Ninth District Opinions Released July 10, 2013

On July 10, 2013 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released five opinions. All of the decisions were for appeals out of Summit County. My summaries of the opinions appears below: 

Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Truck Line Dispatch, Inc., 2013-Ohio-2988 was an appeal from a decision of the Akron Municipal Court appealing a judgement granted to Auto Owners Insurance Company. The issue on appeal was whether the insurance company had shown during a Civ. R. 60 (B) motion hearing that it had obtained good service on Truck Line Dispatch. The company argued that since its president had not been served with a copy of the complaint the service wasn't valid. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that a corporation may be served by delivering a copy of the complaint to its usual place of business and having a person at that location sign for the complaint. In this case that was done and therefore the Court found that the Rule 60 (B) motion should not have been granted. 

D.R. v. J.R., 2013-Ohio-2987 was an appeal from the granting of a protection order by the Summit County Domestic Relations Court. The issues on appeal was whether the trial court had deprived J.R. of due process by not timely ruling on objections to a magistrate's decision and then finding that the magistrate's decision was moot because the protection order had expired. 

The order was issued on October 28, 2011. J.R. through his attorney filed objections to the decision on November 7, 2011 and also filed a praecipe for a transcript of the proceedings with the court reporter. The transcript was not filed until June 26, 2012. J.R. through his attorney then filed supplemental objections on July 6, 2012. On December 6, 2012 the trial court dismissed the objections as moot since the order expired under its own terms on October 25, 2012. 

The Court of Appeals found that since there are collateral consequences to the issuance of a protection order the fact that the order had expired was not determinative. It held that the trial court had a duty to hold a hearing on the objections to determine whether the order was properly granted. The case was then remanded back to the trial court for a hearing on the objections. 

State v Jones, 2013-Ohio-2986 was an appeal from the Summit County Common Pleas Court's order that Mr. Jones was entitled to a new trial. The appeal was filed by the State. The basis for the order was the results of new DNA testing that was done on articles of evidence introduced at trial. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the newly discovered evidence raised the issue of whether the State could meet its burden of proof at trial. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 

State v. Jeffery, 2013-Ohio-2985 was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying Mr. Jeffery's motion to withdraw his plea. At the hearing on the motion Mr. Jeffery testified that he was distraught because of the funeral of his sister and having to make arrangements for the funeral of his daughter who had also died. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had misunderstood Mr. Jeffery's testimony on these issues and remanded the case for further consideration of Mr. Jeffery's motion. 

State v. Clark, 2013-Ohio-2984 was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court finding Mr. Clark guilty of community control sanction violations, ordering him to pay attorney fees, and not calculating how many days of jail credit he had. The Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Clark that the trial court erred by not including in its sentencing entry the number of jail credit days he was entitled to receive against his prison sentence. It also found that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the reasonable attorney fees incurred by his court-appointed counsel without holding a hearing to see if he had the ability to pay the attorney fees. 

Ninth District Opinions Released on June 3 and June 5, 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released two opinions from Lorain County on June 3, 2013 and four opinions from Summit County on June 5, 2013. The opinions released on June 3, 2013 were:

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Horn, 2013-Ohio-2374 was a reversal of a summary judgment granted by the Lorain County Common Pleas Court. The issue in the case was whether the bank had shown that it had the right to file the lawsuit when it filed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed on the authority of Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017 at P40. The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. 

Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-2260 affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court that affirmed a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission that denied Mr. Wright unemployment compensation. The Commission found that Wright had quit his job as a truck driver without just cause when he left his truck at his employer's terminal in Seville, Ohio and told his employer he would not drive for the company if it would not give him a local route. 

The opinions released on June 5, 2013 were:

State v. Novotny, 2013-Ohio-2321 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court that convicted Mr. Novotny of interference with custody of a juvenile who had left her home and moved in with Mr. Novotny. Originally he was charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and the interference with custody. The jury found him not guilty of the unlawful sexual conduct but guilty of the interference with custody. The Court of Appeals rejected all assignments of error raised by Mr. Notovny. 

McFall v. McFall, 2013-Ohio-2320 reversed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court should have held a hearing on the wife's motion to vacate under Civ. R. 60 (B). While the majority found that the trial court should have held a hearing and found that the wife had raised the issue in a reasonable period of time, the dissent found that the issue could have been handled on a direct appeal and therefore the trial court did not have to hold a hearing on the 60 (B) motion. 

State v. Harmon, 2013-Ohio-2319 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court convicting Mr. Harmon of several criminal charges. In his assignments of error Mr. Harmon argued that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of battered woman's syndrome because there was no established pattern of domestic violence. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, as well as the remaining assignments of error. 

Clayton v. Walker, 2013-Ohio-2318 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division which had issued a temporary restraining order through a magistrate. Mr. Walker apparently filed objections to the magistrate's order in another related case. The trial court took judicial notice of those objections, considered them, and overruled them. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not take judicial notice of the objections filed in the other case and held that Mr. Walker had never objected in the case that was on appeal. 

Since he hadn't filed objections under that case number, the appellate court held that the trial court had no authority to even consider the objections to the magistrate's order and affirmed the issuing of the order. There was a dissent by Judge Carr in which she argued that the trial court had the power to review the magistrate's decision and she believed that the appellate court could review that decision. 

Ninth District Opinions Released on May 29, 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District released 10 decisions on May 29, 2013. All of the decisions were appeals from Summit County courts. The decisions are as follows:

State v. Stephens, 2013-Ohio-2223 was an appeal from convictions for complicity to commit aggravated murder and robbery. The most interesting issue on appeal was whether the State had violated Stephens' speedy trial rights by not trying him within 270 days. Stephens argued that the triple count provision applied since he was held in jail from the time of his arrest until the time of the trial. The Court of Appeals found that if either the triple count was applied or it wasn't the State brought him to trial within the required time. The opinion deals with the effect of a holder from another county and what happens when the holder is not entered into the record. In this case since Stephens agreed that he had a holder from Stark County and since the holder wasn't introduced into evidence, the Court of Appeals found that the holder applied for the entire period he was awaiting trial. 

Spade v. Taliwal, 2013-Ohio-2177 was an appeal by the administrator of an estate for a woman who had died following surgery. On appeal the administrator argued that the trial judge had abused her discretion in refusing to give a jury instruction on concurrent negligence. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed. There is a very interesting dissent in which the meaning of the phrase "abuse of discretion" is examined. The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages. 

State v. Roper, 2013-Ohio-2176 was an appeal by the State in a criminal case in which the State argued that there should have been two consecutive sentences for firearm specifications imposed and not concurrent sentences imposed. The Court of Appeals reversed because it found that while the trial court had merged offenses, the sentencing entry did not reflect that merger. The Court of Appeals went on to state that if an offense merges into another offense, then the trial court cannot impose either a concurrent or consecutive firearm specification sentence for that offense because that would be imposing a "penalty enhancement"  under circumstances where no penalty can be imposed on the underlying predicate offense. In short, once an offense is merged into another offense, no penalty can be imposed for the firearm specification that was attached to the merged offense. 

Rasberry v. Taylor, 2013-Ohio-2175 was an appeal from the Akron Municipal Court involving a unrepresented appellant and an appellee who was unrepresented at trial in a landlord-tenant dispute. The appellant raised issues regarding the unauthorized practice of law by the landlord and a co-owner of the property that he had rented. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of damages as to the one owner, but not as to the other owner. 

The appellate court found that the co-owner never signed the complaint but that instead it was signed by Rasberry. Since Rasberry was apparently not an attorney, he couldn't sign on behalf of his co-owner. Therefore, as to the co-owner, the complaint may not have been filed. The appellate court remanded the case to determine the ramifications, if any, from the failure of Rasberry's co-owner to sign the complaint. 

Ohio Metal Servs., L.L.C. v. All-In Metals, 2013-Ohio-2174 was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas involving a settlement agreement and proceedings to enforce that agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. 

May v. Lubinski, 2013-Ohio-2173 was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court involving a dispute between a trust called the Silver Lakes Estates and property owners in Silver Lakes. The case in the Common Pleas Court centered on the powers of the Board of Trustees. The owners challenged the power of the Trustees to make capital improvements and mandatory assessments for such improvements and to make certain expenditures. They also claimed that the Board breached its fiduciary duties to the owners and challenged the qualifications of certain trustees to serve on the Board. The Trust also appealed from the trial court's decision. 

The appellate court both affirmed and reversed parts of the trial court's opinion. The appellate court found that the trust language was unambiguous and that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties. The appellate court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the qualifications of one of the Board members to serve as trustee. The appellate court also found that the trial court's finding that a person serving as a trustee was not properly appointed was erroneous but its finding that another trustee was not properly serving was correct. 

State v. Ibn-Ford, 2013-Ohio-2172 concerned an appeal from convictions for one count of rape and four counts of domestic violence. The defendant alleged several grounds of error, but the Court of Appeals only sustained one. The error sustained was whether the trial court had complied with R.C. 2947.23(A) when it imposed court costs. The appellate court found that it had not and reversed and remanded on the issue of court costs. 

Fuline v. Green, 2013-Ohio-2171 was an appeal from an order of the Barberton Municipal Court ordering that the appellant, Green, pay attorney fees for proceedings following his denial of admissions. The Court of Appeals found that the matters that Green denied were at issue or were of no substantial importance, and therefore, the award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees. 

Budd v. Budd, 2013-Ohio-2170 was an appeal from the Summit County Court of Domestic Relations. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order regarding division of property and remanded for further proceedings. Because of its disposition on the first assignment of error, it declined to reach the other assignments of error raised by the appellant. 

State v. Brooks, 2013-Ohio-2169 reversed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court imposing consecutive 12 month sentences for two fifth degree felonies. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's imposition of the 12 months sentences. The reversal was because the trial court did not make the factual findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), as it was worded at the time Mr. Brooks was sentenced. 

Ninth District Opinion in a Divorce Case Appeal

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released one opinion on May 8, 2003. The appeal was from a decision of the Summit County Domestic Relations Court. The appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in part. 

The decision was Zaccardelli v. Zaccardelli, 2013-Ohio-1878. The facts of the case are as follows:

After executing a prenuptial agreement, Mark J. and Renee C. Zaccardelli 
(“Husband” and “Wife,” respectively) were married on July 7, 2000. The parties’ prenuptial 
agreement provided, in part, that Husband’s premarital property, including a residence on Carter Road and his interest in his family’s business, Blue Line Design, Inc. (“Blue Line”), together with the increase in value to his separate property would remain his property, free of any claim by Wife. After their wedding, the parties resided in the Carter Road residence. During their marriage, Husband worked for Blue Line, and Wife worked as a teacher until the parties’ son was born in 2002. When their son was born, Wife terminated her fulltime employment in order to stay home with their son, and later, to stay home with their daughter, who was born in 2004. During that time, Wife provided tutoring services, worked part-time from the home, and continued her education, obtaining her master’s degree in education. In 2007, Husband and Wife executed a deed transferring title of the Carter Road property to their joint ownership with rights of survivorship. 

In 2010, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. However, the court determined that, pursuant to a provision in the agreement, the parties could 
modify the agreement through a writing signed by both parties. The trial court determined that the 2007 deed effectively modified the prenuptial agreement in regard to the Carter Road property. 

The case proceeded to final hearing, and, on December 16, 2011, the trial court 
issued a decree of divorce. In the decree, the trial court determined that one-half of the “retained earnings” held by Blue Line constituted undisbursed income attributable to Husband as a fifty percent shareholder in the company. The court concluded that Husband’s share of Blue Line’s retained earnings that had accumulated during the marriage constituted marital property, which was subject to division. The court further determined that the Carter Road property was subject to division between the parties due the 2007 deed. The court reviewed parenting time recommendations submitted by the guardian ad litem and the family court services investigator. The court further reviewed shared parenting plans that the parties had submitted. The trial court adopted Wife’s proposed plan in the decree. 

The appellant-husband listed seven assignments of error in his appeal. The first assignment of error concerned the trial court's decision to award the wife one-half of the income from a closely held business entity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on that issue. 

The third assignment of error concerned the trial court's decision to award one-half interest in a piece of real estate that the husband argued had been excluded from the trial court's control because of a pre-nuptial agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the property because it found that the husband had contractually agreed to give his wife a one-half interest after the pre-nuptial agreement was signed. 

The fourth assignment of error concerned the trial court's refusal to consider the wife's master's degree, which was obtained during the marriage as a marital asset. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision holding that under Ohio Supreme Court precedent a advanced degree is not a marital asset. 

The second assignment of error concerned the trial court's valuation of property located in Sagamore Hills. The husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion regarding this valuation. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court on this issue. 

The fifth assignment of error concerned the trial court's decision to adopt the shared parenting plan presented by the wife and not adopt the one that was presented by the husband. The Court of Appeals reviewed this on an abuse of discretion standard and found no abuse of discretion. 

The sixth assignment of error concerned the trial court's decision to order the husband to maintain a life insurance policy with his wife named as beneficiary while not imposing the same requirement on the wife. On this assignment of error the Court of Appeals wrote the following: 


"Therefore, we conclude that the trial court could properly order Husband to secure the property division payment and his child support obligation with a life insurance policy. To 
the extent Husband has argued otherwise, his sixth assignment of error is overruled. However, in regard to the beneficiary designation of such a policy, it was improper for the trial court to require Husband to name Wife as the beneficiary to the extent that the policy secured Husband’s child support obligation. Therefore, to this extent, Husband’s sixth assignment of error is sustained."

The seventh assignment of error concerned the trial court's decision to require the husband to pay for a private school over and above his child support obligation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on that issue.  

Ninth Appellate District Opinions Released 4.10.2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District released four opinions on Wednesday, April 10. All the opinions were from Summit County. My summaries of the opinions appear below. As always any mistake made in the summaries is solely my responsibility. 

State v. Caldwell, 2013-Ohio-1417, which concerned a criminal appeal from the Summit County Common Pleas Court. Mr. Caldwell assigned five grounds for error, including the admission of hearsay statements and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals first noted that only a few of the alleged hearsay statements were objected to at the time of the trial. The Court of Appeals noted that unless the admission of such statements amounted to plain error, failure to make objections at the time of the trial waived those objections. The Court of Appeals found that if one of the statements was inadmissible, it was harmless error and it found that the other statement was properly admitted. 

The Court of Appeals then considered the ineffective assistance of counsel argument. The Court noted that failure to object to hearsay evidence does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, citing to opinions from the Ohio Supreme Court. Mr. Caldwell also argued that his counsel was ineffective because she left a police officer on the jury. The Court of Appeals noted that when that juror was called, the defense had no more peremptory challenges and that there was no reason to successfully challenge for cause. The Court overruled that assignment of error. 

Mr. Caldwell also argued that the trial court should have held a hearing on his motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel could not be raised on a motion for a new trial, but also concluded that the error did not prejudice Mr. Caldwell. 

The other two assignments of error were that Mr. Caldwell's conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, which the Court rejected. He also argued that the trial court deprived him of confrontation by admitting hearsay statements from co-defendants. The Court of Appeals noted that there was not an objection made at the time of the trial and that Mr. Caldwell had not argued plain error in his initial argument, but only in his reply brief, which is not allowed. The conviction was affirmed. 

Melick v. Melick, 2013-Ohio-1418 was an appeal from the Summit County Domestic Relations Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of that court. The opinion carries an interesting discussion of the law regarding the disqualification of a magistrate for alleged bias. The opinion also contains discussion on assignments of error concerning child support and the use of the child support calculation tables. 

Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2013-Ohio-1419 deals with issues raised by an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Board of Tax Appeals. The Appellant was a long term lessee of the property involved in the case. The Board ruled that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the assessment. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Court noted that there is both statutory law and case law that the only a landowner has standing to bring a challenge to the valuation of property for tax purposes. The other assignment of error was rendered moot by the appellant's lack of standing. 

Solomon v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 2013-Ohio-1420 was an appeal from a decision by the Summit County Common Pleas Court granting a motion for summary judgment. The summary judgment was granted to Marc's in a lawsuit brought by a customer who was injured while shopping. The injury occurred when a shopping cart lost a wheel and tipped over. The appellant alleged that she was an invitee and that Marc's had a duty to inspect its shopping carts to make sure that were working properly. Marc's agreed with the appellant that it had such a duty. The Court of Appeals held that there was a question of fact concerning whether that duty was violated and reversed and remanded the case. 

Ninth District Court of Appeals Opinions for 3.27.2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released eight opinions on March 27, 2013. The opinions were as  follows:

State v. Austin, 2013-Ohio-1159, which was a criminal case out of Summit County. Austin listed three assignments of error. The Court affirmed on the first two assignments of error, but reversed and remanded on the third.

The Court held that the trial court did not consider whether the two offenses that Austin were sentenced on were allied offenses of similar import under a "merger" theory.

In its opinion by Judge Whitmore, the Court wrote the following:

"The record does not support the conclusion that the trial court considered and applied Johnson when it sentenced Austin. Neither the court, nor the parties ever discussed Johnson or the issue of merger. Were this Court to apply Johnson to Austin’s breaking and entering and vandalism convictions, we would be doing so in the first instance. This Court has consistently declined to do so. See, e.g., State v. Chisholm, 9th Dist. No. 26007, 2012-Ohio-3932, ¶ 22. The State here has acknowledged that the trial court did not consider Johnson and has requested that this Court remand the matter. We agree that a remand is appropriate, given our prior decisions. Therefore, this matter must be remanded to the trial court for it to apply Johnson and determine whether Austin’s offenses should merge. “Moreover, in the event that the offenses are allied, ‘the State also must have the opportunity to elect the offense[] upon which it wishes to proceed to sentencing.’” Asefi at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Ziemba, 9th Dist. No. 25886, 2012-Ohio-1717, ¶ 23. Austin’s third assignment of error is sustained solely on the basis that this matter must be remanded, consistent with the foregoing discussion."

Harper v. Chaney, 2013-Ohio-1160, which was a civil case out of Summit County. The assignment of error was:

The Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the danger confronted by the plaintiff was "open and obvious" and therefore held that summary judgment was improper.

The Court explained its ruling this way:

"Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Ms. Harper, the non-moving party, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances give rise to a question of fact regarding whether Ms. Harper would have been able to observe the step had she been looking down at the basement floor on the day of her accident. See Zambo at ¶ 9. Specifically, there was evidence of

some daylight streaming in from a basement window, which may or may not have been partially obstructed by a curtain. Further, there was evidence of sufficient lighting to descend the basement stairs, but insufficient lighting in the area beyond the basement stairs where this seemingly random step was located. While the trier of fact may ultimately find that, under these

lighting conditions, Ms. Harper was reasonably expected to discover the step and avoid the hazard, we believe that such a factual determination must be resolved in Ms. Harper’s favor at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether, under the existing lighting conditions, the step posed an open and

obvious danger. See Marock v. Barberton Liedertafel, 9th Dist. No. 23111, 2006-Ohio-5423, ¶ 19."

State ex rel. Longville v. Akron, 2013-Ohio-1161, was a civil case out of Summit County which listed three assignments of error by the appellant and one assignment of error by the appellee.  Only one of the assignments was ruled upon and the Court reversed on that assignment. The Court of Appeals wrote the following concerning the assignment of error that it reversed on:

"In its first assignment of error, the City of Akron argues that the trial court erred in granting Ms. Longville’s motion for summary judgment because it improperly converted Ms. Longville’s request for declaratory judgment and injunction into a mandamus action, where Ms. Longville did not properly plead the elements of a mandamus action in her complaint. For the

reasons set forth below, we agree that the trial court erred."

Because it reversed on that assignment of error, it held that it did not have to reach the other assignments of error at this time.

Statev. Papczun, 2013-Ohio-1162 was a criminal case out of Summit County. The Court dismissed the appeal for a lack of a final appealable order.  In the following paragraph, the Court explained its ruling:

"In State v. Keith, 9th Dist. No. 08CA009362, 2009-Ohio-76, this Court concluded that the calculation of jail-time credit must be included in the sentencing order and that, “in order to challenge the trial court’s calculation of jail time credit, an appellant must appeal from the trial court’s entry imposing sentencing.” Id. at ¶ 8. We reasoned that an appeal from an order that denies a motion to revisit the issue of jail time credit is, essentially, an appeal from an order denying reconsideration of the sentencing order. Id. Because “[a] motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is a nullity * * * and ‘a judgment entered on a motion for reconsideration is a

nullity,’” this Court concluded that an order that denies a motion for jail time credit is not final and appealable. Id., quoting State v. Harbert, 9th Dist. No. 20955, 2002-Ohio-6114, ¶ 24-25."

State v. Porter, 2013-Ohio-1163 was another decision where the Court of Appeals concluded that the appeal was defective and therefore it did not have to address the merits of the appeal. Porter, who was convicted in the Summit County Common Pleas Court, was appealing from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In the opinion the Court wrote the following:

"A trial court may not entertain an untimely petition for post-conviction relief

unless the petitioner shows that: (1) either he or she “was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, [after the filing deadline], the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies

retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and that the petition asserts a claim based on that right”; and (2) the petitioner shows that but for the constitutional error at trial, no reasonable fact-finder would have found petitioner guilty. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b). Porter has made no

argument that any of these conditions apply."

Since Porter did not file a timely petition for relief, the trial court was not required to entertain the petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.

Thomas v. Bauschlinger, 2013-Ohio-1164, was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court dealing with several issues. The Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appellants, who were acting pro se, sued several officials of the City of Barberton. The lawsuit involved actions taken by the City administration and the City Police Department. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit with respect to members of the Police Department, the Mayor, and the City Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed regarding the allegations made against the City's Building Inspector.

The Court explained its ruling in this paragraph:

"Here, again taking as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, the Building

Department condemned the property without an interior inspection or any further justification. Without notice to the Thomases and without providing them an opportunity to collect their personal belongings, the City demolished the property, destroying their belongings. In their prayer for relief, the Thomases maintained that they lost the use of their real and personal property due to the “willful[ ]and wanton acts” of the Appellees. Taking as true the allegations of the complaint, we cannot say that there exists no set of facts by which the Thomases could establish that [the Building inspector] acted manifestly outside the scope of his employment or with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” See LaSalle Bank at ¶ 19; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Therefore, the claims against him should not have been dismissed under Civ.R. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, to the extent that the Thomases argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims against [the Building Inspector] on the basis of his purported political subdivision employee immunity, their assignments of error are sustained."

Young v. Young, 2013-Ohio-1165, was an appeal from a decision of the Summit County Court of Domestic Relations regarding allocation of parenting time. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the issues raised in the appeal became moot when the child who was the subject of the parenting time order turned 18. The Court explained its ruling this way:

"Once K.Y. turned 18, she ceased to be a child/minor. The domestic relations court lacks authority to order an adult to engage in companionship time with her parent. Even if the court erred by dismissing the proceedings, the remedy Father seeks is no longer available due to K.Y.’s having turned 18. Therefore, Father’s appeal is moot. See In re Wyatt, 3d Dist. No. 5-07-

45, 2008-Ohio-2115, ¶ 9; Dahmen v. Dahmen, 11th Dist. No. 2007-T-0037, 2008-Ohio-2129, ¶ 7-9; Matter of Miller, 5th Dist. No. 97-COA-01223, 1998 WL 429830, *1-2 (July 9, 1998)."

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 2013-Ohio-1222 is an appeal from the Medina County Court of Domestic Relations. Both the husband and the wife appealed from the trial court's order. The wife's appeal resulted in the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court, but the husband's appeal resulted in the Court reversing the trial court's order regarding the issue of spousal support.

The husband argued that the trial court erred by not conducting an analysis of whether a pre-nuptial agreement that concerned spousal support had

terms that were unconscionable as of the time of the divorce.

The Court set forth its reasoning in this quote from the opinion:

"The question for the trial court is not whether the spousal support terms of a prenuptial agreement are fair, but whether they are unconscionable when viewed at the time of the divorce. The burden of this demonstration is on the party alleging the unconscionability. Gross at 109-110."