Court Rules 'Negotiated Plea' to Lesser Charge Barred Homicide Prosecution When Crime Victim Later Died

In Case Where the State Did Not Reserve Right to Further Prosecution

State v. Dye, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5728.
Lake App. No. 2008-L-106, 2009-Ohio-2949. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-5728.pdf

(Dec. 1, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that an agreement between a Lake County man and local prosecutors in which the defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated vehicular assault and the state agreed to drop two criminal specifications and continue the defendant’s bond constituted a “negotiated guilty plea” that barred the state from later charging the defendant with vehicular homicide when the victim later died as a result of his injuries.

The Court’s 5-1 majority opinion was written by Justice Robert R. Cupp.

In 1999, James Dye struck 13-year-old Robbie Arnold with his pickup truck while Dye was driving under the influence of alcohol. Arnold suffered life-threatening injuries that rendered him quadriplegic. Dye, who admitted drinking seven beers prior to the accident, was charged with DUI and aggravated vehicular assault with three specifications, any of which would enhance his sentence on the assault charge. Dye entered not guilty pleas on all counts and specifications.

At a subsequent plea hearing, Dye changed his not guilty pleas to guilty on both the vehicular assault and DUI charges and on one of the three specifications. The state dismissed the other two specifications and advised the court that it had agreed to continuation of Dye’s bond until sentencing was completed on the conditions that he not drive and abstain from any use of alcohol or drugs. The court accepted Dye’s guilty pleas, convicted him of the charged offenses and specification, and continued his trial bond pending sentencing. The state did not agree to recommend a less-than-maximum sentence, and the trial court subsequently imposed maximum sentences of 18 months in prison for the vehicular assault charge and six months for DUI, with those terms to be served concurrently. The state did not make a reservation of rights in the trial record to pursue additional charges against Dye in the event that Arnold should die from his injuries. Dye served his full prison term and was released from custody in June 2001.

In December 2006, Arnold died from complications of the injuries he had received in the 1999 traffic accident.

In July 2007, the Lake County prosecutor’s office sought and obtained a grand jury indictment against Dye for aggravated vehicular homicide. Dye entered a plea of not guilty and filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the homicide indictment based on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 1993 holding in State v. Carpenter that “(t)he state cannot indict a defendant for murder after the court has accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense and the victim later dies of injuries sustained in the crime, unless the state expressly reserves the right to file additional charges on the record at the time of the defendant’s plea.” The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, finding that Carpenter did not apply to Dye’s case because his guilty pleas were not “negotiated,” and because he pleaded to the original charges brought against him rather than to a “lesser charge.” Dye changed his initial not guilty plea to no contest. He was found guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentenced to nine years in prison, with credit for the 18 months he had served on the assault charge.

Dye appealed. On review, the 11th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered that Dye’s vehicular homicide indictment be dismissed and his conviction vacated. The court of appeals based its ruling on findings that Dye’s 1999 guilty plea to vehicular assault was a “negotiated plea to a lesser offense” within the meaning of Carpenter, and the state was therefore precluded from seeking a future indictment for homicide because it had not expressly reserved in the trial record the right to pursue additional charges against Dye if Arnold should die from his injuries. The state sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 11th District’s ruling.

In today’s majority opinion, Justice Cupp wrote: “In order for a guilty plea to be a ‘negotiated guilty plea’ within the meaning of State v. Carpenter, the record must show the existence of the elements of a contract (the plea agreement). The state maintains that there was no plea agreement and that Dye effectively pleaded guilty to the indictment in the first case. Dye pleaded guilty to both counts of the first indictment, but only to the first of the three specifications attached to the aggravated vehicular assault charge. (To be sure, that specification not only imposed a mandatory prison term, as did the other specifications that were dismissed, but it included a mandatory permanent revocation of Dye’s driver’s license.) The state sought the maximum sentence, which was imposed. The state contends that Dye did not gain a reduced charge, a more favorable sentencing recommendation, or anything else, as one would expect from a negotiated plea agreement.”

“This matter is not without some difficulty. However, a close examination of the record supports the conclusion that a negotiated plea existed within the meaning of Carpenter. Although the record is limited regarding the plea negotiations in Dye’s first case, the transcript of the plea hearing reflects that some form of communication occurred before that hearing during which Dye notified the state that he would plead guilty to Counts One and Two and the first specification. Because Dye agreed to plead to this portion of the charges, the state recommended dismissal of the two remaining specifications. In addition, the state indicated that it had made an agreement with Dye to recommend the continuation of bond on the condition that Dye refrain from driving and using drugs or alcohol.”

“The state contends that this latter part of the agreement at most related to the continuation of the bond and not the overall plea, but, although it is a close question, we view the agreement for continuation of the bond as corroborating the defendant’s claim that his guilty plea was negotiated with the state. Dye’s change of plea from not guilty to guilty and the state’s later recommendation that the second and third specifications be dismissed, in conjunction with the agreement on continuation of bond, support the conclusion that Dye’s guilty plea was a negotiated plea within the meaning of Carpenter. The state obtained a definite prison term and avoided the uncertainties of trial. Dye gave up rights that may have resulted in acquittal.”

“As the court of appeals concluded, any time a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she will have relinquished the right to a trial at which the defendant could be acquitted, and the state gains the benefit of obtaining a conviction without having to go to trial. ... We caution that our holding that a negotiated plea existed in Dye’s case does not mean that every plea of guilty necessarily is the result of a negotiated plea agreement within the meaning of Carpenter. On this record, the evidence of plea negotiations and the parties’ awareness of the gravity of the victim’s injuries, together with the state’s failure to reserve the right to prosecute for any later homicide charge, justify the conclusion that the state agreed to forgo further prosecution of Dye.”

“ ... Because Dye’s 1999 plea was a ‘negotiated guilty plea’ within the meaning of Carpenter, the state had a duty to ‘expressly reserve the right to file additional charges’ if the victim dies of his injuries. ... Accordingly, the state was precluded from bringing the aggravated-vehicular-homicide charge against Dye after the victim died. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.”

Justice Cupp’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger.

Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissent stating that in her view Dye’s original guilty plea was not a “negotiated guilty plea” within the meaning of State v. Carpenter. She wrote: “ ... Dye essentially pleaded guilty to the crimes charged. The state requested a maximum sentence, which was imposed. There was no negotiated reduced plea or plea bargain. The dismissal of the two specifications to the aggravated vehicular assault charge did not result in a reduced sentence. Dye received no more lenient a sentence than he would have if he had been found guilty at trial.”

“... I agree with the court of appeals that any time a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she will have relinquished the right to a trial at which the defendant could be acquitted, and the state gains the benefit of obtaining a conviction without having to go to trial. But to hold that this detriment to the defendant and benefit to the state—which will be true of every guilty plea—amounts to a negotiated plea agreement under Carpenter is to read that case’s holding too broadly. ... Because Dye’s 1999 plea was not a ‘negotiated guilty plea’ within the meaning of Carpenter, I believe that the state had no duty to expressly reserve the right to file additional charges in the event of the death of the victim. Accordingly, I would hold that the state was not precluded from bringing the aggravated-vehicular-homicide charge against Dye after the victim died.”

Contacts
Teri R. Daniel, 440.350.2683, for the state and Lake County Prosecutor's Office.

Michael B. Bowler, 330.253.3337, for James Dye.