court’s Byrd decision was not applicable because Byrd addressed only contradictory affidavits submitted by self-interested parties in a case, whereas the source of the disputed affidavit in this case was a third-party expert witness. The Supreme Court agreed to review the 2nd District’s decision and determine whether the legal reasoning of its Byrd decision also applies in cases where an affidavit submitted by a retained expert witness in opposition to a summary judgment motion contradicts testimony by that same expert in a prior deposition.
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor noted that a retained expert witness in a civil action has a close working relationship with the party on whose behalf he or she offers testimony, and also with that party’s attorney. Because of this and other parallels between a party and a retained expert witness, the majority determined that the rationale supporting the Byrd rule is germane in the case of a contradictory affidavit of a retained expert witness. Justice O’Connor wrote: “The retained expert witness is engaged to review the facts and offer opinion testimony on the essential, material elements of the claim at issue. In essence, the expert is an extended voice of the party and the proponent of the party’s claims. ... Unlike an attorney’s limited contact with a fact witness or a treating physician, an attorney’s direction of a retained, nonparty expert is significant, akin to the attorney’s direction of a party. The attorney directs the expert as to the subject matter upon which an opinion is needed, helps to determine what evidence the expert reviews, and works closely with the expert throughout the litigation to prove or defend against the causes of action.”
“ ... While the attorney technically does not represent the expert during the expert’s deposition, the attorney customarily prepares the expert for the deposition and supports the expert during the deposition just as he or she would with a party. And the attorney often acts during an expert’s deposition as he or she would act during a party’s deposition, objecting to opposing counsel’s questioning and rehabilitating the expert if necessary. If the attorney is dissatisfied with the expert’s deposition testimony or believes that a misstatement has been made, the attorney has the ability to clarify the deposition on the record. ... The numerous parallels between the degree of control an attorney has over a party and over a retained, nonparty expert lead us to the conclusion that Byrd’sruling should apply to contradictory affidavits of retained, nonparty experts to prevent the use of a self-serving affidavit to defeat summary judgment. If a retained, nonparty expert is permitted to defeat summary judgment at the eleventh hour by changing his or her opinions without a sufficient explanation, summary judgment will be rendered meaningless.”
“We hold that an affidavit of a retained, nonparty expert contradicting the former deposition testimony of that expert and submitted in opposition to a pending motion for summary judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact to prevent summary judgment unless the expert sufficiently explains the reason for the contradiction.”
Applying that holding to the disputed affidavit in this case, Justice O’Connor wrote: “The determination of whether Dr. Sickles’ affidavit contradicted his deposition without a sufficient explanation for the alleged contradiction is a factual determination that is properly made by the trier of fact. The trial court did not expound on its reasoning for granting Dr. Aggarwal’s motion for summary judgment and never ruled on the motion to strike Dr. Sickles’ affidavit, and the appellate court declined to apply the Byrd analysis. In light of our clarification of Byrd’sapplicability, the appropriate course is to remand this matter to the trial court to apply the analysis set forth herein. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial court to now engage in that analysis.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Robert R. Cupp.
Chief Justice Eric Brown entered a separate opinion in which he agreed with the majority’s remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings, but dissented from its expansion of the Byrd decision to cases involving retained experts. He wrote: “From the record, it is clear that the nature of Dr. Sickles’s affidavit and deposition testimony has not been addressed explicitly by the lower courts. I agree with the majority that the determination of whether a contradiction exists should be made by the trial court. Therefore, I would remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of whether a contradiction exists. I find that no discussion of whether to extend the holding of Byrd to retained, nonparty experts is warranted until there has been a clear determination that the affidavit contradicts, not merely supplements, the deposition testimony.”
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer dissented without opinion, stating that he would affirm the ruling of the court of appeals.
Contacts
Lawrence J. White, 937.294.5800, for Barbara Pettiford.
Kevin W. Popham, 614.485.1800, for Dr. Rajendra K. Aggarwal.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman's Report on Judge Collier's July 12, 2010 Criminal Docket
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that following people appeared in Judge Collier’s court July 12 for criminal cases:
Danielle Spahn, 27, of Northland Drive in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony.
Eric Vormelker, 27, of Wooster Street in Lodi, was sentenced to 90 days of residential community control sanctions on one count of Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a fifth-degree felony.
Alan Zgrabik, 24, of Ballash Road in Seville, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Burglary, a third-degree felony.
James Brooks, 33, of Chestnut Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 23.
Matthew Harris, 43, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Felonious Assault on a Peace Officer, a first-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
Nicholas Mauch, 23, of Blueberry Hill Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Jamie Maynard, 23, of Ledge Road in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug and one count of Possession of Drugs, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. She was sentenced to one year in prison.
Vincent Milczewski, 24, of Behrwald Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony, and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 8.
James Nixon, 27, of East 4th Street in Ashland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 8.
Jacob Packard, 18, of Avon Lake Road in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Glenn Schutte, 20, of Greenwich Road in Seville, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Joseph Skiba, 27, of Etta Boulevard in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Brenda Spidell, 46, of Hamlin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Trent Turner, 21, of Holborn Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Robbery, both of which are second-degree felonies. The charges carry a firearm specification. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Danielle Spahn, 27, of Northland Drive in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony.
Eric Vormelker, 27, of Wooster Street in Lodi, was sentenced to 90 days of residential community control sanctions on one count of Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a fifth-degree felony.
Alan Zgrabik, 24, of Ballash Road in Seville, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Burglary, a third-degree felony.
James Brooks, 33, of Chestnut Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 23.
Matthew Harris, 43, of Bank Street in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Felonious Assault on a Peace Officer, a first-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
Nicholas Mauch, 23, of Blueberry Hill Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Jamie Maynard, 23, of Ledge Road in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug and one count of Possession of Drugs, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. She was sentenced to one year in prison.
Vincent Milczewski, 24, of Behrwald Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony, and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 8.
James Nixon, 27, of East 4th Street in Ashland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft from the Elderly, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 8.
Jacob Packard, 18, of Avon Lake Road in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Glenn Schutte, 20, of Greenwich Road in Seville, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Joseph Skiba, 27, of Etta Boulevard in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Brenda Spidell, 46, of Hamlin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Trent Turner, 21, of Holborn Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Robbery, both of which are second-degree felonies. The charges carry a firearm specification. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Monday, July 12, 2010
Judge Kimbler Civil Case Report for June, 2010
Judge Kimbler started June with 647 pending civil cases. During June, 102 new civil cases were filed and five civil cases were reassigned, reactivated, or transferred into Judge Kimbler's courtroom. As a result, during June, Judge Kimbler had 854 cases pending at some point on his docket.
During June, Judge Kimbler disposed of 121 civil cases. Of those dispositions, 10 were settled or dismissed prior to trial; 26 were dismissed; default judgments were granted in 28 cases; three cases were transferred to another judge; 13 were stayed as a result of either a bankruptcy filing or an interlocutory appeal; and 39 were terminated for other reasons. As a result of these dispositions, Judge Kimbler had 636 civil cases pending at the end of June.
In both the new filings and the dispositions, the single biggest category of case was Foreclosures with 49 new cases filed and 62 cases disposed. The second biggest category was Other Civil with 42 new filings and 41 dispositions. Rounding out the top three categories was Other Torts with nine new filings and 12 dispositions.
During June, Judge Kimbler disposed of 121 civil cases. Of those dispositions, 10 were settled or dismissed prior to trial; 26 were dismissed; default judgments were granted in 28 cases; three cases were transferred to another judge; 13 were stayed as a result of either a bankruptcy filing or an interlocutory appeal; and 39 were terminated for other reasons. As a result of these dispositions, Judge Kimbler had 636 civil cases pending at the end of June.
In both the new filings and the dispositions, the single biggest category of case was Foreclosures with 49 new cases filed and 62 cases disposed. The second biggest category was Other Civil with 42 new filings and 41 dispositions. Rounding out the top three categories was Other Torts with nine new filings and 12 dispositions.
Medina County Common Pleas Court Adult Criminal Case Report
Judge Collier and Judge Kimbler started the month of June with 210 pending criminal cases. During the month each judge took in 33 new cases. During the month they disposed of 58 cases. Those cases were disposed of in the following manner:
In Judge Collier's court one case was sent to diversion; 15 cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to the original charge; two cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to amended charges; in three cases the defendant was not available for trial or sentencing; and one case was terminated by other means.
In Judge Kimbler's court two cases were terminated by a court trial; four cases were dismissed by the State; one case was sent to diversion; 13 cases were resolved by pleas of no contest or guilty to the original charge; two cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to amended charges; one defendant was not available for either trial or sentencing; eleven cases were transferred to another judge; and two cases were terminated by other means.
At the end of June Judge Collier had 127 cases pending on his docket and Judge Kimbler had 116 cases pending on his docket.
In Judge Collier's court one case was sent to diversion; 15 cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to the original charge; two cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to amended charges; in three cases the defendant was not available for trial or sentencing; and one case was terminated by other means.
In Judge Kimbler's court two cases were terminated by a court trial; four cases were dismissed by the State; one case was sent to diversion; 13 cases were resolved by pleas of no contest or guilty to the original charge; two cases were resolved by pleas of guilty or no contest to amended charges; one defendant was not available for either trial or sentencing; eleven cases were transferred to another judge; and two cases were terminated by other means.
At the end of June Judge Collier had 127 cases pending on his docket and Judge Kimbler had 116 cases pending on his docket.
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Sentences for Friday, July 9, 2010
Judge Kimbler sentenced two defendants on Friday, July 9, 2010. The defendants were Jeffery P. Foster of Parma, Ohio and William E. Reindel, III also of Parma, Ohio. Mr. Foster was sentenced for one count of Theft of a Check, a fifth degree felony. Mr. Reindel was sentenced for three counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Counterfeit Substance, both felonies of the fifth degree.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Foster to three years of general supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. While under supervision Mr. Foster must complete 24 hours of community service; undergo a drug-alcohol abuse assessment and abide by any aftercare recommendations; continue weekly attendance at NA meetings; and pay court costs and a monthly community control sanction fee. If Mr. Foster violates the terms and conditions of supervision, he is facing a six month prison sentence.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Reindel to five years of intensive supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. While under supervision Mr. Reindell must perform 24 hours of community service; undergo a drug-alcohol abuse assessment and abide by any after recommendations; and make reasonable efforts to obtain and maintain full time employment. If he violates supervision, he is facing a 12 month prison sentence. Judge Kimbler waived court costs and did not impose any community control sanction fees.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Foster to three years of general supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. While under supervision Mr. Foster must complete 24 hours of community service; undergo a drug-alcohol abuse assessment and abide by any aftercare recommendations; continue weekly attendance at NA meetings; and pay court costs and a monthly community control sanction fee. If Mr. Foster violates the terms and conditions of supervision, he is facing a six month prison sentence.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Reindel to five years of intensive supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. While under supervision Mr. Reindell must perform 24 hours of community service; undergo a drug-alcohol abuse assessment and abide by any after recommendations; and make reasonable efforts to obtain and maintain full time employment. If he violates supervision, he is facing a 12 month prison sentence. Judge Kimbler waived court costs and did not impose any community control sanction fees.
Judge Kimbler Arraigns 18 Defendants on Friday, June 9, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the defendants listed below appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on Friday, July 9, 2010 for arraignment. All of them entered pleas of not guilty and their cases were scheduled for trial.
Jemil A. Harrison of Cleveland, Ohio, who is charged with 2 counts of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which are fourth degree felonies.
Nichole M. Fenick of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Illegal Possession of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony; and five counts of Deception to Obtain Dangerous Drugs, all of which are fifth degree felonies.
John A. McCarty of Wadsworth, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Burglary, a second degree felony.
Luke D. Rufener of Rittman, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Burglary, felonies of the second degree and one count of Burglary, a felony of the third degree.
Marvin K. Waddle, Jr. of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Felonious Assault, both felonies of the second degree.
Kajuana K. Myers, of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Marijuana), in the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth degree felony and one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Marijuana), a fifth degree felony.
Andrew R. Schmieder of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, (Oxycodone), one of which if a fourth degree felony; the second of which is a third degree felony, and the third of which is a second degree felony.
Elizabeth K. O’Connor of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, (Oxycodone), both fourth degree felonies. The State is also seeking forfeiture of property that it alleges was either used in the commission of the offenses or represents proceeds obtained from committing the offenses.
Bobby L. Sallee of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Theft of a Check and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth degree felonies.
Ryan L. Johnson of Cleveland, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Forgery, a fifth degree felony.
Jessica L. Graham of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Endangering Children, one count being a second degree felony and the other count being a third degree felony. Ms. Graham is also charged with one count of Felonious Assault, a second degree felony.
Roger L. Graham of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Endangering Children, a third degree felony.
William R. Carson of Akron, Ohio, who is charged with Burglary, a second degree felony; Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony; two counts of Breaking and Entering, both fifth degree felonies; Possessing Criminal Tools, a fifth degree felony; Burglary, a fourth degree felony; and Attempted Burglary, a fifth degree felony.
Angelo T. Lenos of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs of Abuse, both of which are fourth degree felonies.
Lisa N. Ispan of Akron, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fifth degree felony.
John R. Robinson of Chippewa Lake, Ohio, who is charged with five counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth degree felonies.
David M. Hinz of Brunswick, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fourth degree felony.
James V. Justine of Old Brooklyn, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Burglary, a third degree felony and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth degree felony.
Jemil A. Harrison of Cleveland, Ohio, who is charged with 2 counts of Trafficking in Drugs, both of which are fourth degree felonies.
Nichole M. Fenick of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Illegal Possession of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony; and five counts of Deception to Obtain Dangerous Drugs, all of which are fifth degree felonies.
John A. McCarty of Wadsworth, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Burglary, a second degree felony.
Luke D. Rufener of Rittman, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Burglary, felonies of the second degree and one count of Burglary, a felony of the third degree.
Marvin K. Waddle, Jr. of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Felonious Assault, both felonies of the second degree.
Kajuana K. Myers, of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Marijuana), in the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth degree felony and one count of Trafficking in Drugs, (Marijuana), a fifth degree felony.
Andrew R. Schmieder of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, (Oxycodone), one of which if a fourth degree felony; the second of which is a third degree felony, and the third of which is a second degree felony.
Elizabeth K. O’Connor of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Trafficking in Drugs, (Oxycodone), both fourth degree felonies. The State is also seeking forfeiture of property that it alleges was either used in the commission of the offenses or represents proceeds obtained from committing the offenses.
Bobby L. Sallee of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Theft of a Check and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth degree felonies.
Ryan L. Johnson of Cleveland, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Forgery, a fifth degree felony.
Jessica L. Graham of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Endangering Children, one count being a second degree felony and the other count being a third degree felony. Ms. Graham is also charged with one count of Felonious Assault, a second degree felony.
Roger L. Graham of Lodi, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Endangering Children, a third degree felony.
William R. Carson of Akron, Ohio, who is charged with Burglary, a second degree felony; Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony; two counts of Breaking and Entering, both fifth degree felonies; Possessing Criminal Tools, a fifth degree felony; Burglary, a fourth degree felony; and Attempted Burglary, a fifth degree felony.
Angelo T. Lenos of Medina, Ohio, who is charged with two counts of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs of Abuse, both of which are fourth degree felonies.
Lisa N. Ispan of Akron, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fifth degree felony.
John R. Robinson of Chippewa Lake, Ohio, who is charged with five counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth degree felonies.
David M. Hinz of Brunswick, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fourth degree felony.
James V. Justine of Old Brooklyn, Ohio, who is charged with one count of Burglary, a third degree felony and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth degree felony.
Wednesday, July 07, 2010
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for July 6, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Collier's courtroom for criminal cases on Tuesday, July 6TH:
Stephanie Barnum, 23, of Lafayette Road in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Forgery, a fourth-degree felony.
Jeanie Burgett, 34, of Avalon Drive in Grafton, was sentenced to 180 days in jail on one count of Theft, a first-degree misdemeanor.
Michael Dechiara, 23, of Ridgecrest Drive in Wadsworth, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony.
Dennis Auerswald, 60, of Dover Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Aggravated Murder, one count of Murder, a first-degree felony, and one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 26. He remains in Medina County Jail on $1 million bond.
Michael Buckler, 29, of Sunset Drive in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
Michael David, 21, of Sleepy Hollow Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Dennis Fosdick, 24, of Mayview Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Marisol Gonzalez, 33, of West Union Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Lynn Grace-Anspach, 26, of Birch Hill Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
William Grunder, 45, of James Way in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Breaking and Entering, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 25.
Renee Kappele, 47, of Ethel Avenue in Lakewood, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Shanita Law, 23, of West Union Street, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Johnny Mcie, 20, of Sanford Road in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Eric Miller, 27, of West Washington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Robert Neura, 44, of Boston Road in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for July 26.
Ellen Smiseck, 21, of Spencer Lake Road in Spencer, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Oxycodone, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 25.
Danielle Spahn, 27, of Northland Drive in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for July 12.
Carolyn Tino, 45, of West Union Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony, and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Corey Tripp, 32, of Gates Mills Boulevard, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Leah Walsh, 25, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of Juvenile or School, both of which are fourth-degree felonies and one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Stephanie Barnum, 23, of Lafayette Road in Medina, was sentenced to one year in prison for a probation violation on an original charge of Forgery, a fourth-degree felony.
Jeanie Burgett, 34, of Avalon Drive in Grafton, was sentenced to 180 days in jail on one count of Theft, a first-degree misdemeanor.
Michael Dechiara, 23, of Ridgecrest Drive in Wadsworth, was sentenced to nine months in prison on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony.
Dennis Auerswald, 60, of Dover Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Aggravated Murder, one count of Murder, a first-degree felony, and one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 26. He remains in Medina County Jail on $1 million bond.
Michael Buckler, 29, of Sunset Drive in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 15.
Michael David, 21, of Sleepy Hollow Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Dennis Fosdick, 24, of Mayview Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Marisol Gonzalez, 33, of West Union Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Lynn Grace-Anspach, 26, of Birch Hill Drive in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
William Grunder, 45, of James Way in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Breaking and Entering, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 25.
Renee Kappele, 47, of Ethel Avenue in Lakewood, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Forgery, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Shanita Law, 23, of West Union Street, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Johnny Mcie, 20, of Sanford Road in Lodi, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Eric Miller, 27, of West Washington Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Robert Neura, 44, of Boston Road in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for July 26.
Ellen Smiseck, 21, of Spencer Lake Road in Spencer, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Oxycodone, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for August 25.
Danielle Spahn, 27, of Northland Drive in Medina, pleaded no contest to one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for July 12.
Carolyn Tino, 45, of West Union Street in Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth-degree felony, and one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Corey Tripp, 32, of Gates Mills Boulevard, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Marijuana, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Leah Walsh, 25, of Abbeyville Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine within the Vicinity of Juvenile or School, both of which are fourth-degree felonies and one count of Trafficking in Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Ohio Law Enforcement Agencies and Courts Gain New Information Connection
The Supreme Court of Ohio and Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray today announced the launch of a cooperative venture that will provide Ohio’s law enforcement agencies with greater access to statewide justice information.
Officers and deputies across the state now can cast a wider net in searching backgrounds of individuals charged with crimes thanks to a new connection between the Ohio Courts Network (OCN), a centralized warehouse of case-related data operated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (OHLEG), a statewide law enforcement database system operated by the Attorney General’s Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI).
Developed by the Supreme Court, the OCN enables courts and justice system partners to share information and to support functions such as criminal history reviews, warrant and protection order searches, pre-sentencing investigations, background checks and pre-custody reviews.
Local courts’ case management systems send data each night to the Supreme Court, which then integrates and securely stores this information and makes it available to other courts and justice system partners.
The justice system partners’ records available through the OCN include those from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation criminal history database and any case-related record from local courts connected to the OCN.
Operated by the Ohio Attorney’s General Office, the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (OHLEG) is a secure Web-based platform available to law enforcement agencies only, containing tools, databases and other applications designed to increase communication among these agencies and assist in their efforts to solve and prevent crimes.
Under the agreement between the Supreme Court and Attorney General Cordray’s office, the Supreme Court added BCI records to the OCN and OHLEG gained access to the court-related records in the OCN.
“Through the OCN, the flow of information between local courts and justice system partners is improved because of the availability of current, accurate and centralized data,” said Robert Stuart, Supreme Court IT Director. “By adding law enforcement agencies as another partner, the OCN continues to serve its intended purpose, which is to provide reliable and useful information to further the fair administration of justice in Ohio.”
“This project is evidence of two important areas of focus,” said Attorney General Cordray. “Partnerships such as our cooperative agreement with the Supreme Court of Ohio allow us to advance the administration of justice by leaps and bounds. Furthermore, our local communities benefit each time we provide new and better tools to their law enforcement officers. Providing better information assists them in their efforts to keep our neighborhoods safe.”
More than 340 courts have signed agreements to participate and have access to the OCN information. More than 70 courts are fully connected to the OCN statewide, and many other courts are working to connect and add their case data as well. The OCN’s goal is to have 80 percent of the case-related data from local courts available systemwide by the end of the year. Learn more about the OCN.
The Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway, launched in 2003, continues to be updated and expanded with new services including the OHLEG-SE search engine, and a “mobile” version of OHLEG-SE that can be viewed on smartphones, which was just added in 2009. Hundreds of law enforcement agencies in Ohio and immediately neighboring states use OHLEG daily, recognizing it as a national model for information-sharing technology in law enforcement. For more information about OHLEG, please visit www.OhioAttorneyGeneral.gov/OHLEGBrochure.
Ohio Attorney General Contact: Ted Hart, 614.728.4127.
Supreme Court of Ohio Contact: Bret Crow, 614.387.9250.
Officers and deputies across the state now can cast a wider net in searching backgrounds of individuals charged with crimes thanks to a new connection between the Ohio Courts Network (OCN), a centralized warehouse of case-related data operated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (OHLEG), a statewide law enforcement database system operated by the Attorney General’s Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI).
Developed by the Supreme Court, the OCN enables courts and justice system partners to share information and to support functions such as criminal history reviews, warrant and protection order searches, pre-sentencing investigations, background checks and pre-custody reviews.
Local courts’ case management systems send data each night to the Supreme Court, which then integrates and securely stores this information and makes it available to other courts and justice system partners.
The justice system partners’ records available through the OCN include those from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation criminal history database and any case-related record from local courts connected to the OCN.
Operated by the Ohio Attorney’s General Office, the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (OHLEG) is a secure Web-based platform available to law enforcement agencies only, containing tools, databases and other applications designed to increase communication among these agencies and assist in their efforts to solve and prevent crimes.
Under the agreement between the Supreme Court and Attorney General Cordray’s office, the Supreme Court added BCI records to the OCN and OHLEG gained access to the court-related records in the OCN.
“Through the OCN, the flow of information between local courts and justice system partners is improved because of the availability of current, accurate and centralized data,” said Robert Stuart, Supreme Court IT Director. “By adding law enforcement agencies as another partner, the OCN continues to serve its intended purpose, which is to provide reliable and useful information to further the fair administration of justice in Ohio.”
“This project is evidence of two important areas of focus,” said Attorney General Cordray. “Partnerships such as our cooperative agreement with the Supreme Court of Ohio allow us to advance the administration of justice by leaps and bounds. Furthermore, our local communities benefit each time we provide new and better tools to their law enforcement officers. Providing better information assists them in their efforts to keep our neighborhoods safe.”
More than 340 courts have signed agreements to participate and have access to the OCN information. More than 70 courts are fully connected to the OCN statewide, and many other courts are working to connect and add their case data as well. The OCN’s goal is to have 80 percent of the case-related data from local courts available systemwide by the end of the year. Learn more about the OCN.
The Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway, launched in 2003, continues to be updated and expanded with new services including the OHLEG-SE search engine, and a “mobile” version of OHLEG-SE that can be viewed on smartphones, which was just added in 2009. Hundreds of law enforcement agencies in Ohio and immediately neighboring states use OHLEG daily, recognizing it as a national model for information-sharing technology in law enforcement. For more information about OHLEG, please visit www.OhioAttorneyGeneral.gov/OHLEGBrochure.
Ohio Attorney General Contact: Ted Hart, 614.728.4127.
Supreme Court of Ohio Contact: Bret Crow, 614.387.9250.
Monday, July 05, 2010
July Law Talk: Ohio Consumer Law
Attorney John Celebrezze, host of the award-winning community access television show, Law Talk, interviews Medina Attorney Maryann Chandler about Ohio consumer laws. You can view the show by clicking on the links below.
Part One of Three
Part Two of Three
Part Three of Three
Part One of Three
Part Two of Three
Part Three of Three
Law and Leadership Program to Begin Third Year
A statewide program that seeks to improve diversity in the legal profession will welcome more than 300 students in its third year.
The Law and Leadership Institute identifies promising youth from urban neighborhoods and grooms them to be future leaders in the legal profession by offering them a chance to study law during the summer at an Ohio law school. Students entering the ninth, 10th and 11th grades will begin their studies on July 6 in six cities: Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo.
The institute began in 2008 in Cleveland and Columbus and expanded to the four additional cities last year. The original sites will house all three grades this summer and involve two law schools in each city while the four expansion cities will have two grades at each city’s law school.
“The whole idea behind this program is to enhance students’ critical thinking, writing and research skills, their analytic ability and to expose students to a professional work environment,” said Carl D. Smallwood, president of the Law and Leadership Institute, LLC. “Many of these students come from underserved communities and from families less aware of the steps necessary to prepare for college admission.”
He said the program is much more than simply “job shadowing,” in that ninth-grade summer students are in class for five weeks concluding with a mock trial; 10th-grade students sit for three weeks of classroom instruction and conclude with a one-week internship at a law firm or corporation; and 11th-grade students take ACT/SAT preparation courses to boost their college readiness, go on campus visits, and are paired with lawyer mentors on a research and writing assignment.
He noted that the program stays with the participating students as they move through high school and next year will grow again to include all four high school grades.
Partners for the 2010 institute include the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Ohio Center for Law Related Education, the Ohio State Bar Association, Ohio’s metropolitan bar associations, city school districts and Ohio’s nine law schools: the University of Akron School of Law, Capital University Law School, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, the University of Dayton School of Law, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, The Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law and the University of Toledo College of Law.
The Law and Leadership Institute is supported, in part, by grants from the Ohio State Bar Foundation and the Law School Admissions Council.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow, 614.387.9250.
The Law and Leadership Institute identifies promising youth from urban neighborhoods and grooms them to be future leaders in the legal profession by offering them a chance to study law during the summer at an Ohio law school. Students entering the ninth, 10th and 11th grades will begin their studies on July 6 in six cities: Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo.
The institute began in 2008 in Cleveland and Columbus and expanded to the four additional cities last year. The original sites will house all three grades this summer and involve two law schools in each city while the four expansion cities will have two grades at each city’s law school.
“The whole idea behind this program is to enhance students’ critical thinking, writing and research skills, their analytic ability and to expose students to a professional work environment,” said Carl D. Smallwood, president of the Law and Leadership Institute, LLC. “Many of these students come from underserved communities and from families less aware of the steps necessary to prepare for college admission.”
He said the program is much more than simply “job shadowing,” in that ninth-grade summer students are in class for five weeks concluding with a mock trial; 10th-grade students sit for three weeks of classroom instruction and conclude with a one-week internship at a law firm or corporation; and 11th-grade students take ACT/SAT preparation courses to boost their college readiness, go on campus visits, and are paired with lawyer mentors on a research and writing assignment.
He noted that the program stays with the participating students as they move through high school and next year will grow again to include all four high school grades.
Partners for the 2010 institute include the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Ohio Center for Law Related Education, the Ohio State Bar Association, Ohio’s metropolitan bar associations, city school districts and Ohio’s nine law schools: the University of Akron School of Law, Capital University Law School, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, the University of Dayton School of Law, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, The Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law and the University of Toledo College of Law.
The Law and Leadership Institute is supported, in part, by grants from the Ohio State Bar Foundation and the Law School Admissions Council.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow, 614.387.9250.
Sunday, July 04, 2010
A Visit to the Logan County Courthouse in Stapleton, NE
By Judge James L. Kimbler
Logan County Clerk Patty Harvey
Logan County Courthouse in Stapleton, NE
The pictures above were taken by me during my recent trip to North Platte, Nebraska. I was out there with my wife Joyce and two of our three children. During the week that I was in Nebraska, I visted the Logan County Courthouse which is located in Stapleton, Nebraska and met the Clerk of Logan County, Patty Harvey.
Logan County is a farming and ranching community. Its estimated population in 2009 was 731 and its county seat, Stapleton, had a population of 301.
As you can imagine, Logan County doesn't have a lot of lawsuits. According to Clerk Harvey, there are about 12 cases filed a year and usually one or two felony cases. Logan County has about 400 traffic cases filed a year. The traffic cases are usually handled by a clerk-magistrate. Logan County's clerk-magistrate is Cindi Walz, who also serves three other counties, McPherson, Thomas, and Hooker.
Nebraska has a court system that has two types of trial courts, county courts and district courts. Each of Nebraska's 93 counties has a County Court. On the Nebraska Supreme Court website, the jurisdiction of county courts is explained as follows:
The jurisdiction of the county court is established by state law which provides for exclusive original jurisdiction in probate matters, actions based on a violation of a city or village ordinance, juvenile court matters without a separate juvenile court, adoptions, preliminary hearings in felony cases, and eminent domain proceedings. The county courts have concurrent jurisdiction in civil matters when the amount in controversy is $52,000 or less, criminal matters classified as misdemeanors or infractions, some domestic relations matters, and paternity actions. County judges also hear all small claims matters filed within the court system. County judges in all counties except Lancaster, Douglas and Sarpy have the same duties as judges of separate juvenile courts.
In addition to county courts, there are also District Courts. There are 11 judicial districts in Nebraska. Logan is in District No. 11. The jurisdiction of the District Courts is explained on the Nebraska Supreme Court website as follows:
District courts have original jurisdiction in all felony cases, equity
cases, domestic relations cases, and civil cases where the amount in
controversy involves more than $52,000. District courts also have
appellate jurisdiction in certain matters arising out of county court. They
also serve as appellate courts in administrative appeals, where they review
the record of testimony and evidence from the lower court or tribunal and
issue an opinion and ruling in the case. District court decisions may be
appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals and/or to the Nebraska
Supreme Court.
The District Court that serves Logan County is headquartered in the Lincoln County Courthouse in North Platte. According to Clerk Harvey the District Court judges hold court in the Logan County Courthouse about once a month. There are four judges in District Number 11, three of whom are from Lincoln County and one of whom is from Dawson County.
The people I met in the Logan County Courthouse were very nice and were kind enough to answer my questions about their courthouse. I enjoyed my short visit with them and maybe I will have the opportunity to visit with them in the future.
Logan County Clerk Patty Harvey
Logan County Courthouse in Stapleton, NE
The pictures above were taken by me during my recent trip to North Platte, Nebraska. I was out there with my wife Joyce and two of our three children. During the week that I was in Nebraska, I visted the Logan County Courthouse which is located in Stapleton, Nebraska and met the Clerk of Logan County, Patty Harvey.
Logan County is a farming and ranching community. Its estimated population in 2009 was 731 and its county seat, Stapleton, had a population of 301.
As you can imagine, Logan County doesn't have a lot of lawsuits. According to Clerk Harvey, there are about 12 cases filed a year and usually one or two felony cases. Logan County has about 400 traffic cases filed a year. The traffic cases are usually handled by a clerk-magistrate. Logan County's clerk-magistrate is Cindi Walz, who also serves three other counties, McPherson, Thomas, and Hooker.
Nebraska has a court system that has two types of trial courts, county courts and district courts. Each of Nebraska's 93 counties has a County Court. On the Nebraska Supreme Court website, the jurisdiction of county courts is explained as follows:
The jurisdiction of the county court is established by state law which provides for exclusive original jurisdiction in probate matters, actions based on a violation of a city or village ordinance, juvenile court matters without a separate juvenile court, adoptions, preliminary hearings in felony cases, and eminent domain proceedings. The county courts have concurrent jurisdiction in civil matters when the amount in controversy is $52,000 or less, criminal matters classified as misdemeanors or infractions, some domestic relations matters, and paternity actions. County judges also hear all small claims matters filed within the court system. County judges in all counties except Lancaster, Douglas and Sarpy have the same duties as judges of separate juvenile courts.
In addition to county courts, there are also District Courts. There are 11 judicial districts in Nebraska. Logan is in District No. 11. The jurisdiction of the District Courts is explained on the Nebraska Supreme Court website as follows:
District courts have original jurisdiction in all felony cases, equity
cases, domestic relations cases, and civil cases where the amount in
controversy involves more than $52,000. District courts also have
appellate jurisdiction in certain matters arising out of county court. They
also serve as appellate courts in administrative appeals, where they review
the record of testimony and evidence from the lower court or tribunal and
issue an opinion and ruling in the case. District court decisions may be
appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals and/or to the Nebraska
Supreme Court.
The District Court that serves Logan County is headquartered in the Lincoln County Courthouse in North Platte. According to Clerk Harvey the District Court judges hold court in the Logan County Courthouse about once a month. There are four judges in District Number 11, three of whom are from Lincoln County and one of whom is from Dawson County.
The people I met in the Logan County Courthouse were very nice and were kind enough to answer my questions about their courthouse. I enjoyed my short visit with them and maybe I will have the opportunity to visit with them in the future.
Friday, July 02, 2010
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for June 30, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Collier's court on June 30 for criminal cases:
Eric Henninger, 34, of Summit Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony.
Diana Pierce, 44, of Montano Avenue in Spring Hill, Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Forgery, both of which are third-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Jacob Durand, 19, of Hemlock Court in Brunswick, pleaded no contest to eight counts of Breaking and Entering, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Anthony Glover, 26, of Foundry Street in Medina, pleaded no contest to two counts of Domestic Violence, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Floyd Henderson, 54, of Borden Street in Youngstown, pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. The charge carries a forfeiture specification. Sentencing is scheduled for August 9.
Donald Wojciechowski, 35, of Crestway Oval in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Eric Henninger, 34, of Summit Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony.
Diana Pierce, 44, of Montano Avenue in Spring Hill, Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Forgery, both of which are third-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Jacob Durand, 19, of Hemlock Court in Brunswick, pleaded no contest to eight counts of Breaking and Entering, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Anthony Glover, 26, of Foundry Street in Medina, pleaded no contest to two counts of Domestic Violence, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Floyd Henderson, 54, of Borden Street in Youngstown, pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. The charge carries a forfeiture specification. Sentencing is scheduled for August 9.
Donald Wojciechowski, 35, of Crestway Oval in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for August 16.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
