Denial of Discretionary Bindover of Juvenile for Adult Trial is Not Final Order That State has Right to Appeal

When Defendant Found Amenable to Rehabilitation in Juvenile System

In re M.P., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-599.
Hardin App. No. 6-08-09. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed, and cause remanded to the trial court.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-599.pdf

(Feb. 25, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that an order of a juvenile court denying discretionary bindover of a juvenile offender for trial as an adult because the court finds the defendant is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system is not a final order from which the state may appeal as a matter of right.

The Court’s 7-0 opinion, which affirmed a decision of the 3rd District Court of Appeals, was authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp.

The case involved a 15-year-old, identified by the initials M.P., who was charged in the Hardin County Juvenile Court with a delinquency count of murder for the killing of her mother. The county prosecutor’s office filed a motion asking the juvenile court to issue a discretionary order binding over M. P. to the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas for trial as an adult. In ruling on that motion, the juvenile court first found that there was probable cause to believe that M.P. committed the acts for which she was charged. The judge then conducted a hearing and made a judicial determination that M.P. was “amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system,” and therefore should not be bound over for trial as an adult.

The prosecutor filed a motion with the 3rd District Court of Appeals seeking leave to appeal the denial of bindover. The 3rd District declined to grant leave for an appeal.

The state sought Supreme Court review of the 3rd District’s refusal to hear its appeal. In October 2008, while the state’s petition for review was still pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision, In re A.J.S., in which it held that a juvenile court’s denial of mandatory bindover of a juvenile offender based on a finding of no probable cause was the “functional equivalent of the dismissal of a criminal indictment,” and therefore under R.C. 2945.67 was a final order from which the state had a right to appeal. Following announcement of its decision in In re A.J.S., the Court agreed to review the 3rd District’s ruling in this case.

In today’s decision, Justice Cupp cited R.C. 2945.67(A), which provides that: “A prosecuting attorney ... may appeal as a matter of right ... any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, ... and may appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except the final verdict, ... of the juvenile court in a delinquency case.”

Justice Cupp wrote: “The state urges this court to apply the rationale used in A.J.S. to allow appeals as a matter of right by the state from juvenile court decisions in which discretionary-bindover requests are denied because the court concludes that the child is amenable to care and rehabilitation in the juvenile system, even though the court also finds probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged. Because of the important difference between mandatory-bindover and discretionary-bindover proceedings, we decline the state’s invitation.”

“In a mandatory-bindover proceeding, when a juvenile court determines that no probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the act charged, the court’s finding is the ‘functional equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which the state may appeal as a matter of right’ under R.C. 2945.67(A). ... Here, the court determined that probable cause did exist to believe that the child committed the act charged, and the question presented is the appealability of the court’s order that nevertheless denied the state’s requested discretionary bindover because the court concluded that the child was amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system. In contrast to the probable-cause inquiry, an amenability hearing is a broad assessment of individual circumstances and is inherently individualized and fact-based. ... (U)nder the statute, juvenile court decisions regarding a child’s amenability to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system are different from probable-cause determinations. The legal effects of such determinations are also different.”

“In contrast to a probable-cause determination, a denial of a discretionary-bindover request on the basis of amenability does not necessitate dismissal of any of the charges in the complaint. Rather, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction of the case, the complaint continues as it was filed, and if appropriate, the child is prosecuted as a serious youthful offender under R.C. 2152.11. ... When a discretionary-bindover request is denied in these circumstances, there is no ‘functional equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment’ and there is no authority under R.C. 2945.67(A) for the state to appeal as a matter of right. ... Therefore, any appeal must be by leave of the court.”

Contacts
Colleen P. Limerick, 419.674.2284, for the Hardin County prosecutor’s office.

Elizabeth R. Miller, 614.466.5394, for juvenile offender M.P.

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