Medina County Courthouse

Sunday, April 20, 2014

65th Birthday Pictures

My staff was kind enough to throw me a party on Tuesday, April 15, which was my 65th birthday. Below are some pictures from that day. Thanks to Amanda, Leeanne, Karen and Barb for making all the arrangements. My thanks to all of those who came. It was a very nice day.
This was how it looked from our back deck when I woke up that morning

My administrative assistant, Amanda Armstrong, set up our "smart board" for the party

Birthday cake with the bench festooned for the party

People arriving as my magistrate, Barb Porzio, gets ready to cut pizza sheets

Two of my staff, Karen and Leeann, at the left near the doors talking to guests

Attorney Ed Bowers, his wife, Lynda, and Attorney Mary Beth Corrigan

People at the party in the courtroom. 

More people in the courtroom

Monday, March 24, 2014

Summit County Appellate Decisions for February, 2014

A. L. v. Stephens, 2014-Ohio-677 (Ohio Ct. App., Summit County Feb. 26, 2014) reversed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court because the decision of the magistrate didn't comply with Civ. R. 53. Therefore the civil stalking protection order should not have been issued. 

State v. Brooks, 2014-Ohio-679 affirmed the decision of the trial court since, as Brooks' counsel has argued, there were no appealable issues in the case. The Ninth District conducted its own examination of the record and reached the same conclusion as appellate counsel. 

State v. Davis, 2014-Ohio-687 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-Defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because any gaps or inconsistencies in the victim's testimony regarding what occurred at his home were not so significant that the jury clearly lost its way when it credited the victim's testimony and convicted defendant." Trial court affirmed. 

State v. Chesrown, 2014-Ohio-680 from Lexis:"HOLDINGS: [1]-Court did not err in failing to hold a hearing prior to denying a petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(E) because petitioner failed to submit evidentiary materials containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness; petitioner simply attached a self-serving affidavit accusing another person of making the videos of the child because "they were of the type that the other person would have produced."" Trial court affirmed. 

State v. Shepherd, 2014-Ohio-686 affirmed the trial court's decision that Mr. Shepherd was not entitled to a hearing on his motion for discharge since he did not provide any authority supporting his arguments. 

Sandor v. Marks, 2014-Ohio-685 affirmed the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of an attorney in a legal malpractice case. From Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-A client's legal malpractice claim against an attorney, filed on November 8, 2012, was time-barred by R.C. 2305.11(A) because the attorney established the attorney-client relationship terminated on November 7, 2011, when the attorney sent written notice to the client regarding the termination; the attorney presented a certified mail receipt showing the termination letter was sent on that same day and a time-stamped copy of his notice of withdrawal filed in the underlying action that same day; [2]-Because the trial court did not err in rendering judgment in favor of the attorney on the client's legal malpractice claim, summary judgment was appropriate in favor of the law firm on the client's vicarious liability claim as well."

State v. Hach, 2014-Ohio-682 affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an untimely petition for post-conviction relief.  

State v. Hendricks, 2014-Ohio-683 affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Lollis, 2014-Ohio-684 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-There was sufficient evidence to sustain the aggravated murder conviction under R.C. 2903.01(B) because the text messages provided showed a common plan between defendant and another man to violently rob the victim. The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to reasonably have inferred that defendant had knowledge that the other man would be using a weapon or engaging in violence of a type reasonably likely to produce death, as he instructed the man to "tare em up;" [2]-Although there was no direct evidence that the other man used a gun in the commission of the planned robbery, there existed circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably have inferred that he did so for the firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(A); [3]-Because aggravated murder was a special felony, defendant was subject to parole, not post-release control on that conviction."

Regions Bank v. Sabatino, 2014-Ohio-580 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a bank in its suit to recover a debt owed by appellant. That no evidence was presented that the bank ever sent appellant a notice of default was immaterial, because while the parties's agreement required notice of default for suspensions or reductions of credit, it did not require notice of default for termination and acceleration of the obligation." Trial court affirmed. 

State v. Robinson, 2014-Ohio-579 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-Given the totality of the circumstances, at the time of the stop, the informant's tip was not sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle were committing or about to commit a crime as neither officer was able to verify the significant aspects of the informant's tip that detailed the suspect's future behavior, namely, that the subject, a black male, would go to the restaurant with a white female to complete a drug deal." Trial court reversed. 

Lykes v. Akron Dept. of Public Serv., 2014-Ohio-578 from Lexis:  "HOLDINGS: [1]-The property owner could not argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because he had no right to counsel for purposes of his administrative appeal; [2]-The trial court abused its discretion and acted unreasonably in dismissing the administrative appeal under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) on the basis of his failure to prosecute because it did not consider the unique posture of the administrative appeal before imposing the harshest sanction possible. When he contacted the city after acquiring the property about his options to prevent the demolition of the house he had just purchased, he was advised that his only recourse was to file an administrative appeal, which he did and then sought, albeit clumsily, a stay of the condemnation order and equitable relief from an order which only subsequently implicated his interests after it was issued." Trial court reversed. 

In re T.K., 2014-Ohio-576 from Lexis: "Because the mother not only consented to the award of legal custody to the grandparents, but also specifically waived her right to trial under circumstances where she was represented by counsel, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the mother did not understand the import of her decisions. Thus, the mother could not argue on appeal that the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to eliminate the children’s continued removal from the home under R.C. 2151.419; [2]-In exercising her residual parental privilege to determine the religious affiliation of her child, under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c), the mother could not control the child's every exposure to religion beyond the common understanding of the phrase." Trial court affirmed. 

State v. Litten, 2014-Ohio-577 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-Defendant’s convictions for rape and kidnapping, under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the victim, defendant’s 86-year-old grandmother, testified that defendant grabbed her left breast and digitally penetrated her. Although defendant’s daughter did not testify that she heard the victim screaming, defendant’s version of the events also encompassed screaming on the part of the victim; [2]-Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, the trial court erred by not merging the convictions for rape and kidnapping because the kidnapping was, in fact, incidental to the rape. Defendant’s attack on his grandmother amounted to one continuous course of conduct, he kidnapped her for the sole purpose of raping her, and the kidnapping did not result in an increased risk of harm to the victim, was not prolonged, secretive, or substantial. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded."

Beasley v. Fischer's Foreign Cars, Inc., 2014-Ohio-678 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-A letter written to a magistrate by the owner of a car that objected to the magistrate's calculation of his damages and the date from which interest would accrue with regard to a repair bill refund constituted "written objections" for purposes of Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i); [2]-The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate's decision on the sole basis that no objections had been filed with regard to the magistrate's decision." Trial court reversed and case remanded. 

Uhl v. McKoski, 2014-Ohio-479 from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-A decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellees was proper on appellant's claims after she was bitten by a dog, as the trial court did not err in concluding there was no dispute of fact as to whether appellants harbored the dog; in response to summary judgment, appellant did not present evidence that created a material dispute of fact as to whether appellants knew about the dog, there was no evidence that they had been at the premises after the subject property was leased, and there was no evidence that they had seen or were aware of a "Beware of Dog" sign at the premises." Trial court affirmed. 

Tennant v. Gallick, 2014-Ohio-477 from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Small claims court properly adopted a magistrate's decision to enter a default judgment against an attorney who failed to appear for trial in a small claims action filed by a client, arising from the attorney's failure to timely file an appeal for her son, as agreed, as the fact that the attorney had filed a motion to dismiss did not preclude the default judgment under R.C. 1925.05(A) because no answer was required and the statutory notification indicated that appearance at the hearing was necessary; [2]-Further, as the attorney failed to appear at the small claims trial, he did not present any evidence in support of his objections, such  that his assigned errors lacked merit.OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed."

State v. Culver , 2014-Ohio-681, from Lexis: "HOLDINGS: [1]-Defendant’s convictions for aggravated burglary under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2) and aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) were not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence demonstrated that defendant and his brother worked together with the purpose of stealing from the victim through the use of deception. The officer testified that the two witnesses’ statements were consistent with his observations; [2]-Because the trial court did not in reality merge the counts of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, but rather effectively ordered them to run concurrently, defendant’s sentence was contrary to law. The second judgment entry of conviction did not indicate which count was merged into the other. OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded."

Castin, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2014-Ohio-476, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-A title insurer was not obligated to take any action in regard to a purported defect in a deed because the insured did not suffer loss or damage as a result of a challenge to the title by a third party; rather, all of the damages alleged by the insured arose from its own actions in challenging the title. OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed."

State v. Easley, 2014-Ohio-575, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for breaking and entering under R.C. 2911.13(A), because he admitted that he was trespassing, copper plumbing was stolen from the house, the back door had been kicked in, and his DNA matched the blood sample found in the kitchen; [2]-The jury concluded that defendant, by force or stealth, unlawfully entered the vacant home with the purpose to commit a theft offense; [3]-Prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive defendant of his right to receive a fair trial; [4]-The prosecutor's comment that no evidence was presented to support defendant's version of the events as described in his opening statement was not improper; [5]-The evidence without the prosecutor's alleged improper rebuttal comment supported defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed."

State v. Powe, 2014-Ohio-478, affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Powe's motion for merger. Powe argued that he was sentenced for two offenses that were allied offenses of similar import. Powe argued that his sentence was void, but the Court of Appeals has held that failure to merge allied offenses does not result in a void sentence. Further the appellate court held that Powe had waited too long to bring a motion for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Broadt, 2014-Ohio-370, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not comply with R.C. 2951.041(F) and the requirements of due process when it terminated defendant from the intervention in lieu of conviction progam, as defendant, who had appeared in court for a status call, had no prior notice that she was subject to termination and no opportunity to prepare and present information in her defense. OUTCOME: Reversed and remanded."

State v. Heard, 2014-Ohio-371, affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Heard's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

State v. Shover, 2014-Ohio-373, from Lexis: " OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Assuming without deciding, that the Second Amendment extended outside the home, and specifically to motor vehicles, the trial properly concluded that intermediate scrutiny applied to R.C. 2923.16(B), improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, because it acted as a regulation to preserve the safety of Ohio drivers and the State's law enforcement personnel; [2]-The trial court properly reinstated defendant’s conviction for improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle on remand, after determining that R.C. 2923.16(B) was constitutional; [3]-The trial court failed to comply with the community service notifications in R.C. 2947.23 when it imposed costs at the sentencing hearing; [4]-The trial court erred by failing to consider defendant’s ability to pay under R.C. 2929.19(B) before imposing a $500 fine. OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded."

State v. South, 2014-Ohio-374, from Lexis:  "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Defendant failed to show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress because the officer testified that the.087 result he received when he performed defendant’s blood alcohol concentration test was an accurate result and that the BAC Datamaster was regularly calibrated for accuracy. The issue regarding exactly when defendant had consumed alcohol (i.e., whether he drank it before or after the crash) was simply a matter of credibility for the trier of fact to determine; [2]-The five-year sentence on his underlying operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OVI) conviction was contrary to law. Because the current version of R.C. 2929.14 was applicable, defendant’s third-degree OVI felony under R.C. 4511.19(A) was subject to a maximum of 36 months in prison, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing on his OVI conviction."

State v. Wallace, 2014-Ohio-375, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not err by granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence of marijuana seized by a police officer from the pocket of the sweatshirt that he was wearing at the park, because the State failed to prove that the warrantless search fell under one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed."

State v. Wilson, 2014-Ohio-376, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for an identification expert because the motion failed to satisfy his burden of a "particularized showing" that there was a reasonable probability that such an expert would aid in his defense and that he would be denied a fair trial if his request was denied; [2]-The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the recorded jailhouse statements were relevant and admissible because the statements, wherein defendant expressed displeasure about the police stating that there were two victims, indicated he knew that only one person was hit by bullets; [3]-The record was devoid of any evidence that the trial court considered the issue of whether felonious assault and having a weapon while under a disability were allied and of similar import under R.C. 2941.25 prior to imposing sentence.OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a merger determination."

Wuscher v. Wuscher, 2014-Ohio-377, from Lexis: "OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-A trial court abused its discretion when considering a wife's motion to modify spousal support because the court refused to consider sources for the husband's income outside of his base salary, which was $ 275,000 in 2012 with a total income of $ 573,600; the parties' financial agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, indicated their clear intent for the court to address substantial changes in the parties' income not contemplated at the time of the decree; [2]-The court abused its discretion by refusing to modify the husband's child support obligation because the court mistakenly believed the parties agreed to never calculate the child support obligation on income above $ 150,000, and, after failing to properly consider the parties' incomes, the court did not employ the requisite child support computation worksheet, R.C. 3119.022. OUTCOME: Judgment reversed and cause remanded."







Sunday, March 23, 2014

Lorain County Appellate Decision for February, 2014

There were five appellate decisions for Lorain County cases released in February, 2014, by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District. Two were appeals from criminal cases, two were appeals from civil cases, and one was an appeal from the Lorain County Juvenile Court regarding termination of a father's parental rights. 

The two civil appellate decisions were Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Haupt, 2014-Ohio-348, released on February 3, 2014 and  Varga v. Drees Co., 2014-Ohio-643, released on February 24, 2014. Both were appeals from decisions of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court. 

The Haupt case involved the issue of whether a trial court errs if it does not give notice of a magistrate's decision under Civ. R. 53. In the Haupt case the record did not reveal that Haupt was served with a copy of the magistrate's order and therefore did not have an opportunity to object to the order granting the bank's motion for summary judgment prior to the trial court adopting the order and granting the bank's motion. 

The Varga case involved the issue of whether a trial court should have stayed a lawsuit between the parties which concerned the building of a residence for the Vargas by the Drees Company. In reversing the trial court the appellate court held that if arguably the causes of action can be related to the subject matter of the contract, and if the contract contains an arbitration clause, then the case must be stayed by the trial court and the parties given the opportunity to arbitrate the dispute. In this case the appellate court found that the issues raised by the Vargas' lawsuit arguably arose out of the contract and therefore the action should be stayed. 

The two criminal appellate decisions were State v. D'Agostino,2014-Ohio-551, and  State v. Marrero, 2014-Ohio-553.

In D'Agostino the appellate court held the following:"[1]-Defendant failed to show that her appointed counsel was suffering from a medical condition that affected her ability to represent defendant; appointed counsel conducted voir dire, gave both the opening statement and closing argument, cross-examined the victim, and conducted the direct examination of defendant; [2]-By having her own expert testify extensively about his methodologies and her credibility, defendant opened the door for the State to rebut that testimony through its expert; as such, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice as a result of her counsel's failure to object to the testimony of the State's expert; [3]-The trial court erred by sentencing defendant for both felonious assault and domestic violence as the offenses were allied offenses of similar import; hence, it was necessary to remand the matter for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry." (Quote from decision on Lexis."

In Marrero the appellate court found that the defendant had filed a petition for post-conviction relief untimely and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The trial court's dismissal of the petition was affirmed. 

The remaining case was a case from the Lorain County Juvenile Court. The case was captioned In re A.H., 2014-Ohio-552.  In that case the appellate court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating the parental rights of A.H.'s father. From Lexis: "HOLDING: [1]-A father's parental rights over his child were properly terminated because the evidence supported the finding that the child was in the care of the social service agency for the requisite period of time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); [2]-Accordingly, even if the father's challenge to the termination under § 2151.414(E) was not supported by the record, any error was not reversible because it did not result in prejudice to the father; [2]-The record supported the trial court's conclusion that termination of parental rights and permanent custody in the social service agency was in the child's best interests based on consideration of the factors under § 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(d), the child's need for a secure permanent placement, and the father's inability to provide that."

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

Medina County Appellate Decisions for February, 2014

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released three decisions in February for appeals out of Medina County. All three of them were criminal cases. Two of the cases involved search and seizure issues. The third involved an issue of sufficiency of the evidence. 

The two search and seizure opinions were State v. Harper, 2014-Ohio-347, released on February 3, 2014, and State v. Horvath, 2014-Ohio-641 released on February 24, 2014. 

In the Harper opinion the appellate court reversed the Medina County Court of Common Pleas that had ruled that a traffic stop was based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion and that the Ohio Highway Patrol Trooper making the stop had conducted a valid inventory search. The appellate court disagreed with both of those conclusions. Since the State had introduced evidence seized from Ms. Harper's car at her trial for drug possession her conviction was reversed and the case was remanded. On remand the State moved to dismiss the charge since it could not sustain its burden of proof without the seized evidence. 

In the Horvath opinion the appellate court also reversed the trial court, but in that case the reversal was of the granting of a motion to suppress by the Medina Municipal Court. In Horvath the Medina Municipal Court had ruled that weaving by a motorist within his or her own lane does not constitute a traffic violation and therefore cannot lead to a traffic stop. 

The appellate court held that the case should be remanded to the trial court for that court to determine whether, given the particular facts of the case, Horvath's weaving raised a reasonable suspicion that his operation was impaired. 

State v. Lewis, 2014-Ohio-642, released on February 24, 2014,  concerned the issue of whether the evidence introduced in the Medina County Common Pleas Court was sufficient to sustain a conviction for domestic violence. The appellate court held that it was and affirmed Lewis's conviction, which had resulted in a 10 month prison sentence. 

Wayne County Appellate Decisions for February, 2014

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released one opinion in February for a case out of Wayne County. Poulson v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Inc., 2014-Ohio-554, concerned whether the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas had erred in awarding summary judgment to the Fraternal Order of Eagles in a slip and fall case. 

Poulson had brought suit under two theories. One was negligence and the other was negligence per se. The negligence per se cause of action was based on a Wooster, Ohio ordinance that incorporated the Ohio Basic Building Code. The Court of Appeals found that the Eagle's motion for summary judgment had not addressed the cause of action for negligence per se. Therefore the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted on that cause of action. 

The appellate court further found that the motion for summary judgment was well taken with respect to the cause of action for negligence. Therefore the trial court's order was affirmed on that cause of action. 

Friday, February 14, 2014

Summit County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

State v. Furman, 2014-Ohio-20 affirmed Ms. Furman's conviction for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery by the Summit County Common Pleas Court. That court sentenced her to 18 years in prison, nine years on each count. In an earlier appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District ordered a new sentencing hearing so that the trial court could consider whether the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import under a State v. Johnson analysis. The trial conducted such an analysis and found that the offenses were not allied offenses under State v. Johnson and re-sentenced Ms. Furman to 18 years in prison. 

Ms. Furman raised two issues on appeal. The first issue was whether the trial court erred in determining the two offenses were not allied offenses. The second was whether the trial court erred in not giving her a minimum sentence. In both cases the appellate court found that the failure to enter the presentence investigation report into the record meant that the appellate court could not review the sentence and therefore has to presume regularity. Such a presumption meant that the trial court would be affirmed. 

State v. Nichols, 2014-Ohio-102 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying Nichols's motion for post-conviction relief. The appellate court found that he had not established that he was entitled to the relief and therefore affirmed the denial of his petition. 

State v. Rogers, 2014-Ohio-103 affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court convicting Rodgers of a drug offense. Rodgers challenged his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying him motion to suppress. He argued that the officer who arrested him did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was committing an offense. He also argued that the trial court relied on facts that were not proved by the hearing. 

In denying Rodger's assignment of error the appellate court noted that Rodgers was operating a motor vehicle with restricted license plates; that he was behind the wheel of a car in a high-crime area; that the car was idling; and that when he asked Rodgers about the restricted operator's license, Rodgers could not verify that he was operating the car for work-related purposes. While the appellate court said that the mere fact that a car has restricted license plates does not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable suspicion, in this case there were other corroborating factors. Therefore the conviction was affirmed. 

Haley v. Nomad Preservation, Inc., 2014-Ohio-181 affirmed a two decisions of the Summit County Common Pleas Court. In one decision the trial court had granted judgment to a defendant after converting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12 (B) into a motion for summary judgment so that it could consider evidence. In the other decision the trial court had granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the moving defendant. 

Haley argued that the trial court erred in considering material outside of the four corners of the motion which, in effect, converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In rejecting this argument the appellate court wrote the following: "Not only had the trial court considered other evidence the first time it ruled on the motion, this Court explained in its decision that it was proper for the trial court to consider other evidence so long as notice was given. In light of the procedural history of this particular case, we cannot say that the trial court’s consideration of Mr. Ayache’s affidavit was unexpected or that Mr. Haley did not have an adequate opportunity to oppose the evidence." 

The appellate court also found that granting the motion for dismissal because of a lack of personal jurisdiction was also proper. Haley argued that the defendant filing the motion had acted untimely. In rejecting this argument the appellate court wrote the following: "Mr. Haley has not cited any authority suggesting that a party forfeits his right to move to vacate a judgment that was rendered without personal jurisdiction merely because of the passage of time. See Civ.R. 12(H)(1) (setting out specific conditions under which a party waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person); Timekeeping Sys., Inc. v. Safety Protection Universal Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99714, 2013-Ohio-3919, ¶ 12."

State v. McDaniel, 2014-Ohio-183 affirmed Mr. McDaniel's convictions for murder and felonious assault. McDaniel argued that the two offenses were allied offenses of similar import and that the State should have been made to elect the offense for which it wanted McDaniel sentenced. The Court of Appeals rejected this assignment of error. It found that under the analysis dictated by State v. Johnson the two offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. 

Ramoso v. Ramoso, 2014-Ohio-28 overruled the assignment of error brought by Mrs. Ramoso. She argued that the Summit County Domestic Relations Court erred by dismissing her objections to a magistrate's decision without a hearing. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument noting that she did not file a transcript with the objections. It pointed out that Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) requires such a transcript and failure to file one allowed the trial court to dismiss the objections. 

State v. Reeves, 2014-Ohio-282 affirmed the conviction of Mr. Reeves for possession of heroin and affirmed the forfeiture of money claimed to be proceeds from the felony drug offense. It also affirmed his conviction for having weapons while under a disability. 

Reeves raised three assignments of error. The first was that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The second was that the guilty verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The third was that the trial court did not require the State to produce evidence that the order of forfeiture was proportional to the offense. All three assignments of error were overruled. In overruling the third assignment of error the appellate court noted that the law does not require a proportionality review when the property being forfeited is money derived from the offense.   


Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Lorain County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

State v. Powell, 2014-Ohio-63 affirmed Mr. Powell's conviction for one count of rape. Powell argued on appeal that the verdict, which came after a bench trial, was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Both assignments of error were rejected. 

State v. Thomas, 2014-Ohio-64 affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court denying his motion to "correct" a void decision of that court. Thomas argued that his conviction of aggravated murder was defective because the determination of his guilt wasn't made by a three judge panel. 

The appellate court pointed out that failure to have a three judge panel doesn't deprive a common pleas court of subject matter jurisdiction. If a common pleas court has erred in not having a three judge panel hear a defendant's case, that error must be brought up on a direct appeal, not in a post-conviction proceeding or in a motion for relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. 

Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Haupt, 2014-Ohio-348 reversed a decision by the Lorain County Common Pleas Court granting judgment to Third Federal Savings & Loan. Ms. Haupt argued that she had not been served a copy of the magistrate's decision and therefore didn't have the opportunity to file objections to the decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with her contention. There was also an interesting issue regarding whether the appeal was timely. By a 2-1 decision the Court of Appeals found that it was timely. The dissent believed that the appeal was not timely.  

Wayne County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

PNC Bank, Natl. Assn. v. West, 2014-Ohio-161 overruled the granting of a motion for summary judgment to the plaintiff by the Wayne County Common Pleas Court. The appellate court found that the "evidence" offered in support of the motion for summary judgment and was intended to establish that the bank had standing to bring the action wasn't admissible under Ohio's Rules of Evidence. Therefore the summary judgment was reversed and the cause remanded back to the trial court. 

State v. Raber, 2014-Ohio-249 affirmed an order of the Wayne County Common Pleas Court denying Mr. Raber's motion to expunge his record or seal his conviction. The basis for the trial court's ruling was that a conviction for the offense of sexual imposition, a third degree misdemeanor, is not one that can be expunged or sealed. The appellate court agreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. 

Medina County Appellate Decisions for January, 2014

U.S. Bank v. Cooper, 2014-Ohio-61 reversed and remanded the case to the Medina County Common Pleas Court with instructions that the case was to be dismissed. The Coopers had filed a motion to set aside a default judgment that was granted to U.S. Bank by the Medina County Common Pleas Court. 

The trial court denied the Rule 60 (B) motion because the Coopers did not meet the requirements of GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976). In reversing the decision of the trial court the Court of Appeals reasoned that the Coopers were not required to file a motion under Rule 60 (B) because if the bank never had standing to bring the lawsuit then the judgment was void and not just voidable. Since it was void the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss. 

State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-62 affirmed Johnson's conviction for two counts of felonious assault and one count of breaking and entering. Johnson argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not giving the "castle doctrine" instruction and in answering questions posed by the jury. 

With respect to the "castle doctrine" Johnson argued that the instruction should have been given because Johnson was in his car and pursuant to R.C. 2901.09(B).  The trial court concluded that the defense wasn't available because under Johnson's version of events he was not in the car when he assaulted the victims. The appellate court found that it could not find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the instruction and so denied the appeal on that basis. 

With regard to the second assignment of error the appellate court found that Johnson's counsel had agreed to the instruction as given by the trial court. Therefore the assignment was reviewed under a plain error analysis. Under that standard the assignment of error overruled. 

Johnson also alleged that his attorney was ineffective in representing him a trial. The Court of Appeals also rejected that argument. 

Wednesday, January 08, 2014

Summit County Civil Appellate Decisions, December, 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released  numerous opinions on appeals from civil cases from Summit County courts. My summaries of the opinions that I was able to view appear below. 

Stetz v. Copley Fairlawn School Dist., 2013-Ohio-5411, released on December 11, 2013, reversed the Summit County Common Pleas Court's decision that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals held that whether the school district is entitled to such immunity depends on a three tier analysis. In this case the trial court did not complete such an analysis and therefore the denial of the motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.  

Hendy v. Wright, 2013-Ohio-5786, issued on December 31, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division. The assignments of error broke down into two groups. One group alleged that the trial court had violated Ohio's Code of Judicial Conduct through its orders and the magistrate's recommendations. All of those assignments of error were overruled because the Court of Appeals doesn't have jurisdiction over the enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 

The other assignments of error were overruled because the appellant had not specifically objected to the trial court's order as required by Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(b). Since such objections weren't filed the only way that the appellant could get relief was to have shown plain error but since he didn't argue plain error nor did he explain why the appellate court should adopt a plain error standard of review. 

Witschey, Witschey & Firestine Co., L.P.A. v. Daniele, Jr.,  2013-Ohio-5724, released on December 26, 2013, reversed and remanded a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court that a real estate conveyance wasn't fraudulent under R.C. Chapter 1336. The trial court R.C. 1336.08 (A) to rebut the presumption of fraud that arose because the transferror had not received any compensation for the transfer. The trial court's reasoning was that since the original transfer was a gift then when the defendant son transferred the property back to the defendant parents it was a transfer for valuable consideration or a reasonable equilavent value. The Court of Appeals found that this was not correct. It remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to use R.C. 1336.04 (A) (1) to the evidence already introduced. 

Black v. Stouffer Realty, Inc., 2013-Ohio-5723 was released on December 26, 2013. Black, Stouffer Realty, and a sales person for Stouffer Realty filed assignments and cross-assignments of error. All the assignments and cross-assignments of error were overruled. 

When the case was submitted to the jury there was a form which allowed the jury to determine whether Black was entitled to attorney fees and punitive damages. The jury indicated that she was entitled to attorney fees but not punitive damages. Black argued that this was an inconsistent verdict and therefore the jury should be re-instructed and returned for further deliberation. The trial court refused. On appeal Black argued that Civ. R. 49 (B) applied to the facts in her case. That Rule deals with the procedure that is to be applied when there are inconsistent answers to jury interrogatories. The appellate court, however, the the form was a a general verdict form and not the same as jury interrogatories. Therefore that assignment of error was overruled. 

Black also assigned as error the use of the verdict form described above. Since Black didn't object at the time the trial court sent the verdict form to the jury she was limited to a plain error analysis. The appellate court found that the trial court did not commit plain error. The other assignments of error made by the parties can be seen by clicking on the link to the opinion above. 

Ward v. Ohio State Waterproofing, 2013-Ohio-5560, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed the decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying a motion to vacate an arbitration award. The Court of Appeals noted that when considering a motion to vacate an arbitration award the court is guided by R.C. 2711.10. That section allows a court to vacate an award if it finds that the award was procured by fraud, corruption or undue means; if there evident partiality or corruption on part of any of the arbitrators; if the arbitrators were guilty of certain specified misconduct; and if the arbitrators exceeded their power, or so imperfectly executed them that final award could not be made. Applying that statute to the facts of the case, the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed that denial. 

Lasater v. Vidahl, 2013-Ohio-5558, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying a motion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil lawsuit. The awarding of attorney fees is allowed in certain circumstances by R.C. 2323.51. The granting of a motion for attorney fees under that section or the denial of attorney fees is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Applying that standard to the facts in this case the appellate court concluded that the denial should be affirmed. 

111 N. Main St., Inc. v. Von Allmen Ents., L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-5554, released on December 19, 2013, affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court. The parties had entered into a settlement agreement whereby von Allmen Enterprises and the Von Allmens had agreed that they owed certain sums of money to 111 N. Main Street for arrearages of rent on a lease. Mr. Von Allmen appeared at a settlement conference and agreed that they money was owed and that he personally guaranteed the arrearage amount. When the payments weren't made, 111 N. Main filed a lawsuit seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. 

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court never had personal jurisdiction over the Von Allmens as individuals because service was never obtained on them, they never waived service, or were ever served personally with the motion to enforce the agreement. Since there was no personal jurisdiction then the trial court could not enter judgment against them as individuals. 
The appellate court also considered the assignments of error by Von Allmen Enterprises and overruled them. 

Osburn Towing v. Akron, 2013-Ohio-5409, released on December 11, 2013, reversed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court. The decision was reversed because the appellate court found that the Common Pleas Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The reason why the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction was that the act that Osburn was complaining about was a legislative act and therefore could not be reviewed under R.C. 2506.01. Since the appellate court found that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, it did not address the other issues raised on appeal by the City of Akron. 



Tuesday, January 07, 2014

Summit County Appellate Decisions in Juvenile Court Cases, December, 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released five decisions on appeals from the Summit County Juvenile Court during December of 2013. My summaries of these decisions appear below. 

In re R.P., 2013-Ohio-5728, released on December 26, 2013, affirmed the decision of the Summit County Juvenile Court's decision to declare R.P. a dependent child and place her in the custody of the Summit County Children Services Board. 

In the first assignment of error R.P.'s father argued that the trial court erred in allowing evidence to be admitted at the hearing that had not been made available to him during discovery. The Court of Appeals overruled this assignment of error. It noted that the Juvenile Rules, unlike the Criminal Rules, do not require that the discovery response be supplemental as more information becomes available. The Court of Appeals reasoned that under the Juvenile Rules a party has to make a motion to compel discovery in order to make sure that the party is receiving updated discovery. 

In two of the assignments of error the father argued that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing R.P.'s counselor to testify. The Court of Appeals held that if allowing the testimony was erroneous, it was harmless error. 

Three of the assignments of error dealt with the Juvenile Court allowing the intervention of a couple who had been legal custodians of R.P. into the case and quashing a subpoena that had been issued for records of the CSB that related to the couple. 

With regard to the trial court's quashing of the subpoena to the couple the Court of Appeals held that the father did not demonstrate how the evidence would have been relevant to his case. With regard to the decision of the trial court to allow the couple to intervene even though they did not comply with the Juvenile Rules regarding intervention of parties, the Court of Appeals held that the father did not establish that the intervention was prejudicial to his rights. 

The father also assigned as error the trial court allowing certified copies of the mother's misdemeanor convictions into evidence. The Court of Appeals held that such evidence was allowed under Evid. R. 902 (4) and Evid. R. 803 (8), which is the hearsay exception for public records. 

Two of the assignments of error dealt with the finding by the trial court that R.P. was a dependent child. The Court of Appeals overruled those assignments of error, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the dependency finding. 

The last two assignments of error dealt with the trial court not allowing copies of confidential records held by the CSB's counsel to be given to the father and the findings made by the trial court in support of its decision. Both assignments of error were overruled. 

In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-5727, released on December 26, 2013, affirmed the decision of the Summit County Juvenile Court that terminated the parental rights of the mother of J.B. and placed him in the permanent custody of the Children Services Board. The mother alleged that the finding that such termination was in the best interest of the child was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals overruled that assignment of error. 

In re M.H., 2013-Ohio-5565, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed an order of the Summit County Juvenile Court terminating the parental rights of the mother of M.H. and placing her in the permanent custody of the Children Services Board. She argued that the order was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's order. 

In re L.W., 2013-Ohio-5556, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed an order of the Juvenile Court finding that the best interests of L.W. were served by placing him in the temporary custody of the Children Services Board. Both the mother and the father appealed. 

Both parents assigned as error the trial court's finding that L.W. was dependent was against the manifest weight of the evidence. That assignment was overruled. 

The father assigned as error the trial court's finding that the child did not have to be personally served in order for the court to have acquired jurisdiction over the child. The Court of Appeals noted that objections to personal jurisdiction have to be made timely and that the father's refusal to make timely objections to the trial court having personal jurisdiction meant that he had forfeited that argument. 

The father also asserted as error the trial court's finding that it did not have to appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for L.W. The Court of Appeals noted that such a finding is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and that there is not an absolute right for a child to be represented by counsel or a GAL in a dependency or neglect case, but only in an abuse case. Therefore that assignment of error was also overruled. 

In re V.H., 2013-Ohio-5408, released on December 11, 2013, affirmed the Juvenile Court's finding that V.H. was a delinquent child by reason of having the offense of gross sexual imposition. V.H. challenged the finding by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the Juvenile Court's finding of delinquency. The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and found it sufficient.  


Summit County Appellate Decisions in Criminal Cases, December 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released 14 decisions in criminal cases out of Summit County during December of 2013. My summaries of these cases appear below. 

State v. Wood, 2013-Ohio-5802, released on December 31, 2013, affirmed Wood's criminal conviction for drug possession by the Summit County Common Pleas Court. Wood argued that the assistant prosecutor trying the case engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by introducing evidence that Wood had used a drug scale, a plate, and a razor blade to weigh and cut crack cocaine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and found that the evidence was relevant to show that Wood possessed the drugs involved in the charge. 

State v. Tayse, 2013-Ohio-5801,released on December 31, 2013, affirmed the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief by the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court ruled correctly when it held that the petition was filed untimely. 

State v. Carson, 2013-Ohio-5785, released on December 31, 2013, affirmed Mrs. Carson's conviction for one count of attempted deception to obtain a dangerous drug, a first degree misdemeanor. Mrs. Carson argued that her attorney was ineffective in not presenting certain evidence to the jury. The Court of Appeals pointed out that on that issue Mrs. Carson had the burden of proof on the issue that her trial attorney was not effective and that she didn't meet that burden. She also argued that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the State's burden of proof and that her verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Two judges of the appellate panel rejected all of Mrs. Carson's assignments of error. Judge Carla Moore would have sustained Mrs. Carson's manifest weight of the evidence assignment of error. 

State v. Culp, 2013-Ohio-5799, released on December 31, 2013, reversed a decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The reversal was because the trial court did not conduct an analysis of the offenses for which Culp was convicted to see if they merged for purposes of sentencing. The case was remanded so that the trial court could conduct such an analysis. 

State v. Bostick, 2013-Ohio-5784, released on December 31, 2013, sustained the defendant's convictions in the Summit County Common Pleas Court. Bostick had argued that the assistant prosecutor trying the case had unconstitutionally used her peremptory challenges to dismiss female jurors. The trial court conducted a brief hearing outside the presence of the jurors and overruled all three of the objections. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), does not require a trial judge to conduct a in-depth hearing when ruling on a Batson challenge. 

Bostick also argued that a jury, and not the trial judge, should have determined whether he was a repeat violent offender. This assignment of error was also overruled. 

Editor's Note: I was not able to view the decision of State v. Maffei, 2013-Ohio-5787, which was also released on December 31, 2013. 

State v. Hrnjak, 2013-Ohio-5726, released on December 26, 2013, affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or for post-conviction relief. Hrnjak argued that his defense attorney failed to correctly advise him regarding the impact a conviction would have on his immigration status in the United States. He also alleged that the trial court erred in not conducting a live hearing instead of determining the motions from the record. Both assignments of error were overruled. Judge Carr's concurring opinion contains an interesting analysis of a recent United States Supreme Court decision regarding the duty of defense counsel in a criminal case to advise about the effects on a defendant's immigration status in the United States. 

State v. Hill, 2013-Ohio-5725, released on December 26, 2013, affirmed in part and reversed in part Hill's convictions for murder and felonious assault. Hill was charged with two counts of murder and four counts of felonious assault. He was found guilty of all charges and also found guilty of having a firearm when he committed the offenses. At sentencing the trial judge found that count two, which was for murder, merged into count one, also for murder. The judge also found that count four, for felonious assault, merged into count one. 

On appeal Hill argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for murder. He also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felonious assault on count three. The Court of Appeals overruled his assignment of error on the murder count but granted the assignment of error on the felonious assault count. In particular the appellate court found that the injuries received by the victim prior to being shot did not arise to the level of "serious physical harm" as that count required. 


State v. Valenti, 2013-Ohio-5564, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying a motion to suppress. Valenti appealed raising the issue of whether she had been unreasonably detained by the police while they were waiting for a drug dog to arrive and walk about her boyfriend's vehicle. The Court of Appeals found that the approximate 19 minute delay was not unreasonable and overruled the assignment of error. 

State v. Powell, 2013-Ohio-5561, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying a motion for judicial release. Powell was sentenced to four years in prison on one charge and one year in prison on a second charge, the two sentences to be served consecutively. Powell also received credit for 256 days of jail time against his sentences. When he filed the motion for judicial release the trial judge denied the motion because he had not filed according to the time limits for filing for judicial release when a defendant is serving a five year prison sentence. 

Powell raised two arguments in the appeals court. The first was that his cases should have been considered as two cases, not one case, for purposes of calculating time limits for filing a motion for judicial release. The second was that because he had been given 256 days of jail credit, he was not serving a five year sentence, even if both sentences were considered. For procedural reasons the Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. 

State v. McCallister, 2013-Ohio-5559, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed the decision of the Summit County Common Pleas Court denying McCallister's motion to withdrew his plea. McCallister argued that the trial court's omission in its sentencing entry of post-release control meant that his sentence was void. The appellate court found that the trial court had properly imposed post-release control in the sentencing entry. It also pointed out that even if it had not such an error would not void the sentence but would instead lead to the case being remanded for a proper imposition of post-release control. 

State v. Jackson, 2013-Ohio-5557, released on December 18, 2013, affirmed in part and reversed in part Jackson's convictions for two counts of murder, 10 counts of felonious assault, one count of firing a gun into a habitation, and one count of carrying a concealed weapon. Several of the counts also contained firearm specifications. 

In his first assignment of error Jackson argued that the evidence offered was insufficient to support his convictions for murder, felonious assault, and improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation. The Court of Appeals rejected this assignment of error and found that the evidence was sufficient. 

In his second assignment of error Jackson argued that the offenses of murder, felonious assault, and improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation were allied offenses of similar import. The Court of Appeals found that the offense of improper discharge of a weapon into a habitation merged with the felonious assault and murder counts but that the offenses of murder and felonious assault did not merge. 

State v. Marbury, 2013-Ohio-5306, released on December 4, 2013, affirmed the denial of Marbury's motion to "correct illegal or void sentence" by the Summit County Common Pleas Court. The appellate court overruled both assignments of error. It found that Marbury could have brought the assignments of error before the Court of Appeals by a direct appeal from his sentence. Since he did not, he could not bring them up after sentencing by a post-sentence motion. 

State v. Lerch, 2013 Ohio 5305, was released on December 4, 2013. Unfortunately I could not retrieve the document in order to summarize the decision. 



Sunday, January 05, 2014

Lorain County Appellate Decisions, December, 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released 10 Lorain County decisions in December of 2013. My summaries of the decisions appear below:

State v. Stone, 2013-Ohio-5782, released on December 30, 2013, was an appeal from the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. At issue was the amount of jail credit that Stone should have received against his jail sentence imposed as a community control sanction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It did not have jurisdiction and that Stone should have raised the issue in an appeal from the judgement entry of conviction. 

King v. Carleton, 2013-Ohio-5781, released on December 30, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Juvenile Court. The appeal was filed pro se and the appellate court stated in its decision that it had difficulty understanding all the issues that the mother of the child was raising. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Lorain County Juvenile Court granting overnight visitation to the child's father and also finding that the mother was in contempt, but imposing no penalty. 

State v. Bales, 2013-Ohio-5780, released on December 30, 2013, affirmed the Lorain County Common Pleas Court's order dismissing the case against Bales pursuant to Crim. R. 48. In dismissing the case the trial court made the following findings and set them forth in its journal entry. These findings included: 1) successful participation in the judicially created diversion program, (2) payment of fines and court costs, (3) no pending criminal charges, (4) no dependence on alcohol or drugs, and (5) a positive recommendation from the adult probation department. The Court of Appeals held that dismissing a charge after making such findings was not an abuse of discretion. 

In re T.A., 2013-Ohio-5646, released on December 23, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Juvenile Court terminating the parental rights of both the mother and father of two minor children. The mother raised one assignment of error and the father raised two assignments of error. All assignments of error were overruled. 

Camera v. Lorain Civ. Serv. Comm., 2013-Ohio-5644, released on December 23, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court which, in turn, had affirmed a decision of the Lorain City Civil Service Commission. The Commission had terminated Camera's employment as Street Commissioner following his conviction for theft and tampering with records, both of which were first degree misdemeanors. The trial court found that there was reliable, substantial, and probative evidence supporting the Commission's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed. 

State v. Liebling, 2013-Ohio-5491, released on December 16, 2013, affirmed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court granting a motion to suppress evidence. The State raised two grounds for its appeal. One was that the trial court's factual findings were not supported by the record and the other was that the trial court improperly considered an argument not raised in the defendant's motion but was raised in a prior motion. 

The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. it noted that the trial court had considered the testimony of both the Trooper making the traffic stop and Liebling. It found Liebling's version of events more plausible. Since the trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses. The Court also found that the issue of the drug dog's credibility had been raised in a prior motion, it was not the basis of the trial court's ruling suppressing the evidence.

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Bowers, 2013-Ohio-5488, released on December 16, 2013, affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a judgment filed pursuant to Civ. R. 60 (B). The trial court denied the motion because Mr. and Mrs. Bowers did not asset that they had a meritorious defense and therefore could not satisfy their burden under Civ. R. 60.  

State v. Spurlock, 2013-Ohio-5369, released on December 9, 2013, affirmed in part and reversed in part a decision from the Elyria Municipal Court. Spurlock argued that his warrantless arrest violated his due process rights. That argument was rejected. he also argued that the State failed to show that the field sobriety tests were done in substantial compliance with testing standards as required by 4511.19(D)(4)(b). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on that assignment of error. In doing so it rejected the State's argument that Spurlock's motion did not set forth an adequate factual basis for the suppression of the test on those grounds. The Court of Appeals found that the State, by failing to object in the Municipal Court, had waived that argument. 

State v. Guerra, 2013-Ohio-5367, released on December 9, 2013, affirmed Guerra's conviction for aggravated murder. Guerra argued that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Both of those assignments of error were overruled. The Court of Appeals also rejected his argument that the trial court had improperly allowed evidence of prior confrontations between Guerra and the victim or friends of the victim. Guerra argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Evid. R. 404 and 403. That argument was also rejected. 

Bremke v. Sherck, 2013-Ohio-5361, released on December 9, 2013, reversed a decision of the Lorain County Common Pleas Court granting a motion for summary judgment in a case involving a vacated street and whether or not the defendants had an easement over the vacated land. The appellate court found that there was a material issue of fact regarding this issue and that a motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. 

Wayne County Appellate Decisions, December 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released two decisions for appeals from Wayne County Courts in December of 2013. My summaries of these decisions appear below:

State v. Weese, 2013-Ohio-5789, released on 12/31/2013, reversed a decision of the Wayne County Municipal Court. The trial court had ordered Mr. Weese to pay court costs but did not tell him that if he didn't pay the court costs the court could order him to do community service. At the time of his sentencing the Court of Appeals held that R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) required a sentencing judge to advise a defendant that failure to pay court costs could result in a community service requirement. The case was then remanded back to the trial court so that the trial court could properly order the payment of court costs. 

In re K.P., 2013-Ohio-5490, released on 12/31/2013, affirmed a decision on the Wayne County Juvenile Court ordering that the mother of K.P. be named sole residential parent. 

Appellate Decisions for Medina County for December of 2013

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District released six decisions for appeals from Medina County courts during December of 2013. My summaries of these decisions appear below:

Dillard v. Automation Tool & Die, Inc., 2013-Ohio-5645, released on 12/23/2013. This decision held that a denial by a trial court of a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 41 (A) (2) is not a final appellable order. Since the trial judge's order denying the motion could not be appealed, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. 

State v. Cooper, 2013-Ohio-5489, released on 12/16/2013, held that the Wadsworth Municipal Court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The defendant argued that motion should be granted on the basis of R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b). That section of the O.R.C. allows a police officer to testify as to the results of a field sobriety test if the trial court makes certain findings. The burden of proof set forth in that section is clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress. 

Bonk v. Mitchell, 2013-Ohio-5487, released on 12/16/2013, held 2-1 that an appeal filed from a decision of the Medina Municipal Court was untimely and therefore the appeal should be dismissed. Judge Belfance dissented. The appellant did not file a response brief to the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal. The dissent contains an interesting discussion regarding a trial court's duty under Civ. R. 58 and the effect that a failure to comply with that rule can have on the time to file an appeal. 

Drogell v. Westfield Group, 2013-Ohio-5262, released on 12/2/2013, upheld a decision of the Medina County Common Pleas Court granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Westfield. Mr. Drogell set forth two causes of action in his complaint. One was for age discrimination and the other was for disability discrimination. The trial court had awarded summary judgment on both causes of action. The decision contains an interesting discussion regarding whether a trial court has to consider a deposition that does not comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The majority held that it does not. In her dissent, however, Judge Carr maintained that the trial court should consider such a deposition unless there is an objection to the deposition being considered. 

There were two other decisions from Medina County that were released but I did not summarize them because I couldn't open them. The decisions are State v. Dukles and State v. Shank. If I can open the decisions at a later date this blog post will be updated.