The following schedule of cases is set for hearings by the Supreme Court’s Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline in September. All hearings take place before a three-judge panel of the board and are open to the public. The hearings involve an individual attorney or judge who is charged with professional misconduct.
Hearings may be continued for good cause at any time. Interested persons should contact the board’s office at 614.387.9370 for more information about a case and to confirm that the hearing will be held as scheduled.
Members of the media seeking more information about a particular case may review the public file at the board’s office on the fifth floor of the Ohio Judicial Center, 65 S. Front St., Columbus, OH 43215-3431.
Aug. 30
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Joseph H. Smith, Respondent
Case No. 10-029
Respondent's address: 3378 Nagel Road, Avon
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, West Hearing Room 104
Aug. 30-31
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Nicholas M. Gallo, Respondent
Case No. 09-087
Respondent's address: 1633 Pleasantdale Road, Apt. 10, Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 3
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Norman L. Folwell, Respondent
Case No. 10-032
Respondent’s address: 407 Second St., Marietta
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 7
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Joseph H. Smith, Respondent
Case No. 10-029
Respondent’s address: 3378 Nagel Road, Avon
Hearing Time/Location: 1:30 p.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 10
Lorain County Bar Association, Relator v. Jeffery S. Brown, Respondent
Case No. 10-027
Respondent’s address: 124 Middle Ave., Suite M-A, Elyria
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 15
Akron Bar Association, Relator v. Jana B. DeLoach, Respondent
Case No. 10-10
Respondent’s address: P.O. Box 2385, Akron
Hearing Time/Location: 10:30 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 20 & 21
Dayton Bar Association, Relator v. Georgianna I. Parisi, Respondent
Case No. 09-064
Respondent’s address: 257 Regency Ridge Drive, Dayton
Hearing Times/Locations: 10 a.m.; Dayton Bar Association, 109 N. Main St., Suite 600, Dayton
Sept. 20, 21, 22, & 23
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. Thomas C. Eschrich, Respondent
Case No. 09-069
Respondent’s address: 10533 Shadowland Ave., Las Vegas, NV
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 29
Cincinnati Bar Association, Relator v. John W. Hauck, Respondent
Case No. 10-022
Respondent’s address: 2406 Auburn Ave., Cincinnati
Hearing Time/Location: 10 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Sept. 30 & Oct. 1
Disciplinary Counsel, Relator v. William L. Summers, Respondent
Case No. 10-037
Respondent’s address: 55 Public Square, Suite 2020, Cleveland
Hearing Time/Location: 9 a.m.; Ohio Judicial Center, North Hearing Room 106
Contact: Jon Marshall at 614.387.9370 or Chris Davey at 614.387.9250.
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Court Holds Indictment Lacking Culpable Mental State Is Not Defective When It Tracks Language of Statute
State v. Horner, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3830.
Lucas App. No. L-07-1224, 2008-Ohio-6169. Certified question answered, and judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3830.pdf
(Aug. 27, 2010) – In a decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled its 2008 decision in State v. Colon and ruled that:
1) An indictment that charges an offense by tracking the language of the criminal statute is not defective for failure to identify a culpable mental state when the statute itself fails to specify a mental state.
2) When the General Assembly includes a culpable mental state in one discrete clause, subsection, or division of a statute, but not in another discrete clause, subsection, or division of the same statute, courts must apply the analysis prescribed in the Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wac (1981) and State v. Maxwell (2002) to determine the necessary mental state where none is specified.
3) By failing to enter a timely objection to a defect in an indictment, a defendant waives all but plain error on appeal.
The Court’s 4-2 majority opinion was authored by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.
In order to convict a defendant of a criminal offense, the state must prove: 1) that the accused committed an act that is prohibited by law (in Latin, the actus reus), and 2) that in committing the prohibited conduct, the accused acted with a specified guilty or “culpable” mental state (in Latin, the mens rea) which is set forth in the section of law defining that offense. The culpable mental states set forth in Ohio criminal statutes, in increasing order of severity, are “negligently,” “recklessly,” “knowingly,” and “intentionally.”
R.C. 2901.21(B) provides that when a state law that defines a criminal offense does not specify a required mens rea for that offense, courts hearing charges under that statute must determine whether or not the language of the statute “plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in that section.” If it is determined that the legislature intended to impose strict liability, then the state is required to prove at trial only that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct, and is not required to establish any culpable mental state. If it is determined that the statutory language does not impose strict liability, R.C. 2901.21(B) requires the state to prove at trial that the defendant acted with at least the guilty mental state of “recklessly.”
In this case, Gregory Horner of Toledo was indicted on six criminal counts arising from an incident in which he and a codefendant assaulted two other men during a robbery. One charge was dismissed by the state. Two of the five remaining counts in the indictment alleged that Horner had committed aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), which prohibits the infliction or attempted infliction of “serious physical harm” on another person during the commission of a theft offense. R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) does not specify a culpable mental state. The state did not allege and the grand jury did not find that Horner had acted with any specified mens rea in committing the aggravated robbery counts in his indictment. Horner did not object to the absence of a mens rea in the aggravated robbery counts of the indictment at any point in the trial court proceedings. He entered no-contest pleas to each of the five counts of the indictment, and was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 11 years in prison.
In a subsequent appeal, Horner cited the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in State v. Colon that failure by the state to include a required guilty mental state of “recklessly” in a defendant’s indictment for the crime of robbery rendered his indictment fatally defective, and that the defendant’s failure to object to that error at the time of his trial did not bar him from raising it later on appeal. Horner asked the 6th District Court of Appeals to rule that he was entitled to a new trial because his indictment for aggravated robbery lacked a mens rea and therefore was invalid on the same basis as the indictment in Colon. The 6th District denied the appeal, stating that in Colon the Supreme Court had considered only the mens rea required for a violation of the robbery statute, R.C. 22911.02(A)(2), and therefore its holding applied only to indictments for that offense and not to indictments for the separate offense of aggravated robbery chargedunder R.C. 2911.01(A)(3).
The 6th District subsequently certified that its decision on the applicability of Colon was in conflict with a ruling in a similar case by another appellate district. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve the conflict between districts.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Stratton observed that, prior to the Colon decision, prosecutors and trial courts across the state had relied on the Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Wac and State v. Maxwell. In those cases, she noted, the Court ruled that where one clause or section of a criminal statute sets forth a required mens rea for one form or element of a crime, but a different section of the same statute does not include a mens rea, the legislature’s omission of a mens rea in the latter provision indicated intent that the element set forth in the latter section of the law be considered a “strict liability” element for which the state was not required to prove any mens rea. Applying that standard to this case, Justice Stratton said the legislature’s inclusion of a mens rea in another section of the statute under which Horner was charged, R.C. 2911.01(B), means that the exclusion of a required mens rea in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) showed clear legislative intent that the latter section be read as a strict liability provision.
Justice Stratton also wrote that, despite a second opinion (Colon II) in which the Supreme Court reconsidered and limited its holding in Colon I to cases where a defective indictment leads to multiple other errors by a trial court, “(T)he effect of our Colon holdings meant that for the first time, an indictment that charged an offense in the exact language of the Revised Code could still be defective when the statute itself failed to specify a culpable mental state. As a result, Colon I and Colon II have been called ‘a boon to defendants, a headache to appellate courts, and a nightmare to prosecutors.’ ... Today we recognize the confusion created by Colon I and II and hold that when an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of the crime, but tracks the language of the criminal statute describing the offense, the indictment provides the defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him and is, therefore, not defective.”
“Consequently, we respond to the certified question by holding that Colon I and (Colon II) are inapplicable to the offense of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3). In fact, Colon I is overruled, and Colon II is overruled to the extent that it holds that such an indictment is defective. Further, we hold that failure to timely object to a defect in an indictment constitutes a waiver of the error. ... Any claim of error in the indictment in such a case is limited to a plain-error review on appeal. ... (B)ecause the language of Horner’s indictment charging him with aggravated robbery tracked the aggravated robbery statute, R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), and because the statute does not require any further mens rea requirement beyond that encompassed in the theft portion of the statute, the grand jury considered the essential elements of aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we uphold the appellate court’s determinations that the indictment was not defective and that there was no plain error, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.”
Justice Stratton’s opinion was joined by Justices Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger concurred in judgment and agreed with the first and third paragraphs of the majority opinion syllabus. She dissented, however, from the majority holding that because another section of R.C. 2911.01 includes the required mens rea of “knowingly,” the absence of a required mens rea in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) indicated legislative intent to impose strict liability for the element that a defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict physical harm.
She wrote: “R.C. 2901.21(B) establishes the mens rea of recklessness as the default standard of liability when no mens rea is specified ... The majority has mistakenly held that the lack of mens rea alone is sufficient to indicate an intention to impose strict liability, stating ‘[b]y choosing language in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) that makes it a crime to merely inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm, as opposed to requiring a purpose or intent to injure, the General Assembly ... has indicated its purpose to impose strict liability.’ But to ‘inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm,’ as that phrase is used in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), implies action on the part of a defendant that requires a mental state of some degree, unless it has been clearly dispensed with. The General Assembly explicitly provides in R.C. 2901.21(B) that recklessness is the default mens rea, unless there is a clear indication that strict liability is intended.”
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Lanzinger’s view that the physical harm form of aggravated robbery set forth in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) is not a strict liability offense but is rather an offense for which the state must show the “default” culpability of recklessness set forth in R.C. 2901.21(B). Justice Pfeifer wrote further that, by holding that the aggravated robbery charge brought against Horner was a strict liability offense, the majority had made it unnecessary and therefore improper for the Court to overturn its earlier decisions in Colon I and Colon II in order to resolve this case.
He wrote: “Had the majority found recklessness as the operative mens rea here, then Colon I and Colon II would have been fair game, since Colon I and Colon II involved a situation in which R.C. 2901.21(B) imposed a mens rea of recklessness and the indictment failed to set forth that mens rea. Here, the majority overrules Colon I and Colon II even before determining whether they are applicable. You can overrule the Colon cases or you can find strict liability for an R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) offense, but you cannot do both in this case.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
David F. Cooper, 419.213.2061, for the state and Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office.
John F. Potts, 419.255.2800, for Gregory Horner.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Lucas App. No. L-07-1224, 2008-Ohio-6169. Certified question answered, and judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3830.pdf
(Aug. 27, 2010) – In a decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled its 2008 decision in State v. Colon and ruled that:
1) An indictment that charges an offense by tracking the language of the criminal statute is not defective for failure to identify a culpable mental state when the statute itself fails to specify a mental state.
2) When the General Assembly includes a culpable mental state in one discrete clause, subsection, or division of a statute, but not in another discrete clause, subsection, or division of the same statute, courts must apply the analysis prescribed in the Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Wac (1981) and State v. Maxwell (2002) to determine the necessary mental state where none is specified.
3) By failing to enter a timely objection to a defect in an indictment, a defendant waives all but plain error on appeal.
The Court’s 4-2 majority opinion was authored by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.
In order to convict a defendant of a criminal offense, the state must prove: 1) that the accused committed an act that is prohibited by law (in Latin, the actus reus), and 2) that in committing the prohibited conduct, the accused acted with a specified guilty or “culpable” mental state (in Latin, the mens rea) which is set forth in the section of law defining that offense. The culpable mental states set forth in Ohio criminal statutes, in increasing order of severity, are “negligently,” “recklessly,” “knowingly,” and “intentionally.”
R.C. 2901.21(B) provides that when a state law that defines a criminal offense does not specify a required mens rea for that offense, courts hearing charges under that statute must determine whether or not the language of the statute “plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in that section.” If it is determined that the legislature intended to impose strict liability, then the state is required to prove at trial only that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct, and is not required to establish any culpable mental state. If it is determined that the statutory language does not impose strict liability, R.C. 2901.21(B) requires the state to prove at trial that the defendant acted with at least the guilty mental state of “recklessly.”
In this case, Gregory Horner of Toledo was indicted on six criminal counts arising from an incident in which he and a codefendant assaulted two other men during a robbery. One charge was dismissed by the state. Two of the five remaining counts in the indictment alleged that Horner had committed aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), which prohibits the infliction or attempted infliction of “serious physical harm” on another person during the commission of a theft offense. R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) does not specify a culpable mental state. The state did not allege and the grand jury did not find that Horner had acted with any specified mens rea in committing the aggravated robbery counts in his indictment. Horner did not object to the absence of a mens rea in the aggravated robbery counts of the indictment at any point in the trial court proceedings. He entered no-contest pleas to each of the five counts of the indictment, and was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 11 years in prison.
In a subsequent appeal, Horner cited the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in State v. Colon that failure by the state to include a required guilty mental state of “recklessly” in a defendant’s indictment for the crime of robbery rendered his indictment fatally defective, and that the defendant’s failure to object to that error at the time of his trial did not bar him from raising it later on appeal. Horner asked the 6th District Court of Appeals to rule that he was entitled to a new trial because his indictment for aggravated robbery lacked a mens rea and therefore was invalid on the same basis as the indictment in Colon. The 6th District denied the appeal, stating that in Colon the Supreme Court had considered only the mens rea required for a violation of the robbery statute, R.C. 22911.02(A)(2), and therefore its holding applied only to indictments for that offense and not to indictments for the separate offense of aggravated robbery chargedunder R.C. 2911.01(A)(3).
The 6th District subsequently certified that its decision on the applicability of Colon was in conflict with a ruling in a similar case by another appellate district. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve the conflict between districts.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Stratton observed that, prior to the Colon decision, prosecutors and trial courts across the state had relied on the Supreme Court’s holdings in State v. Wac and State v. Maxwell. In those cases, she noted, the Court ruled that where one clause or section of a criminal statute sets forth a required mens rea for one form or element of a crime, but a different section of the same statute does not include a mens rea, the legislature’s omission of a mens rea in the latter provision indicated intent that the element set forth in the latter section of the law be considered a “strict liability” element for which the state was not required to prove any mens rea. Applying that standard to this case, Justice Stratton said the legislature’s inclusion of a mens rea in another section of the statute under which Horner was charged, R.C. 2911.01(B), means that the exclusion of a required mens rea in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) showed clear legislative intent that the latter section be read as a strict liability provision.
Justice Stratton also wrote that, despite a second opinion (Colon II) in which the Supreme Court reconsidered and limited its holding in Colon I to cases where a defective indictment leads to multiple other errors by a trial court, “(T)he effect of our Colon holdings meant that for the first time, an indictment that charged an offense in the exact language of the Revised Code could still be defective when the statute itself failed to specify a culpable mental state. As a result, Colon I and Colon II have been called ‘a boon to defendants, a headache to appellate courts, and a nightmare to prosecutors.’ ... Today we recognize the confusion created by Colon I and II and hold that when an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of the crime, but tracks the language of the criminal statute describing the offense, the indictment provides the defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him and is, therefore, not defective.”
“Consequently, we respond to the certified question by holding that Colon I and (Colon II) are inapplicable to the offense of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3). In fact, Colon I is overruled, and Colon II is overruled to the extent that it holds that such an indictment is defective. Further, we hold that failure to timely object to a defect in an indictment constitutes a waiver of the error. ... Any claim of error in the indictment in such a case is limited to a plain-error review on appeal. ... (B)ecause the language of Horner’s indictment charging him with aggravated robbery tracked the aggravated robbery statute, R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), and because the statute does not require any further mens rea requirement beyond that encompassed in the theft portion of the statute, the grand jury considered the essential elements of aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we uphold the appellate court’s determinations that the indictment was not defective and that there was no plain error, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.”
Justice Stratton’s opinion was joined by Justices Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger concurred in judgment and agreed with the first and third paragraphs of the majority opinion syllabus. She dissented, however, from the majority holding that because another section of R.C. 2911.01 includes the required mens rea of “knowingly,” the absence of a required mens rea in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) indicated legislative intent to impose strict liability for the element that a defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict physical harm.
She wrote: “R.C. 2901.21(B) establishes the mens rea of recklessness as the default standard of liability when no mens rea is specified ... The majority has mistakenly held that the lack of mens rea alone is sufficient to indicate an intention to impose strict liability, stating ‘[b]y choosing language in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) that makes it a crime to merely inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm, as opposed to requiring a purpose or intent to injure, the General Assembly ... has indicated its purpose to impose strict liability.’ But to ‘inflict or attempt to inflict serious physical harm,’ as that phrase is used in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), implies action on the part of a defendant that requires a mental state of some degree, unless it has been clearly dispensed with. The General Assembly explicitly provides in R.C. 2901.21(B) that recklessness is the default mens rea, unless there is a clear indication that strict liability is intended.”
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Lanzinger’s view that the physical harm form of aggravated robbery set forth in R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) is not a strict liability offense but is rather an offense for which the state must show the “default” culpability of recklessness set forth in R.C. 2901.21(B). Justice Pfeifer wrote further that, by holding that the aggravated robbery charge brought against Horner was a strict liability offense, the majority had made it unnecessary and therefore improper for the Court to overturn its earlier decisions in Colon I and Colon II in order to resolve this case.
He wrote: “Had the majority found recklessness as the operative mens rea here, then Colon I and Colon II would have been fair game, since Colon I and Colon II involved a situation in which R.C. 2901.21(B) imposed a mens rea of recklessness and the indictment failed to set forth that mens rea. Here, the majority overrules Colon I and Colon II even before determining whether they are applicable. You can overrule the Colon cases or you can find strict liability for an R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) offense, but you cannot do both in this case.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
David F. Cooper, 419.213.2061, for the state and Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office.
John F. Potts, 419.255.2800, for Gregory Horner.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Judge Kimbler’s Criminal Docket for Tuesday, August 31, 2010
State of Ohio v. Alex R. Huffman, Case No. 10-CR-0247: Alex R. Huffman of Remsen Road in Medina appeared in Judge Kimbler’s court on Tuesday, August 31, and entered a change of plea to one count of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, a first degree misdemeanor. In consideration of the State moving to amend the indictment from a fifth degree felony to a first degree misdemeanor, Mr. Huffman entered a guilty plea. Judge Kimbler accepted the plea, revoked his bond, and set the date of October 15, 2010 for imposition of sentence following a pre-sentence investigation.
State of Ohio v. Jessica L. Graham, Case No. 10-CR-0330: Motion by defendant to continue the trial is granted. Trial is scheduled for November 1, 2010 and a pre-trial is scheduled for October 25, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Ashley P. Tucker, Case No. 10-CR-0046: Motion by defendant to change the date for her change of plea hearing is granted. The new date is September 16, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Matthew A. Thomas, Case No. 08-CR-0503: Defendant's motion for an independent analysis is scheduled for hearing on September 17, 2010.
State of Ohio v. John J. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0295: Attorney Thomas J. Morris appointed to represent the defendant, effective July 9, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Oleh Yarochovitch, Case No. 10-CR-0179: Change of plea hearing set for September 2, 2010 is hereby rescheduled by the Court to September 23, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Defendant's motion to appoint expert is scheduled for hearing on September 17, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Defendant's motion to continue the jury trial is granted. New trial date is October 18, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Jessica L. Graham, Case No. 10-CR-0330: Motion by defendant to continue the trial is granted. Trial is scheduled for November 1, 2010 and a pre-trial is scheduled for October 25, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Ashley P. Tucker, Case No. 10-CR-0046: Motion by defendant to change the date for her change of plea hearing is granted. The new date is September 16, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Matthew A. Thomas, Case No. 08-CR-0503: Defendant's motion for an independent analysis is scheduled for hearing on September 17, 2010.
State of Ohio v. John J. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0295: Attorney Thomas J. Morris appointed to represent the defendant, effective July 9, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Oleh Yarochovitch, Case No. 10-CR-0179: Change of plea hearing set for September 2, 2010 is hereby rescheduled by the Court to September 23, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Defendant's motion to appoint expert is scheduled for hearing on September 17, 2010.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Defendant's motion to continue the jury trial is granted. New trial date is October 18, 2010.
Law Talk with Juvenile Magistrate Susanna Lewis Part 1
Medina Attorney John Celebrezze, host of the award winning community access show Law Talk, recently sat down with Juvenile Court Magistrate Susanna Lewis to talk about her job and how it impacts Medina County residents who go through the Medina County Juvenile Court. Magistrate Lewis was appointed by Judge John Lohn and, among other things, helps with his Teen Court program. You can see Part one of the interview by clicking on the link below:
Law Talk with Juvenile Magistrate Susanna Lewis Part 2
Medina Attorney John Celebrezze, host of the award winning community access show Law Talk, recently sat down with Juvenile Court Magistrate Susanna Lewis to talk about her job and how it impacts Medina County residents who go through the Medina County Juvenile Court. Magistrate Lewis was appointed by Judge John Lohn and, among other things, helps with his Teen Court program. You can see Part Two of the interview by clicking on the link below:
Monday, August 30, 2010
Ask the Judge, Part One
The Celebrezze-Zanghi Community Legal Education Project has a new television show that is running on community access television stations in Medina County. Hosted by Attorney John Celebrezze and Medina resident Kate Feeks, the show allows Medina County residents to ask questions of the county's judges. Judge James L. Kimbler was the first guest on Ask the Judge. Part One of the show appears below:
Ask the Judge, Part Two
The Celebrezze-Zanghi Community Legal Education Project has a new television show that is running on community access television stations in Medina County. Hosted by Attorney John Celebrezze and Medina resident Kate Feeks, the show allows Medina County residents to ask questions of the county's judges. Judge James L. Kimbler was the first guest on Ask the Judge. Part Two of the show appears below:
Judge Kimbler Decision on Survival of Workers' Compensation Claim
Below is an opinion that I recently filed in a civil case. Please note that the opinion is subject to an appeal.
Ms. Tracy Lytle filed an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission disallowing her claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits. Prior to a determination by this Court as to whether she was entitled to such benefits, she died. The Estate then filed a motion to substitute itself as a party pursuant to Civ. R. 25 (A). The Court granted that motion. The State then filed a motion to dismiss this action. The motion alleged that the cause of action for benefits abated with Ms. Lytle’s death. Therefore, the State alleged that there was no longer a viable cause of action for benefits.
In Melton v. Fisher Body Elyria, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9408, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District, sitting as the Lorain County Court of Appeals, held that the death of a worker extinguished the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Court wrote the following:
“Ohio workers compensation law creates two separate and distinct categories of individuals entitled to benefits: living employees and their dependents after death. Ratliff v. Flowers (1970), 25 Ohio App. 2d 113; Bozzelli v. Indus. Comm. (1930), 122 Ohio St. 201.
An injured employee's cause of action accrues at the time he receives an injury in the course of his employment. A dependent's cause of action, accrues at the time of the death of the employee from an injury received in the course of his employment. Indus. Comm. v. Kamidth (1928), 118 Ohio St. 1, paragraph three and four of the syllabus approved and followed in Indus. Comm. v. Davis (1933), 126 Ohio 593, paragraph one and two of the syllabus. Therefore, such causes of action are separate and not dependent.
Before his death the claimant had filed a motion for further allowance with the Industrial Commission. This claim was not ruled on before his death. When a claimant dies, action on any claim pending before the bureau or industrial commission, it abated by the claimant's death. Ohio Administrative Code Section 4123-5-21; Ratliff, supra. Therefore claimant's motion for further allowance was abated. However, since appellant's claim for death benefits, pursuant to R.C. 4123.59, is a separate cause of action, claimant's death did not abate it.
The law recognizes the right of dependents to recover under a separate action for death benefits as long as it is shown that the cause of death was the direct and proximate result of the industrial injury. Oswald v. Connor, (1985), 16 Ohio St. 3d 38. Therefore, the trial court erred in not affording the dependents a trial and by granting judgment to the appellees on the basis that the claim was abated.”
In this case, however, the claim is not for death benefits, but for benefits for the injury that the Estate claims that Ms. Lytle was due at the time of her death. Therefore, even though the language quoted above is dicta as far as the issue of whether a cause of action for benefits that allegedly accrued to the employee at the time of her death abates, this Court finds that the Melton decision is persuasive and therefore, this Court will follow it.
This position has also been adopted by other appellate courts in Ohio. See, for example, Hook v. City of Springfield (2000), 141 Ohio App. 3d 260 and Hlatky v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.
Therefore, this Court grants the motion to dismiss. Court costs over and above any deposit filed with the Clerk of Courts are hereby waived.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED.
Ms. Tracy Lytle filed an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission disallowing her claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits. Prior to a determination by this Court as to whether she was entitled to such benefits, she died. The Estate then filed a motion to substitute itself as a party pursuant to Civ. R. 25 (A). The Court granted that motion. The State then filed a motion to dismiss this action. The motion alleged that the cause of action for benefits abated with Ms. Lytle’s death. Therefore, the State alleged that there was no longer a viable cause of action for benefits.
In Melton v. Fisher Body Elyria, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9408, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Appellate District, sitting as the Lorain County Court of Appeals, held that the death of a worker extinguished the claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Court wrote the following:
“Ohio workers compensation law creates two separate and distinct categories of individuals entitled to benefits: living employees and their dependents after death. Ratliff v. Flowers (1970), 25 Ohio App. 2d 113; Bozzelli v. Indus. Comm. (1930), 122 Ohio St. 201.
An injured employee's cause of action accrues at the time he receives an injury in the course of his employment. A dependent's cause of action, accrues at the time of the death of the employee from an injury received in the course of his employment. Indus. Comm. v. Kamidth (1928), 118 Ohio St. 1, paragraph three and four of the syllabus approved and followed in Indus. Comm. v. Davis (1933), 126 Ohio 593, paragraph one and two of the syllabus. Therefore, such causes of action are separate and not dependent.
Before his death the claimant had filed a motion for further allowance with the Industrial Commission. This claim was not ruled on before his death. When a claimant dies, action on any claim pending before the bureau or industrial commission, it abated by the claimant's death. Ohio Administrative Code Section 4123-5-21; Ratliff, supra. Therefore claimant's motion for further allowance was abated. However, since appellant's claim for death benefits, pursuant to R.C. 4123.59, is a separate cause of action, claimant's death did not abate it.
The law recognizes the right of dependents to recover under a separate action for death benefits as long as it is shown that the cause of death was the direct and proximate result of the industrial injury. Oswald v. Connor, (1985), 16 Ohio St. 3d 38. Therefore, the trial court erred in not affording the dependents a trial and by granting judgment to the appellees on the basis that the claim was abated.”
In this case, however, the claim is not for death benefits, but for benefits for the injury that the Estate claims that Ms. Lytle was due at the time of her death. Therefore, even though the language quoted above is dicta as far as the issue of whether a cause of action for benefits that allegedly accrued to the employee at the time of her death abates, this Court finds that the Melton decision is persuasive and therefore, this Court will follow it.
This position has also been adopted by other appellate courts in Ohio. See, for example, Hook v. City of Springfield (2000), 141 Ohio App. 3d 260 and Hlatky v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.
Therefore, this Court grants the motion to dismiss. Court costs over and above any deposit filed with the Clerk of Courts are hereby waived.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED.
Judge Kimbler Journal Entry on Motion to Suppress
On August 23, 2010, Judge Kimbler filed a journal entry denying a motion to suppress in the case of State of Ohio v. Michael A. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0163. A copy of the body of the motion appears below:
Case History
Mr. McCarty is charged with five crimes. He filed a motion to suppress on June 16, 2010 alleging that the State obtained both physical evidence and statements from Mr. McCarty by unconstitutional means. The Court heard Mr. McCarty’s motion on August 12, 2010. This entry sets forth the Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ruling on Mr. McCarty’s motion.
Findings of Fact
Early in the morning of April 19, 2010, Patrolman Matt Markley of the Wadsworth Police Department was on duty. That day he was working the 10 pm to 6 am shift. At approximately 1:20 am he made a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger.
Officer Markley made the stop after his cruiser’s radar unit clocked the car in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger doing 65 mph in a 50 mph zone. The car was driven by a Mary Moser.
At the start of his shift, Officer Markley was told that the day before there had been a series of car break-ins in Wadsworth. Property taken from the cars included electronic devices such as mp3 players and cell phones.
After making the stop, Officer Markley began to run the registration and license information for the vehicle and the driver. While he was running that information, he asked his dispatcher to contact a canine unit from Seville. Officer Markley wanted the canine unit to do a sniff around the car.
The request to dispatch the canine unit came in at 1:23 through the Medina County Sheriff’s Office Dispatch Center. The Seville Officer received the dispatch at 1:26 and he arrived at the scene at 1:31. When he arrived at the scene with his canine partner, Officer Markley briefed him on what he wanted done. The Seville officer then walked his canine partner around the stopped car. The dog alerted on the vehicle and the two officers began to search the car.
While they were searching the vehicle, Officer Markley discovered a bag with several cell phones in it, mp3 players, white wires, other electronic cords, and gloves. At that point Officer Markley gave both the driver and Mr. McCarty the warnings regarding their constitutional rights.
After receiving the warnings, Mr. McCarty told the Officer that he had bought the bag and its contents for $50.00 from a person in a park. He also said that he knew the items in the bag were stolen. At that point, Officer Markley arrested Mr. McCarty for receiving stolen property.
After arresting Mr. McCarty for receiving stolen property, Officer Markley took him down to the Wadsworth Police Station. Over the next few hours Mr. McCarty admitted to stealing the items in the bag on April 18 and 19. During this time he was not deprived of food or drink, wasn’t under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, and the Officer didn’t make any promises or threats to get him to make statements.
Conclusions of Law
A stop is constitutional if it is supported by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause." State v. Molek, 11th Dist. No. 2001-P-0147, 2002 Ohio 7159, at P25. In order to make an investigative stop within constitutional parameters, a police officer must be able to cite articulable facts that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889.
The scope and duration of an investigative stop must not exceed what is necessary to complete the purpose for which the initial stop was made. Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 1997 Ohio 343, 685 N.E.2d 762, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 11 Ohio B. 250, 463 N.E.2d 1237.
"In conducting an investigative traffic stop, an officer may detain a motorist for a period of time sufficient to run a computer check on his license, registration, and vehicle plates and to issue him a warning or a citation." State v. Rusnak (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 27, 696 N.E.2d 633, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.
An officer, however, cannot use the lawfulness of an initial stop to conduct a fishing expedition for evidence of another crime. State v. Bevan (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 130, 608 N.E.2d 1099.
Whether or not a detention is reasonable depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the facts of each case. State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by prohibiting admission of inculpatory statements resulting from custodial interrogation unless law enforcement officers have followed enumerated procedural safeguards.
Those safeguards include the arresting officer advising the arrested persons that he or she has a right to remain silent; a right to stop answering or talking to the police at any time; a right to have an attorney present during any interrogation; and the right to have a court-appointed attorney if the arrested person cannot afford to hire an attorney.
An officer may make a warrantless arrest if he has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested committed a crime. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent person in believing that the person being arrested had committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142.
Reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity is not required, prior to subjecting an otherwise lawfully-detained vehicle to a canine sniff. State v. Ramirez, (2004) Ohio 6541 (9th District, Dec. 8, 2004); State v. Lynn (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 402, syllabus at paragraph six; State v. Rusnak (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28-29; and State v. Carlson (1995),102 Ohio App. 3d 585 (9th District, April 19, 2005); State v. Blednick (1997), Ohio App. LEXIS 4884 (9th District, Nov. 5, 1997); State v. Ray (2004), Ohio App. LEXIS 3045 (9th District, June, 30 2004).
A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog is sui generis and does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or under the Ohio Constitution. United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 707, (canine sniff of luggage at airport); see also United States v. Reed (6th Cir. 1998), 141 F.3d 644, 649-50 (canine sniff of dresser while police were lawfully present inside residence); State v. Lynn
(2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 402 (canine sniff of inoperable and undetained vehicle); State v. French (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 740, syllabus at paragraph nineteen; State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 585; State v. Palicki (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 175, syllabus at paragraphs four and five; and State v. Riley (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 468, syllabus at paragraph one (canine sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles).
Once the drug sniffing dog had “hit” on the vehicle, the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant. See State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional right to due process of law is violated when a conviction is founded upon an involuntary or coerced confession, even if there is ample evidence apart from the confession to support the conviction. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368, 376, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774; Lynumn v. Illinois (1963), 372 U.S. 528, 537, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922, 83 S. Ct. 917. A suspect's waiver of his right not to incriminate himself and his subsequent confession must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.
Absent evidence that a suspect's will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct, the decision of a suspect to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege is made voluntarily. State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St. 3d 88, 91-92, 559 N.E.2d 459.
To determine voluntariness, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the defendant; the length, intensity, and frequency of the interrogation; and the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment, or the existence of any threat or inducement. State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 40-41, 358 N.E.2d 1051, vacated as to death penalty (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 3135, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1154.
After a suspect is arrested the police must advise of the suspect of the constitutional right not to incriminate himself; that anything the suspect says can and will be used against the suspect; that if the suspect starts talking, the suspect can stop at any time; that the suspect has the right to an attorney; and that if the suspect can’t afford one, one will be appointed to represent the suspect. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436; 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2817; 10 A.L.R.3d 974.
Holding
The Court finds that the motion to suppress should be overruled. Officer Markley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of the car in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger was violating the traffic laws of Ohio. This suspicion was based on the reading he got from his cruiser’s radar unit.
Once he stopped the vehicle, he had the right to ask for a drug sniffing dog, provided that he did not drag out the stop in order to get the dog to the car. Since the dog arrived at the scene within about 10 minutes of the stop, and since a stop under 20 minutes is presumed reasonable, the sniff was constitutionally permissible.
Once the dog alerted on the vehicle, Officer Markley had probable cause to search the vehicle. Finding the bag gave him the basis to interrogate Mr. McCarty concerning the bag’s contents. Mr. McCarty’s statements about buying the bag and knowing the contents were stolen then gave Officer Markley probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
Officer Markley’s interrogation of Mr. McCarty was constitutional. He advised Mr. McCarty of his constitutional rights and did not apply unconstitutional coercion to obtain the statements.
Order
Mr. McCarty’s motion to suppress is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Case History
Mr. McCarty is charged with five crimes. He filed a motion to suppress on June 16, 2010 alleging that the State obtained both physical evidence and statements from Mr. McCarty by unconstitutional means. The Court heard Mr. McCarty’s motion on August 12, 2010. This entry sets forth the Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ruling on Mr. McCarty’s motion.
Findings of Fact
Early in the morning of April 19, 2010, Patrolman Matt Markley of the Wadsworth Police Department was on duty. That day he was working the 10 pm to 6 am shift. At approximately 1:20 am he made a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger.
Officer Markley made the stop after his cruiser’s radar unit clocked the car in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger doing 65 mph in a 50 mph zone. The car was driven by a Mary Moser.
At the start of his shift, Officer Markley was told that the day before there had been a series of car break-ins in Wadsworth. Property taken from the cars included electronic devices such as mp3 players and cell phones.
After making the stop, Officer Markley began to run the registration and license information for the vehicle and the driver. While he was running that information, he asked his dispatcher to contact a canine unit from Seville. Officer Markley wanted the canine unit to do a sniff around the car.
The request to dispatch the canine unit came in at 1:23 through the Medina County Sheriff’s Office Dispatch Center. The Seville Officer received the dispatch at 1:26 and he arrived at the scene at 1:31. When he arrived at the scene with his canine partner, Officer Markley briefed him on what he wanted done. The Seville officer then walked his canine partner around the stopped car. The dog alerted on the vehicle and the two officers began to search the car.
While they were searching the vehicle, Officer Markley discovered a bag with several cell phones in it, mp3 players, white wires, other electronic cords, and gloves. At that point Officer Markley gave both the driver and Mr. McCarty the warnings regarding their constitutional rights.
After receiving the warnings, Mr. McCarty told the Officer that he had bought the bag and its contents for $50.00 from a person in a park. He also said that he knew the items in the bag were stolen. At that point, Officer Markley arrested Mr. McCarty for receiving stolen property.
After arresting Mr. McCarty for receiving stolen property, Officer Markley took him down to the Wadsworth Police Station. Over the next few hours Mr. McCarty admitted to stealing the items in the bag on April 18 and 19. During this time he was not deprived of food or drink, wasn’t under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, and the Officer didn’t make any promises or threats to get him to make statements.
Conclusions of Law
A stop is constitutional if it is supported by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause." State v. Molek, 11th Dist. No. 2001-P-0147, 2002 Ohio 7159, at P25. In order to make an investigative stop within constitutional parameters, a police officer must be able to cite articulable facts that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889.
The scope and duration of an investigative stop must not exceed what is necessary to complete the purpose for which the initial stop was made. Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229; State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 1997 Ohio 343, 685 N.E.2d 762, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Chatton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 11 Ohio B. 250, 463 N.E.2d 1237.
"In conducting an investigative traffic stop, an officer may detain a motorist for a period of time sufficient to run a computer check on his license, registration, and vehicle plates and to issue him a warning or a citation." State v. Rusnak (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 27, 696 N.E.2d 633, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.
An officer, however, cannot use the lawfulness of an initial stop to conduct a fishing expedition for evidence of another crime. State v. Bevan (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 130, 608 N.E.2d 1099.
Whether or not a detention is reasonable depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the facts of each case. State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by prohibiting admission of inculpatory statements resulting from custodial interrogation unless law enforcement officers have followed enumerated procedural safeguards.
Those safeguards include the arresting officer advising the arrested persons that he or she has a right to remain silent; a right to stop answering or talking to the police at any time; a right to have an attorney present during any interrogation; and the right to have a court-appointed attorney if the arrested person cannot afford to hire an attorney.
An officer may make a warrantless arrest if he has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested committed a crime. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent person in believing that the person being arrested had committed a crime. Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142.
Reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity is not required, prior to subjecting an otherwise lawfully-detained vehicle to a canine sniff. State v. Ramirez, (2004) Ohio 6541 (9th District, Dec. 8, 2004); State v. Lynn (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 402, syllabus at paragraph six; State v. Rusnak (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28-29; and State v. Carlson (1995),102 Ohio App. 3d 585 (9th District, April 19, 2005); State v. Blednick (1997), Ohio App. LEXIS 4884 (9th District, Nov. 5, 1997); State v. Ray (2004), Ohio App. LEXIS 3045 (9th District, June, 30 2004).
A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog is sui generis and does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or under the Ohio Constitution. United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 707, (canine sniff of luggage at airport); see also United States v. Reed (6th Cir. 1998), 141 F.3d 644, 649-50 (canine sniff of dresser while police were lawfully present inside residence); State v. Lynn
(2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 402 (canine sniff of inoperable and undetained vehicle); State v. French (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 740, syllabus at paragraph nineteen; State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 585; State v. Palicki (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 175, syllabus at paragraphs four and five; and State v. Riley (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 468, syllabus at paragraph one (canine sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles).
Once the drug sniffing dog had “hit” on the vehicle, the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant. See State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional right to due process of law is violated when a conviction is founded upon an involuntary or coerced confession, even if there is ample evidence apart from the confession to support the conviction. Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 U.S. 368, 376, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774; Lynumn v. Illinois (1963), 372 U.S. 528, 537, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922, 83 S. Ct. 917. A suspect's waiver of his right not to incriminate himself and his subsequent confession must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.
Absent evidence that a suspect's will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired because of coercive police conduct, the decision of a suspect to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege is made voluntarily. State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St. 3d 88, 91-92, 559 N.E.2d 459.
To determine voluntariness, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the defendant; the length, intensity, and frequency of the interrogation; and the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment, or the existence of any threat or inducement. State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 40-41, 358 N.E.2d 1051, vacated as to death penalty (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 3135, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1154.
After a suspect is arrested the police must advise of the suspect of the constitutional right not to incriminate himself; that anything the suspect says can and will be used against the suspect; that if the suspect starts talking, the suspect can stop at any time; that the suspect has the right to an attorney; and that if the suspect can’t afford one, one will be appointed to represent the suspect. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436; 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2817; 10 A.L.R.3d 974.
Holding
The Court finds that the motion to suppress should be overruled. Officer Markley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of the car in which Mr. McCarty was a passenger was violating the traffic laws of Ohio. This suspicion was based on the reading he got from his cruiser’s radar unit.
Once he stopped the vehicle, he had the right to ask for a drug sniffing dog, provided that he did not drag out the stop in order to get the dog to the car. Since the dog arrived at the scene within about 10 minutes of the stop, and since a stop under 20 minutes is presumed reasonable, the sniff was constitutionally permissible.
Once the dog alerted on the vehicle, Officer Markley had probable cause to search the vehicle. Finding the bag gave him the basis to interrogate Mr. McCarty concerning the bag’s contents. Mr. McCarty’s statements about buying the bag and knowing the contents were stolen then gave Officer Markley probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
Officer Markley’s interrogation of Mr. McCarty was constitutional. He advised Mr. McCarty of his constitutional rights and did not apply unconstitutional coercion to obtain the statements.
Order
Mr. McCarty’s motion to suppress is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Judge Kimbler’s Criminal Docket for Monday, August 30, 2010
Judge Kimbler handled the cases of the following defendants on Monday, August 30, 2010:
State of Ohio v. John A. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0295: Mr. McCarty failed to appear at a pre-trial conference scheduled for Monday, August 30, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler revoked Mr. McCarty’s bond for failure to appear and ordered a warrant issued for his arrest.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Judge Kimbler denied a motion to reduce Mr. Tracy’s bond. The case is scheduled for a jury trial on September 1, 2010 at 9:00 am.
State of Ohio v. Nichole M. Fenick, Case No. 10-CR-0307: Ms. Fenick appeared in court with her attorney, Teresa Barrington, and entered a plea of no contest to six felony charges. One charge was for Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony, and the remaining five charges were for Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all fifth degree felonies. Judge Kimbler found her guilty of all six charges on the no contest pleas; ordered a pre-sentence investigation; and continued her bond. Judge Kimbler will sentence Ms. Fenick on October 7, 2010 at 8:30 am.
State of Ohio v. Michael A. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0163: The State made a motion to amend Count I, Burglary to Attempted Burglary, and following that amendment Mr. McCarty entered a plea of no contest to the one count of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony; three counts of Breaking and Entering, each of those counts being a fifth degree felony; and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth degree felony.
Following the changes of plea, the parties made a joint recommendation to Judge Kimbler that he impose a 15 month prison sentence. Judge Kimbler accepted the recommendation and imposed a 15 month prison sentence on the count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a 12 month prison sentence on the Attempted Burglary; and a six month prison sentence on the three counts of Breaking and Entering. Judge Kimbler ordered that the sentences be served concurrently and that Mr. McCarty receive credit for 133 days served in the Medina County Jail awaiting trial.
State of Ohio v. John A. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0295: Mr. McCarty failed to appear at a pre-trial conference scheduled for Monday, August 30, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler revoked Mr. McCarty’s bond for failure to appear and ordered a warrant issued for his arrest.
State of Ohio v. Joseph M. Tracy, Case No. 10-CR-0311: Judge Kimbler denied a motion to reduce Mr. Tracy’s bond. The case is scheduled for a jury trial on September 1, 2010 at 9:00 am.
State of Ohio v. Nichole M. Fenick, Case No. 10-CR-0307: Ms. Fenick appeared in court with her attorney, Teresa Barrington, and entered a plea of no contest to six felony charges. One charge was for Illegal Processing of Drug Documents, a fourth degree felony, and the remaining five charges were for Deception to Obtain a Dangerous Drug, all fifth degree felonies. Judge Kimbler found her guilty of all six charges on the no contest pleas; ordered a pre-sentence investigation; and continued her bond. Judge Kimbler will sentence Ms. Fenick on October 7, 2010 at 8:30 am.
State of Ohio v. Michael A. McCarty, Case No. 10-CR-0163: The State made a motion to amend Count I, Burglary to Attempted Burglary, and following that amendment Mr. McCarty entered a plea of no contest to the one count of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony; three counts of Breaking and Entering, each of those counts being a fifth degree felony; and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a fourth degree felony.
Following the changes of plea, the parties made a joint recommendation to Judge Kimbler that he impose a 15 month prison sentence. Judge Kimbler accepted the recommendation and imposed a 15 month prison sentence on the count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a 12 month prison sentence on the Attempted Burglary; and a six month prison sentence on the three counts of Breaking and Entering. Judge Kimbler ordered that the sentences be served concurrently and that Mr. McCarty receive credit for 133 days served in the Medina County Jail awaiting trial.
Saturday, August 28, 2010
Columbus Man Sentenced for Passing Counterfeit Bills at Local Businesses
On Thursday, August 26, 2010, Judge James Kimbler sentenced a Columbus man for three counts of Forgery involving local businesses. Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Deshine Garrett of Forest Hill in Columbus, to non-residential community control sanctions. The sanctions included supervision by the Adult Probation Department for three years; 24 hours of community service; a drug assessment with an approved agency; restitution; no contact with the co-defendants involved in the case; and no possession or consumption of alcohol. Judge Kimbler also ordered that supervision of Mr. Garrett be transferred to the Franklin County Probation Department.
The three forgery counts arose from the passing of $100.00 counterfeit bills at local businesses in southern Medina County. The businesses were a Pilot Truck Stop on Lake Road; a Subway Restaurant located inside the Pilot Truck Stop; and the Factory Brand store at the Lodi Outlet Mall. In each case, the defendants would pass a counterfeit $100.00 bill when they paid for items they purchased at the stores. When asked why he did this, Mr. Garrett money was tight and he was trying to get a place for his family. He also volunteered that he "didn't use his brain the right way."
The three forgery counts arose from the passing of $100.00 counterfeit bills at local businesses in southern Medina County. The businesses were a Pilot Truck Stop on Lake Road; a Subway Restaurant located inside the Pilot Truck Stop; and the Factory Brand store at the Lodi Outlet Mall. In each case, the defendants would pass a counterfeit $100.00 bill when they paid for items they purchased at the stores. When asked why he did this, Mr. Garrett money was tight and he was trying to get a place for his family. He also volunteered that he "didn't use his brain the right way."
Medina Man Sentenced for Drug Trafficking
On Thursday, August 26, 2010, Judge James Kimbler sentenced Adam M. Szwec of Lafayette Road in Medina, Ohio, on four counts of Drug Trafficking. Three of the counts were felonies of the fifth degree and one was a fourth degree felony.
Judge Kimbler ordered Mr. Szwec to serve 180 days of home incarceration with review at 90 days; placed under supervision by the Adult Probation Department for three years, with the initial supervision being intensive; ordered him to complete 24 hours of community service; ordered him to get a drug assessment and abide by all aftercare recommendations; suspended his driver's license for six months; and ordered him to pay a $40.00 monthly community control sanction fee. At the request of Medina County Prosecuting Attorney Dean Holman, Judge Kimbler also ordered Mr. Szwec to pay back the county for the "buy money" that he received from the confidential informant used in the case. In the event that Mr. Szwec violates the above conditions, he is looking at a one year prison sentence.
In both the pre-sentence investigation interview and in court on Thursday, Mr. Szwec described being charged with drug trafficking as both the worst thing and the best thing that has happened to him. It was the worst because he was facing a possible prison sentence, but it was the best because it has motivated him to stop using drugs and get treatment.
Judge Kimbler ordered Mr. Szwec to serve 180 days of home incarceration with review at 90 days; placed under supervision by the Adult Probation Department for three years, with the initial supervision being intensive; ordered him to complete 24 hours of community service; ordered him to get a drug assessment and abide by all aftercare recommendations; suspended his driver's license for six months; and ordered him to pay a $40.00 monthly community control sanction fee. At the request of Medina County Prosecuting Attorney Dean Holman, Judge Kimbler also ordered Mr. Szwec to pay back the county for the "buy money" that he received from the confidential informant used in the case. In the event that Mr. Szwec violates the above conditions, he is looking at a one year prison sentence.
In both the pre-sentence investigation interview and in court on Thursday, Mr. Szwec described being charged with drug trafficking as both the worst thing and the best thing that has happened to him. It was the worst because he was facing a possible prison sentence, but it was the best because it has motivated him to stop using drugs and get treatment.
Medina Woman Ordered to Pay $3,000 in Restitution to Armstrong Cable
On Thursday, August 26, Judge Kimbler sentenced Laura L. Campbell, 42, of Normandy Park Drive in Medina, Ohio, for Theft, a fifth degree felony. Ms. Campbell is a former employee of Armstrong Cable. The theft charge arose from an investigation that was done by Armstrong regarding certain accounts that Ms. Campbell could access. Ms. Campbell admitted to taking money from Armstrong while she worked there because her prescription costs were too high, the bank was foreclosing on her home, and she was desperate.
Judge Kimbler sentenced her to three years supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department, ordered her to make restitution of $3,000.00 to Armstrong, ordered her to do 24 hours of community service, make best efforts to obtain and maintain gainful employment, and undergo random drug testing. She was also ordered to pay a monthly community control sanction fee and pay for drug testing. Judge Kimbler waived court costs because she has to make restitution to Armstong. If she violated the conditions of her supervision, she could be sent to prison for one year.
Judge Kimbler sentenced her to three years supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department, ordered her to make restitution of $3,000.00 to Armstrong, ordered her to do 24 hours of community service, make best efforts to obtain and maintain gainful employment, and undergo random drug testing. She was also ordered to pay a monthly community control sanction fee and pay for drug testing. Judge Kimbler waived court costs because she has to make restitution to Armstong. If she violated the conditions of her supervision, she could be sent to prison for one year.
North Ridgeville Man Sentenced for Stealing From Employer
Daniel R. Kleinsmith, 45, of Ronald Drive in North Ridgeville, Ohio, was sentenced on Thursday, August 26, for one count of Theft. Although originally indicted as a felony, the State amended the indictment to a misdemeanor on condition that Mr. Kleinsmith enter a guilty plea.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Kleinsmith to 180 days in jail, but suspended the jail sentence on several conditions. The conditions included being supervised by the Medina County Adult Probation Department for two years; paying $1314.22 in restitution; performing 24 hours of community service; making best efforts to obtain and maintain employment; obtaining a drug/alcohol assessment and abiding by all aftercare recommendations; not possessing or consuming alcohol; and paying a monthly community control sanction fee if employed.
In his explanation of why he stole from his employer, Mr. Kleinsmith explained that as a truck driver for his employer he had access to a fuel card. He used the fuel card for private purchases and turned in the receipts, intending to pay back his employer when he got paid. He had been doing this for several years, but this time, he got into a dispute with his employer over his paychecks. He believed that the employer owed him money for his work, and the employer believed that Mr. Kleinsmith owed him for his use of the credit card.
By the time the case was filed, Mr. Kleinsmith was no longer working for his employer. One day Mr. Kleinsmith received a certified letter with his paychecks and the next day he was visited by a detective from the Brunswick Police Department. Following that detective's investigation, he was charged with Theft for using the credit card for private purchases.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Kleinsmith to 180 days in jail, but suspended the jail sentence on several conditions. The conditions included being supervised by the Medina County Adult Probation Department for two years; paying $1314.22 in restitution; performing 24 hours of community service; making best efforts to obtain and maintain employment; obtaining a drug/alcohol assessment and abiding by all aftercare recommendations; not possessing or consuming alcohol; and paying a monthly community control sanction fee if employed.
In his explanation of why he stole from his employer, Mr. Kleinsmith explained that as a truck driver for his employer he had access to a fuel card. He used the fuel card for private purchases and turned in the receipts, intending to pay back his employer when he got paid. He had been doing this for several years, but this time, he got into a dispute with his employer over his paychecks. He believed that the employer owed him money for his work, and the employer believed that Mr. Kleinsmith owed him for his use of the credit card.
By the time the case was filed, Mr. Kleinsmith was no longer working for his employer. One day Mr. Kleinsmith received a certified letter with his paychecks and the next day he was visited by a detective from the Brunswick Police Department. Following that detective's investigation, he was charged with Theft for using the credit card for private purchases.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Akron Man Sent to Prison for Attempted Burglary
William R. Carson, Jr.,53, who is from Akron, but is presently homeless, was sent to prison for one year by Judge James L. Kimbler on Thursday, August 26. In July, a jury convicted Mr. Carson of one count of Attempted Burglary, a fifth degree felony, and two counts of Criminal Trespass, a fourth degree misdemeanor.
Judge Kimbler also sentenced Mr. Carson to thirty days in jail for each criminal trespass, but under Ohio law, a misdemeanor sentence has to be served concurrently with a prison sentence. Judge Kimbler also gave him credit for 129 days he served in the county jail prior to the imposition of sentence.
Although the jury convicted Mr. Carson of three counts, it found him not guilty of one burglary count, a count of possessing criminal tools, and found him not guilty of two counts of breaking and entering, but did find him guilty of the lesser included offenses of criminal trespass. Mr. Carson is expected to appeal his conviction.
Judge Kimbler also sentenced Mr. Carson to thirty days in jail for each criminal trespass, but under Ohio law, a misdemeanor sentence has to be served concurrently with a prison sentence. Judge Kimbler also gave him credit for 129 days he served in the county jail prior to the imposition of sentence.
Although the jury convicted Mr. Carson of three counts, it found him not guilty of one burglary count, a count of possessing criminal tools, and found him not guilty of two counts of breaking and entering, but did find him guilty of the lesser included offenses of criminal trespass. Mr. Carson is expected to appeal his conviction.
Wadsworth Man Sentenced for Burglary & Theft of a Dangerous Drug
Jeremy J. Dusek, 21, of Ridge Road in Wadsworth, Ohio, was sentenced by Judge James L. Kimbler for one count of Burglary, a third degree felony, and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drub, a fourth degree felony.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Dusek on Thursday, August 26. Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Dusek to the Lorain County Community Based Correctional Facility; put him on supervision by the Probation Department for four years following his release from LCCBCF; ordered him to obtain a mental health assessment through the Probation Department's in-house counselor; ordered him to neither possess or consume alcohol; submit to drug-alcohol testing as ordered and be arrested on first positive finding; attend three AA/NA meetings per week; have no contact with the victim or her family; pay supervision and drug testing fees; and make best efforts to obtain and maintain employment. He was also ordered to make restitution to the victims, which he paid prior to sentencing.
Mr. Dusek was charged with breaking into the home the parents of his former girlfriend. He took prescription drugs. The restitution ordered by Judge Kimbler was for the cost of the drugs. When asked by the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence investigation report why he committed this offense, Mr. Dusek explained that he went to the home to see his ex-girlfriend. He walked into the home after he knocked on the door and no one answered. He saw the pills on a counter. He explained that the pills were "calling his name" so he took them and left.
Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Dusek on Thursday, August 26. Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Dusek to the Lorain County Community Based Correctional Facility; put him on supervision by the Probation Department for four years following his release from LCCBCF; ordered him to obtain a mental health assessment through the Probation Department's in-house counselor; ordered him to neither possess or consume alcohol; submit to drug-alcohol testing as ordered and be arrested on first positive finding; attend three AA/NA meetings per week; have no contact with the victim or her family; pay supervision and drug testing fees; and make best efforts to obtain and maintain employment. He was also ordered to make restitution to the victims, which he paid prior to sentencing.
Mr. Dusek was charged with breaking into the home the parents of his former girlfriend. He took prescription drugs. The restitution ordered by Judge Kimbler was for the cost of the drugs. When asked by the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence investigation report why he committed this offense, Mr. Dusek explained that he went to the home to see his ex-girlfriend. He walked into the home after he knocked on the door and no one answered. He saw the pills on a counter. He explained that the pills were "calling his name" so he took them and left.
Wadsworth Man Sentenced for Theft
Daniel W. Lanier, 51, of Grandview Avenue in Wadsworth, Ohio, was sentenced by Judge James L. Kimbler for Theft, a first degree misdemeanor. Judge Kimbler sentenced Mr. Lanier to 180 days in jail, but suspended the sentence on condition that he satisfactorily complete supervision by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. The conditions of his supervision include making restitution to Wal-Mart in the amount of $623.00 and complying with the general terms of supervision for two years.
Mr. Lanier is a former employee of Wal-Mart who took money from three cash registers while he was working one evening. His actions were recorded by a video recording system. The next day, when he came into work, he was fired. Mr. Lanier told the probation officer who wrote the pre-sentence investigation report that he had a good job and he "messed it up." He also said that he was "really sorry" for his actions.
Originally the Medina County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Lanier for a felony, but the State of Ohio moved to amend the indictment on condition that Mr. Lanier enter a guilty plea and agree to make restitution.
Mr. Lanier is a former employee of Wal-Mart who took money from three cash registers while he was working one evening. His actions were recorded by a video recording system. The next day, when he came into work, he was fired. Mr. Lanier told the probation officer who wrote the pre-sentence investigation report that he had a good job and he "messed it up." He also said that he was "really sorry" for his actions.
Originally the Medina County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Lanier for a felony, but the State of Ohio moved to amend the indictment on condition that Mr. Lanier enter a guilty plea and agree to make restitution.
Judge Kimbler Arraignments for August 26, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, August 26, 2010, for arraignments:
Eric Bruner, 28, of Winchester Court in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Candice Kane, 24, of Maddock Road in North Ridgeville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 26.
Michael Leskin, 38, of Pearl Road in Brunswick, pleaded no contest to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for October 7.
David Resovsky, 42, of Branch Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and two of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Michelle Riggs, 25, of McAllister Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony, and two counts of Theft, and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Eric Bruner, 28, of Winchester Court in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 28.
Candice Kane, 24, of Maddock Road in North Ridgeville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 26.
Michael Leskin, 38, of Pearl Road in Brunswick, pleaded no contest to one count of Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for October 7.
David Resovsky, 42, of Branch Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to three counts of Trafficking in Drugs, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and two of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 27.
Michelle Riggs, 25, of McAllister Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony, and two counts of Theft, and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for September 29.
Thursday, August 26, 2010
Judge Kimbler Probation Violations for August 26, 2010
Veronica Perry, Chief Probation Officer of Medina County, reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on August 26, 2010, for probation violations:
Case No. Name Officer PV Hearing Date Disposition:
01CR0067 Venoy, Edker R. Newman 8/26/2010 11 months prison w/51 days credit; all outstanding costs waived.
06CR0180 Overdorf, Jennifer H. Smith 8/26/2010 90 days MCJ w/27 days credit; terminate probation after jail time completed; All outstanding costs waived.
05CR0537 Roberts, Todd R. Newman 8/26/2010 180 days MCJ w/170 days credit; all outstanding costs waived; Probation terminated.
08CR0401 Hylkema, Vanessa C. Copley 8/26/2010 6 months prison w/24 days credit; all outstanding costs waived
08CR0129 Music, Robyn L. Lesko 8/26/2010 2 yrs. Prison w/364 days credit; all outstanding costs waived; terminate supervision
08CR0453 Ruitto, Steve C. Copley 8/26/2010 60 days MCJ w/18 days credit; terminated probation after jail time completed; all outstanding costs waived.
08CR0325 Lackey, Benjamin H. Smith 8/26/2010 Continued until 9/2/10 - No bond
10CR0102 McCarty, Xan L. Lesko 8/26/2010 10 days MCJ w/8 days credit; complete an IOP - D/A program & attend 2 'AA' mtgs. wkly. Contin. on supervision.
09CR0050 Crigger, Anastasia R. Newman 8/26/2010 Was not scheduled to appear. Is at CBCF
04CR0606 Storm, James H. Smith 8/26/2010 Failed to appear - Warrant issued today
08CR0478 Simpson, Jason L. Lesko 8/26/2010 Bond revoked - remanded; hearing to be set.
08CR0382 Huntsman, Troy K. Turchek 8/26/2010 Continued until 9/16/10
09CR0584 Peck, Michael L. Lesko 8/26/2010 Was not scheduled to appear
08CR0402 Amaya, Vincent H. Smith 8/26/2010 Bond revoked; Hearing continued; Def. Atty to submit brief
Case No. Name Officer PV Hearing Date Disposition:
01CR0067 Venoy, Edker R. Newman 8/26/2010 11 months prison w/51 days credit; all outstanding costs waived.
06CR0180 Overdorf, Jennifer H. Smith 8/26/2010 90 days MCJ w/27 days credit; terminate probation after jail time completed; All outstanding costs waived.
05CR0537 Roberts, Todd R. Newman 8/26/2010 180 days MCJ w/170 days credit; all outstanding costs waived; Probation terminated.
08CR0401 Hylkema, Vanessa C. Copley 8/26/2010 6 months prison w/24 days credit; all outstanding costs waived
08CR0129 Music, Robyn L. Lesko 8/26/2010 2 yrs. Prison w/364 days credit; all outstanding costs waived; terminate supervision
08CR0453 Ruitto, Steve C. Copley 8/26/2010 60 days MCJ w/18 days credit; terminated probation after jail time completed; all outstanding costs waived.
08CR0325 Lackey, Benjamin H. Smith 8/26/2010 Continued until 9/2/10 - No bond
10CR0102 McCarty, Xan L. Lesko 8/26/2010 10 days MCJ w/8 days credit; complete an IOP - D/A program & attend 2 'AA' mtgs. wkly. Contin. on supervision.
09CR0050 Crigger, Anastasia R. Newman 8/26/2010 Was not scheduled to appear. Is at CBCF
04CR0606 Storm, James H. Smith 8/26/2010 Failed to appear - Warrant issued today
08CR0478 Simpson, Jason L. Lesko 8/26/2010 Bond revoked - remanded; hearing to be set.
08CR0382 Huntsman, Troy K. Turchek 8/26/2010 Continued until 9/16/10
09CR0584 Peck, Michael L. Lesko 8/26/2010 Was not scheduled to appear
08CR0402 Amaya, Vincent H. Smith 8/26/2010 Bond revoked; Hearing continued; Def. Atty to submit brief
In Capital Cases, 'Final Order' Consists of Both Judgment of Conviction and Sentencing Opinion
State v. Ketterer, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3831.
Butler C.P. No. CR-2003-03-309. Judgment of the trial court reversed in part, and cause remanded for imposition of postrelease control.
Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3831.pdf
(Aug. 25, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that in capital murder cases where a trial court is required to file a separate sentencing opinion setting forth the court’s specific findings regarding a death sentence, a “final appealable order” consists of both the court’s judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Criminal Rule 32(C), and its sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C.2929.03(F).
Applying that holding to the case of convicted murderer Donald Ketterer, the Court rejected Ketterer’s claim that a resentencing decision for non-capital charges in his case did not contain all the information required to constitute a valid “final order” subject to appellate review. In a 5-1 majority opinion authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, the Court also rejected other claims advanced by Ketterer, but remanded his case for resentencing on several of the non-capital charges because the trial court failed to properly impose post-release control for those counts.
Ketterer entered guilty pleas in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas to charges of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, grand theft and aggravated burglary based on events leading up to and following his 2003 killing of Lawrence Sanders. He was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder conviction, and to a total of 22 years in prison for his other offenses. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed and affirmed Ketterer’s aggravated murder conviction and death sentence. However, the Supreme Court remanded his non-capital sentences to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the Court’s ruling earlier that year in State v. Foster. In Foster, the Court held that offenders who received enhanced (non-minimum) prison terms based on factual findings made by the trial judge rather than by a jury must be resentenced.
On remand, the trial court imposed identical prison terms, totaling the same 22 years as it had imposed at Ketterer’s first sentencing for his non-capital offenses. Ketterer appealed the resentencing order to the Supreme Court, advancing among other arguments a claim that the new sentencing order was not a “final” order subject to appellate review because it did not indicate that Ketterer had entered guilty pleas to the non-capital charges against him, and therefore did not comply with a requirement in Criminal Rule 32 (C) that a valid judgment of conviction must state “the plea, the verdict or findings and the sentence.”
In today’s decision, Justice Lanzinger rejected Ketterer’s argument that the resentencing order in his case failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in State v. Baker that “(o)nly one document can constitute a final appealable order.”
Pointing out that Ketterer’s sentences were imposed as part of a capital murder trial, while Baker addressed only non-capital offenses, Justice Lanzinger wrote: “R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the trial court to issue a separate sentencing opinion in addition to the judgment of conviction in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed. ... In Baker, we did not address any interaction between R.C. 2929.03(F) and Crim.R. 32(C). ... Baker does not control this case, because Baker addressed only noncapital criminal cases, in which a judgment of conviction alone constitutes a final, appealable order. R.C. 2929.03(F) requires that a separate sentencing opinion be filed in addition to the judgment of conviction, and the statute specifies that the court’s judgment is not final until the sentencing opinion has been filed. Capital cases, in which an R.C. 2929.03(F) sentencing opinion is necessary, are clear exceptions to Baker’s ‘one document’ rule.”
“We hold that in cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C). Therefore, while the final, appealable order must satisfy the four requirements enumerated in Baker, the first requirement – that the final, appealable order include the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based – will be satisfied if either the judgment of conviction or the sentencing opinion includes the guilty plea, jury verdict, or finding of the court upon which the conviction is based.”
“Ketterer’s sentencing opinion states, ‘The defendant waived his right to a jury and entered a plea of guilty to all charges January 27, 2004 ...’ While the court failed to set forth Ketterer’s guilty plea in the judgment of conviction, the sentencing opinion states that Ketterer pleaded guilty and satisfies the requirement that the final, appealable order set forth the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based. The sentencing opinion and judgment of conviction combine to form a valid final, appealable order.”
In determining that it was necessary to remand the case for proper imposition of a term of postrelease control for Ketterer’s non-capital offenses, Justice Lanzinger observed that the trial court committed four separate errors in its earlier actions imposing postrelease control, and that those errors must be formally corrected by the trial court in order to meet the strict standard of care that must be applied in capital cases.
Justice Lanzinger’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissent in which she pointed to a 2006 decision, Watkins v. Collins, in which the Supreme Court held that the “preeminent purpose” of the state law mandating advisement of postrelease control at trial was that “offenders subject to postrelease control know at sentencing that their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their initial sentences.”
In this case, she wrote, “Ketterer was advised that he was subject to postrelease control, that the duration of that postrelease control would be five years, and that imposition of the postrelease control was mandatory. Therefore, while the trial court may have misspoken and at one point used the word ‘and’ instead of the word ‘through,’ the trial court did comply with the requirement to advise Ketterer that postrelease control was mandatory for five years. Therefore, the preeminent purpose of R.C. 2967.28 was complied with, and no error should be found that warrants reversal.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
Randall L. Porter, 614.466.5394, for Donald Ketterer.
Michael A. Oster, 513.887.3474, for the state and Butler County Prosecutor.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Butler C.P. No. CR-2003-03-309. Judgment of the trial court reversed in part, and cause remanded for imposition of postrelease control.
Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissents.
Brown, C.J., not participating.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-3831.pdf
(Aug. 25, 2010) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that in capital murder cases where a trial court is required to file a separate sentencing opinion setting forth the court’s specific findings regarding a death sentence, a “final appealable order” consists of both the court’s judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Criminal Rule 32(C), and its sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C.2929.03(F).
Applying that holding to the case of convicted murderer Donald Ketterer, the Court rejected Ketterer’s claim that a resentencing decision for non-capital charges in his case did not contain all the information required to constitute a valid “final order” subject to appellate review. In a 5-1 majority opinion authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, the Court also rejected other claims advanced by Ketterer, but remanded his case for resentencing on several of the non-capital charges because the trial court failed to properly impose post-release control for those counts.
Ketterer entered guilty pleas in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas to charges of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, grand theft and aggravated burglary based on events leading up to and following his 2003 killing of Lawrence Sanders. He was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder conviction, and to a total of 22 years in prison for his other offenses. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed and affirmed Ketterer’s aggravated murder conviction and death sentence. However, the Supreme Court remanded his non-capital sentences to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the Court’s ruling earlier that year in State v. Foster. In Foster, the Court held that offenders who received enhanced (non-minimum) prison terms based on factual findings made by the trial judge rather than by a jury must be resentenced.
On remand, the trial court imposed identical prison terms, totaling the same 22 years as it had imposed at Ketterer’s first sentencing for his non-capital offenses. Ketterer appealed the resentencing order to the Supreme Court, advancing among other arguments a claim that the new sentencing order was not a “final” order subject to appellate review because it did not indicate that Ketterer had entered guilty pleas to the non-capital charges against him, and therefore did not comply with a requirement in Criminal Rule 32 (C) that a valid judgment of conviction must state “the plea, the verdict or findings and the sentence.”
In today’s decision, Justice Lanzinger rejected Ketterer’s argument that the resentencing order in his case failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding in State v. Baker that “(o)nly one document can constitute a final appealable order.”
Pointing out that Ketterer’s sentences were imposed as part of a capital murder trial, while Baker addressed only non-capital offenses, Justice Lanzinger wrote: “R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the trial court to issue a separate sentencing opinion in addition to the judgment of conviction in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed. ... In Baker, we did not address any interaction between R.C. 2929.03(F) and Crim.R. 32(C). ... Baker does not control this case, because Baker addressed only noncapital criminal cases, in which a judgment of conviction alone constitutes a final, appealable order. R.C. 2929.03(F) requires that a separate sentencing opinion be filed in addition to the judgment of conviction, and the statute specifies that the court’s judgment is not final until the sentencing opinion has been filed. Capital cases, in which an R.C. 2929.03(F) sentencing opinion is necessary, are clear exceptions to Baker’s ‘one document’ rule.”
“We hold that in cases in which R.C. 2929.03(F) requires the court or panel to file a sentencing opinion, a final, appealable order consists of both the sentencing opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) and the judgment of conviction filed pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C). Therefore, while the final, appealable order must satisfy the four requirements enumerated in Baker, the first requirement – that the final, appealable order include the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based – will be satisfied if either the judgment of conviction or the sentencing opinion includes the guilty plea, jury verdict, or finding of the court upon which the conviction is based.”
“Ketterer’s sentencing opinion states, ‘The defendant waived his right to a jury and entered a plea of guilty to all charges January 27, 2004 ...’ While the court failed to set forth Ketterer’s guilty plea in the judgment of conviction, the sentencing opinion states that Ketterer pleaded guilty and satisfies the requirement that the final, appealable order set forth the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based. The sentencing opinion and judgment of conviction combine to form a valid final, appealable order.”
In determining that it was necessary to remand the case for proper imposition of a term of postrelease control for Ketterer’s non-capital offenses, Justice Lanzinger observed that the trial court committed four separate errors in its earlier actions imposing postrelease control, and that those errors must be formally corrected by the trial court in order to meet the strict standard of care that must be applied in capital cases.
Justice Lanzinger’s opinion was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissent in which she pointed to a 2006 decision, Watkins v. Collins, in which the Supreme Court held that the “preeminent purpose” of the state law mandating advisement of postrelease control at trial was that “offenders subject to postrelease control know at sentencing that their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their initial sentences.”
In this case, she wrote, “Ketterer was advised that he was subject to postrelease control, that the duration of that postrelease control would be five years, and that imposition of the postrelease control was mandatory. Therefore, while the trial court may have misspoken and at one point used the word ‘and’ instead of the word ‘through,’ the trial court did comply with the requirement to advise Ketterer that postrelease control was mandatory for five years. Therefore, the preeminent purpose of R.C. 2967.28 was complied with, and no error should be found that warrants reversal.”
Chief Justice Eric Brown did not participate in the Court’s deliberations or decision in the case.
Contacts
Randall L. Porter, 614.466.5394, for Donald Ketterer.
Michael A. Oster, 513.887.3474, for the state and Butler County Prosecutor.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Missouri Man Wins Civil Jury Trial in Judge Kimbler's Courtroom
A jury in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on Tuesday returned a verdict in favor of a Missouri man who had sued a Medina company. Hugh Proctor, of Odesa, Missouri, sued World Truck Towing & Recovery, Incorporated, for damages that he claimed were owed as a result of leaving cloth oil rags inside his truck’s engine. The trial, which was presided over by a visiting judge, Richard Markus, who is retired, started on Monday. The jury returned a verdict of $28,000.00.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Judge Collier Arraignments for August 23, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared for arraignment in Judge Collier's courtroom on Monday, August 23, 2010:
Matthew Casey, 29, of Newcastle Drive in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
David Fowler, 31, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
David Ingersoll, 47, of Franklin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony; one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count Theft, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Vincent Martz, 22, of Princeton Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Gloria Nichols, 28, of South West End Avenue in Dayton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Cody Steele, 18, of Chargary Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 4.
Matthew Casey, 29, of Newcastle Drive in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
David Fowler, 31, of Medina, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of Credit Cards, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
David Ingersoll, 47, of Franklin Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony; one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count Theft, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Vincent Martz, 22, of Princeton Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 20.
Gloria Nichols, 28, of South West End Avenue in Dayton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a second-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Cody Steele, 18, of Chargary Drive in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 4.
Wadsworth Man Cleared of Attempted Murder in Court Trial
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that Larry Adkins, 61, of Eric Lane in Wadsworth, was found guilty of one count of Menacing by Stalking, a fourth-degree felony. Sentencing is scheduled for September 7.
Judge Christopher Collier heard the two-day trial on August 16 and 17. Judge Collier also found Adkins not guilty of an Attempted Murder charge, which is a first-degree felony. Adkins was taken to the Medina County Jail, where he will remain until sentencing.
Judge Christopher Collier heard the two-day trial on August 16 and 17. Judge Collier also found Adkins not guilty of an Attempted Murder charge, which is a first-degree felony. Adkins was taken to the Medina County Jail, where he will remain until sentencing.
Defendants Sentenced by Judge Collier on Monday, August 23
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants were sentenced by Judge Collier on Monday, August 23, 2010:
April Alford, 34, of Oak Street in Medina, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on two counts of Possession of Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Lauren Beddow, 19, of High Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony.
Harold Brickles III, of West North Street in Medina, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions, with 180 days in jail, on five counts of Passing Bad Checks, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. He was ordered to pay $3,145.07 in restitution to his victims.
David Martin, 30, of Medina, was sentenced to six years in prison on one count of Failure to Give Notice of Change of Address, a first-degree felony.
India Shelton, 23, of Springdale Street in Akron, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
April Alford, 34, of Oak Street in Medina, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on two counts of Possession of Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Her driver’s license was suspended for six months.
Lauren Beddow, 19, of High Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony.
Harold Brickles III, of West North Street in Medina, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions, with 180 days in jail, on five counts of Passing Bad Checks, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. He was ordered to pay $3,145.07 in restitution to his victims.
David Martin, 30, of Medina, was sentenced to six years in prison on one count of Failure to Give Notice of Change of Address, a first-degree felony.
India Shelton, 23, of Springdale Street in Akron, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Forgery, a fifth-degree felony.
Monday, August 23, 2010
2009 Report Shows Decrease in New Cases Filed in Ohio Courts
Ohio Supreme Court Issues 10-Year Analysis
Marked by a decrease in new traffic filings, last year saw the lowest total number of new cases filed in Ohio courts in 10 years, according to a 2009 reportreleased today by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The annual Ohio Courts Statistical Summary examines data from Ohio courts for the years 2000 to 2009.
The Supreme Court included 10 years of data from Ohio courts for the first time in the 2008 report. Previously, the annual Ohio Courts Summary provided raw statistical tables of activity in Ohio’s courts – from trial courts to appellate courts to the Supreme Court – including statistics about caseloads, case terminations and clearance rates from the previous year. (Mayor’s courts’ statistics are published in a separate report, which will be released later this year.)
The raw data are published in a separate publication – the Ohio Courts Statistical Report – while the summary analyzes data from the report and identifies trends.
Taking all courts combined, 2,972,939 new cases were filed in 2009, which was an 8 percent decrease over 2008 and more than 100,000 fewer cases than the next lowest year (2004) over the past 10 years. The data show that traffic cases in municipal and county courts are the primary contributor to the overall decrease.
With traffic cases in municipal and county courts constituting 42 percent of all new filings across all courts, the number of new filings in this category was also at its lowest mark since 2000 with 1,259,095 filings, a 7 percent decrease from 2008.
Other notable trends from the report include:
Breach of contract cases and similar non-tort related civil cases show marked growth over the past 10 years. In 2009, 224,180 new breach of contract cases were filed in municipal and county courts, representing a 68 percent increase over 2000.
Also, in common pleas courts, 68,965 new “other civil” cases were filed, representing an 88 percent increase over 2000. This figure is slightly down (4 percent) from the 10-year high of 72,121 cases filed in 2008.
The highest number of new domestic violence (civil protection order) cases filings in the past 10 years: 20,551.
The lowest number of new abuse, neglect, and dependency cases filed in the past 10 years: 12,727.
This year’s summary also includes a special section on foreclosures that examines 20 years caseload statistics.
Information contained in the reports is provided to the Supreme Court on a monthly basis by all courts except for courts of appeals and probate courts, which provide statistics on a quarterly basis.
The Supreme Court analyzes case filing patterns and trends for the exclusive purpose of assisting in the efficient administration of justice. The Court does not examine or analyze larger social and governmental trends that may contribute to or influence changes in case filing volumes.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250.
Marked by a decrease in new traffic filings, last year saw the lowest total number of new cases filed in Ohio courts in 10 years, according to a 2009 reportreleased today by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The annual Ohio Courts Statistical Summary examines data from Ohio courts for the years 2000 to 2009.
The Supreme Court included 10 years of data from Ohio courts for the first time in the 2008 report. Previously, the annual Ohio Courts Summary provided raw statistical tables of activity in Ohio’s courts – from trial courts to appellate courts to the Supreme Court – including statistics about caseloads, case terminations and clearance rates from the previous year. (Mayor’s courts’ statistics are published in a separate report, which will be released later this year.)
The raw data are published in a separate publication – the Ohio Courts Statistical Report – while the summary analyzes data from the report and identifies trends.
Taking all courts combined, 2,972,939 new cases were filed in 2009, which was an 8 percent decrease over 2008 and more than 100,000 fewer cases than the next lowest year (2004) over the past 10 years. The data show that traffic cases in municipal and county courts are the primary contributor to the overall decrease.
With traffic cases in municipal and county courts constituting 42 percent of all new filings across all courts, the number of new filings in this category was also at its lowest mark since 2000 with 1,259,095 filings, a 7 percent decrease from 2008.
Other notable trends from the report include:
Breach of contract cases and similar non-tort related civil cases show marked growth over the past 10 years. In 2009, 224,180 new breach of contract cases were filed in municipal and county courts, representing a 68 percent increase over 2000.
Also, in common pleas courts, 68,965 new “other civil” cases were filed, representing an 88 percent increase over 2000. This figure is slightly down (4 percent) from the 10-year high of 72,121 cases filed in 2008.
The highest number of new domestic violence (civil protection order) cases filings in the past 10 years: 20,551.
The lowest number of new abuse, neglect, and dependency cases filed in the past 10 years: 12,727.
This year’s summary also includes a special section on foreclosures that examines 20 years caseload statistics.
Information contained in the reports is provided to the Supreme Court on a monthly basis by all courts except for courts of appeals and probate courts, which provide statistics on a quarterly basis.
The Supreme Court analyzes case filing patterns and trends for the exclusive purpose of assisting in the efficient administration of justice. The Court does not examine or analyze larger social and governmental trends that may contribute to or influence changes in case filing volumes.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250.
Friday, August 20, 2010
Judge Kimbler's Criminal Docket for August 19, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following people appeared in Judge Kimbler's court on August 19, 2010 for criminal cases:
Stephen Kroska, 26, of Manchester Avenue NW in Canal Fulton, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on three counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and two of which are fifth-degree felonies.
David Walker, 25, of North Lyman Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years in prison on one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a third-degree felony.
Andrea Anderson, 32, of Lancelot Street in Streetsboro, pleaded not guilty to one count of Complicity to Commit Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Anthony Danilo, 27, of Ravine Boulevard in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 26.
Michael Hilson, 20, of Miner Place in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Jamie T. Smith, 22, of North Elyria Street in Lodi, pleaded no contest and was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony.
Virgil T. Smith III, 54, of Rittman Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Stephen Kroska, 26, of Manchester Avenue NW in Canal Fulton, was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions on three counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, one of which is a fourth-degree felony and two of which are fifth-degree felonies.
David Walker, 25, of North Lyman Street in Wadsworth, was sentenced to three years in prison on one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, a third-degree felony.
Andrea Anderson, 32, of Lancelot Street in Streetsboro, pleaded not guilty to one count of Complicity to Commit Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Anthony Danilo, 27, of Ravine Boulevard in Parma, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 26.
Michael Hilson, 20, of Miner Place in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Jamie T. Smith, 22, of North Elyria Street in Lodi, pleaded no contest and was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony.
Virgil T. Smith III, 54, of Rittman Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Clinton Woman Gets Two Year Prison Sentence
Leah N. Stone of W Nimisila Road in Clinton, Ohio, entered a plea to a drug charge Thursday afternoon in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom. Originally charged with a first degree felony, Ms. Stone entered a guilty plea to a third degree felony. She also agreed to testify truthfully against her co-defendant, who is her ex-boyfriend.
As part of the plea negotiations, both sides had agreed to recommend a two year prison sentence. Judge Kimbler found the agreement to be fair and imposed the two year sentence.
As part of the plea negotiations, both sides had agreed to recommend a two year prison sentence. Judge Kimbler found the agreement to be fair and imposed the two year sentence.
Medina Man Gets Five Years in Prison on Sex Charges
Dewayne E. Brooks, 48 of Abbeyville Road in Medina, entered pleas of guilty to three counts of Gross Sexual Imposition, a third degree felony, Thursday afternoon in Judge Kimbler's courtroom. Following the change of plea, Judge Kimbler imposed a five year prison sentence on all three counts, ordered that they be served concurrently, and also found that Mr. Brooks is a Tier II sex offender. As such, he will have to verify his address every six months for 25 years.
Originally Mr. Brooks was charged with five counts of rape. The charges were made by the daughter of an ex-girlfriend. The indictment alleged that the acts that led to the charges took place in 2007.
In exchange for Mr. Brooks agreeing to a five year prison sentence, the State agreed to amend three of the Rape charges to Gross Sexual Imposition and dismiss the two remaining charges. Prior to making this agreement, the State contacted the victim’s family who agreed to both the amendment of the charges and the sentence.
Originally Mr. Brooks was charged with five counts of rape. The charges were made by the daughter of an ex-girlfriend. The indictment alleged that the acts that led to the charges took place in 2007.
In exchange for Mr. Brooks agreeing to a five year prison sentence, the State agreed to amend three of the Rape charges to Gross Sexual Imposition and dismiss the two remaining charges. Prior to making this agreement, the State contacted the victim’s family who agreed to both the amendment of the charges and the sentence.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Akron Woman Pleads to Receiving Stolen Property from Lodi Outlets Mall
Makeda D. Carey of Danmead Avenue in Akron, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Wednesday, August 18, and entered a plea of no contest to a charge of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth degree felony, and Possessing Criminal Tools, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler accepted the no contest pleas and found her guilty. Judge Kimbler then continued her bond and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. The indictment alleges that the victims were the Children's Place, Eddie Bauer, and Ralph Lauren stores in the Lodi Outlet Mall in southern Medina County. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on September 30, 2010.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for August 16, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Collier’s courtroom on August 16, 2010, for criminal cases:
Jacob Durand, 19, of Hemlock Court in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions, with 30 days in jail, on eight counts of Breaking and Entering, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to pay $1,100 in restitution to his victims.
Anthony Glover, 26, of Foundry Street in Medina, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony.
Frank Steele, 38, of Beverly Hills Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in prison on two counts of Trafficking in Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Donald Wojciechowski, 35, of Crestway Oval in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Brandon Burgess, 18, of Manchester Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 1.
Eric Cochran, 31, of East Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 13.
Thomas Dishon, 23, of Berry Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
Benjamin Eggert, 19, of Lawn Street in Valley City, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 24.
Ryan Ely, 24, of Brosius Road in Garrettsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Anthony George, 18, of Dawn Court in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Bridgett Gordon, 24, of South Main Street in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Joseph Maenza, 32, of Amherst Lane in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 1.
Michael Malin, 18, of Guilford Boulevard in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony; one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; five counts of Misuse of Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. The Tampering and Vandalism charges carry a forfeiture specification. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Amber Reeve, 23, of Phelps Avenue in Cuyahoga Falls, pleaded not guilty to one count of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Shawn Shea, 18, of Andrews Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony; one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Ian Smith, 20, of Egypt Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, one of which is a third-degree felony and one of which is a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Christopher VanHauter, 43, of Wolf Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
Cynthia Vatilla-Almalkawi, 46, of Apple Court in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Donald Whitford, 36, of Black River School Road, pleaded not guilty to one count of Identity Theft and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 17.
Colin Wojdacz, 29, of Seville Road in Seville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Jacob Durand, 19, of Hemlock Court in Brunswick, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions, with 30 days in jail, on eight counts of Breaking and Entering, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. He also was ordered to pay $1,100 in restitution to his victims.
Anthony Glover, 26, of Foundry Street in Medina, was sentenced to 18 months in prison on one count of Domestic Violence, a fourth-degree felony.
Frank Steele, 38, of Beverly Hills Drive in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in prison on two counts of Trafficking in Heroin, both of which are fifth-degree felonies.
Donald Wojciechowski, 35, of Crestway Oval in Brunswick, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony.
Brandon Burgess, 18, of Manchester Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 1.
Eric Cochran, 31, of East Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 13.
Thomas Dishon, 23, of Berry Avenue in Cleveland, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
Benjamin Eggert, 19, of Lawn Street in Valley City, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 24.
Ryan Ely, 24, of Brosius Road in Garrettsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, Counterfeit Controlled Substance, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Anthony George, 18, of Dawn Court in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Bridgett Gordon, 24, of South Main Street in Rittman, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Theft of a Dangerous Drug, both of which are fourth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Joseph Maenza, 32, of Amherst Lane in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for December 1.
Michael Malin, 18, of Guilford Boulevard in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony; one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; five counts of Misuse of Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. The Tampering and Vandalism charges carry a forfeiture specification. A jury trial is scheduled for November 1.
Amber Reeve, 23, of Phelps Avenue in Cuyahoga Falls, pleaded not guilty to one count of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Shawn Shea, 18, of Andrews Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to the following charges: one count of Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony; one count of Vandalism, a fifth-degree felony; one count of Theft of a Credit Card, a fifth-degree felony; and ten counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Credit Cards, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 25.
Ian Smith, 20, of Egypt Road in Medina, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, one of which is a third-degree felony and one of which is a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Christopher VanHauter, 43, of Wolf Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 29.
Cynthia Vatilla-Almalkawi, 46, of Apple Court in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 22.
Donald Whitford, 36, of Black River School Road, pleaded not guilty to one count of Identity Theft and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for November 17.
Colin Wojdacz, 29, of Seville Road in Seville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 8.
Changes of Plea in Judge Kimbler's Courtroom for August 13, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on August 13, 2010, and entered the following changes of plea in their criminal cases:
Donald Nichols, of Parsons Road in LaGrange, Ohio, entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge of Criminal Trespass on Railroad Property, a first degree misdemeanor. Sentencing is scheduled for September 23, 2010.
Thomas Traut, 33, of Gaylann Drive in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 30.
Kimberly Waters, 39, of Lovers Lane in Akron, pleaded no contest to one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count of Possession of Criminal Tools, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 23.
Donald Nichols, of Parsons Road in LaGrange, Ohio, entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge of Criminal Trespass on Railroad Property, a first degree misdemeanor. Sentencing is scheduled for September 23, 2010.
Thomas Traut, 33, of Gaylann Drive in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to two counts of Trafficking in Marijuana, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 30.
Kimberly Waters, 39, of Lovers Lane in Akron, pleaded no contest to one count of Receiving Stolen Property and one count of Possession of Criminal Tools, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 23.
Judge Kimbler Arraignments for August 13, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Kimbler’s courtroom on Friday, August 13, 2010, for arraignments for the following offenses:
Toni Amodio, 29, of Wolf Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Todd Anshutz, 27, of West Prospect Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Delmar Bates, 62, of Grafton Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Passing Bad Checks, one of which is fifth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Ray Cottrill, 38, of Trease Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Leann Gibson, 29, of Framingham Drive in Westlake, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Check and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
David Hinz, 40, of Boston Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Zachary Howard, 33, of Water Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Brandon Myers, 38, of Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Thomas O’Connor, 21, of South Hametown Road in Norton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Scott Shamp, 43, of Nold Avenue in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to one count of Non-Support of Dependents, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Gary Spry, 20, of South Main Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Lisa Terrill, 29, of Third Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 19.
Gilbert Yezbak, 54, of Raccoon Trail in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 19.
Toni Amodio, 29, of Wolf Avenue in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Todd Anshutz, 27, of West Prospect Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
Delmar Bates, 62, of Grafton Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to two counts of Passing Bad Checks, one of which is fifth-degree felony and one of which is a first-degree misdemeanor. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Ray Cottrill, 38, of Trease Road in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Leann Gibson, 29, of Framingham Drive in Westlake, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft of a Check and one count of Forgery, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 18.
David Hinz, 40, of Boston Road in Brunswick, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for September 13.
Zachary Howard, 33, of Water Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Brandon Myers, 38, of Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Burglary, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Thomas O’Connor, 21, of South Hametown Road in Norton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 13.
Scott Shamp, 43, of Nold Avenue in Wooster, pleaded not guilty to one count of Non-Support of Dependents, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 6.
Gary Spry, 20, of South Main Street in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fourth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 12.
Lisa Terrill, 29, of Third Street in Wadsworth, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft and one count of Receiving Stolen Property, both of which are fifth-degree felonies. A jury trial is scheduled for October 19.
Gilbert Yezbak, 54, of Raccoon Trail in Strongsville, pleaded not guilty to one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for October 19.
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Judge Kimbler Sentences Three to Prison on Friday the 13TH.
Judge Kimbler sentenced three defendants to prison during his criminal "call day" last Friday, August 13, 2010. Sentenced to prison were Arlene M. Dobbins, Edward S. Herman, and Michael L. Slis.
Arlene M. Dobbins of Elyria Street in Lodi, Ohio, was sentenced to prison for Assault on a Police Officer, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler imposed a six month prison sentence, gave her credit for three days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, and waived court costs.
Edward S. Herman of Vincennes Place in Strongsville, Ohio, was sentenced to eight months in prison for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 22 days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, imposed a three year license suspension with no driving privileges during the suspension, but suspended the mandatory fine of $1350.00 and waived court costs.
Michael L. Slis of Kingston Drive in Brunswick was sentenced to one month in prison for Having Weapons Under Disability, a third degree felony. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 16 days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, and waived court costs.
Arlene M. Dobbins of Elyria Street in Lodi, Ohio, was sentenced to prison for Assault on a Police Officer, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler imposed a six month prison sentence, gave her credit for three days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, and waived court costs.
Edward S. Herman of Vincennes Place in Strongsville, Ohio, was sentenced to eight months in prison for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 22 days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, imposed a three year license suspension with no driving privileges during the suspension, but suspended the mandatory fine of $1350.00 and waived court costs.
Michael L. Slis of Kingston Drive in Brunswick was sentenced to one month in prison for Having Weapons Under Disability, a third degree felony. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 16 days served in the county jail prior to sentencing, and waived court costs.
Medina County Judges File July Caseload Reports
Judge Collier and Judge Kimbler filed their Ohio Supreme Court Reports on new cases and disposition of old cases for July of 2010. The numbers break down as follows:
At the beginning of July Judge Collier had 726 cases assigned to his docket and Judge Kimbler had 751 cases assigned to his docket. During July, Judge Collier had 128 new cases assigned to his docket and Judge Kimbler had 135 cases assigned to his docket. Judge Collier had 23 cases transferred to, reactivated on, or redesignated on his docket while Judge Kimbler had 16 such cases.
During the month Judge Collier disposed of 180 cases and Judge Kimbler disposed of 128 cases. At the end of July, Judge Collier had 697 cases on his docket and Judge Kimbler had 760 cases pending on his docket.
During the month, the three biggest categories of cases on each Judge's docket were Foreclosures, Other Civil and Criminal. The categories with the least number of cases were Products Liability and Professional Torts.
At the beginning of July Judge Collier had 726 cases assigned to his docket and Judge Kimbler had 751 cases assigned to his docket. During July, Judge Collier had 128 new cases assigned to his docket and Judge Kimbler had 135 cases assigned to his docket. Judge Collier had 23 cases transferred to, reactivated on, or redesignated on his docket while Judge Kimbler had 16 such cases.
During the month Judge Collier disposed of 180 cases and Judge Kimbler disposed of 128 cases. At the end of July, Judge Collier had 697 cases on his docket and Judge Kimbler had 760 cases pending on his docket.
During the month, the three biggest categories of cases on each Judge's docket were Foreclosures, Other Civil and Criminal. The categories with the least number of cases were Products Liability and Professional Torts.
Three Defendants Change Plea in Judge Kimbler's Courtroom on Monday, August 16
Three defendants who were originally scheduled for jury trials entered a change of plea in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Monday, August 16. The defendants were James M. Brienzo, James E. Polanski, and John T. Kaiser. Judge Kimbler ordered pre-sentence investigations in all three cases and will impose sentence in all three cases on September 30, 2010.
Mr. Brienzo, whose address is listed as 146 First Street, Northwest, was charged with one count of Theft over $500.00, a fifth degree felony. The indictment alleges that the Theft took place from Wal-Mart and involved computers. He entered a plea of "no contest" and found guilty on that plea.
Mr. Polanski, whose address is listed as the Lorain Correctional Institution in Grafton, Ohio, was originally charged with one count of Felonious Assault and one count of Kidnapping. The State moved to amend the first count of a charge of Attempted Aggravated Assault and moved to dismiss the second count. Mr. Polanski then entered a guilty plea to the charge of Attempted Aggravated Assault.
Mr. Kaiser, whose address is listed as 3651 Nichols Road in Medina, Ohio, entered a plea of guilty to one count of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. Because he had four convictions for the same offense within 20 years of committing the present offense, the DWI charge was a fourth degree felony.
Mr. Brienzo, whose address is listed as 146 First Street, Northwest, was charged with one count of Theft over $500.00, a fifth degree felony. The indictment alleges that the Theft took place from Wal-Mart and involved computers. He entered a plea of "no contest" and found guilty on that plea.
Mr. Polanski, whose address is listed as the Lorain Correctional Institution in Grafton, Ohio, was originally charged with one count of Felonious Assault and one count of Kidnapping. The State moved to amend the first count of a charge of Attempted Aggravated Assault and moved to dismiss the second count. Mr. Polanski then entered a guilty plea to the charge of Attempted Aggravated Assault.
Mr. Kaiser, whose address is listed as 3651 Nichols Road in Medina, Ohio, entered a plea of guilty to one count of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. Because he had four convictions for the same offense within 20 years of committing the present offense, the DWI charge was a fourth degree felony.
Monday, August 16, 2010
Wadsworth Man Found Not Guilty of Domestic Violence
James P. Skala of Mills Street in Wadsworth, Ohio, was found not guilty of Domestic Violence, a third degree felony, by a jury in Judge Collier's court last week. Mr. Skala was charged with a third degree felony because the indictment alleged that he had two prior convictions for Domestic Violence.
Friday, August 13, 2010
Brunswick Man Changes Plea on Drug Charges
Jeffrey L. Wiseman, Jr. of Brunswick, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Wednesday, August 11, 2010, and changed his plea to three charges of drug trafficking. Mr. Wiseman was charged with three counts of Trafficking in Drugs in the Vicinity of a School. All three charges are fourth degree felonies. In exchange for the change of plea, the State dismissed a forfeiture specification regarding a 2006 black Chrysler automobile.
After accepting the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing will take place on September 30, 2010. Judge Kimbler also continued Mr. Wiseman's bond.
After accepting the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing will take place on September 30, 2010. Judge Kimbler also continued Mr. Wiseman's bond.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Supreme Court Amends Rules Regarding Judicial Campaigns
Justices Take Action in Response to Federal Court Decision
The Supreme Court of Ohio has amended portions of two rules governing disclosure of political party affiliation and solicitations of campaign contributions by judicial candidates. The Supreme Court took the action in response to a decision by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals last month that struck down similar rules in Kentucky. The amendments become effective Thursday.
The amendments to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct remove a ban on judicial candidates identifying themselves in advertising as a member of or affiliated with a political party after the primary election. Justices concurred 5-0 in adopting the amendments to Rule 4.2 with Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger not participating.
In the Comment portion of the revised Rule 4.2, the Justices adopted language urging judicial candidates to minimize references to their party affiliation in campaign materials. “Although these affiliations and others may be communicated to the electorate, a judicial candidate should consider the effect that partisanship has on the principles of judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality.” The vote to adopt the comment was 4-1 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating.
The amended solicitation rule continues to bar judicial candidates from personally soliciting or receiving campaign contributions, but establishes two new exceptions to the personal solicitation ban. Justices concurred 4-1 in adopting the amendments to Rule 4.4 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating. Those exceptions are:
“A judicial candidate may make a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of twenty or more individuals;”
“A judicial candidate may sign letters soliciting campaign contributions if the letters are for distribution by the judicial candidate’s campaign committee and the letters direct contributions to be sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial candidate.”
The Comment portion of revised Rule 4.4 contains an explanation of the continued need for a prohibition on the personal solicitation or receipt of campaign contributions. “These limitations protect four vital interests: (1) avoiding the appearance of coercion or quid pro quo, especially when a judicial candidate engages in a one-on-one solicitation of a lawyer or party who appears before the court; (2) preserving both the appearance and reality of an impartial, independent, and noncorrupt judiciary; (3) ensuring the public’s right to due process and fairness; and (4) furthering the public trust and confidence in the impartiality of the judicial decision-maker. Rule 4.4(A) recognizes that some forms of solicitation are less coercive and less intrusive than others and permits a candidate to engage in solicitations that are less personal and directed at a wider audience.”
The vote to adopt the comment was 4-1 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating.
Information about the rule amendments will be included in court documents filed Thursday in response to a lawsuit in Ohio federal court that challenges the Code of Judicial Conduct provisions.
Access the amendments.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has amended portions of two rules governing disclosure of political party affiliation and solicitations of campaign contributions by judicial candidates. The Supreme Court took the action in response to a decision by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals last month that struck down similar rules in Kentucky. The amendments become effective Thursday.
The amendments to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct remove a ban on judicial candidates identifying themselves in advertising as a member of or affiliated with a political party after the primary election. Justices concurred 5-0 in adopting the amendments to Rule 4.2 with Chief Justice Eric Brown and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger not participating.
In the Comment portion of the revised Rule 4.2, the Justices adopted language urging judicial candidates to minimize references to their party affiliation in campaign materials. “Although these affiliations and others may be communicated to the electorate, a judicial candidate should consider the effect that partisanship has on the principles of judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality.” The vote to adopt the comment was 4-1 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating.
The amended solicitation rule continues to bar judicial candidates from personally soliciting or receiving campaign contributions, but establishes two new exceptions to the personal solicitation ban. Justices concurred 4-1 in adopting the amendments to Rule 4.4 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating. Those exceptions are:
“A judicial candidate may make a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of twenty or more individuals;”
“A judicial candidate may sign letters soliciting campaign contributions if the letters are for distribution by the judicial candidate’s campaign committee and the letters direct contributions to be sent to the campaign committee and not to the judicial candidate.”
The Comment portion of revised Rule 4.4 contains an explanation of the continued need for a prohibition on the personal solicitation or receipt of campaign contributions. “These limitations protect four vital interests: (1) avoiding the appearance of coercion or quid pro quo, especially when a judicial candidate engages in a one-on-one solicitation of a lawyer or party who appears before the court; (2) preserving both the appearance and reality of an impartial, independent, and noncorrupt judiciary; (3) ensuring the public’s right to due process and fairness; and (4) furthering the public trust and confidence in the impartiality of the judicial decision-maker. Rule 4.4(A) recognizes that some forms of solicitation are less coercive and less intrusive than others and permits a candidate to engage in solicitations that are less personal and directed at a wider audience.”
The vote to adopt the comment was 4-1 with Justice Paul E. Pfeifer voting no and Chief Justice Brown and Justice Lanzinger not participating.
Information about the rule amendments will be included in court documents filed Thursday in response to a lawsuit in Ohio federal court that challenges the Code of Judicial Conduct provisions.
Access the amendments.
Contact: Chris Davey or Bret Crow at 614.387.9250.
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
Two Defendants Change Plea in Drug Trafficking Cases
Two defendants who were scheduled for trial in Judge Kimbler's court entered changes of plea on Tuesday, August 10, 2010.
Christi L. Leprevost of Strongsville, Ohio, entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set sentencing for September 23, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Ms. Leprevost's bond pending sentencing.
Deaire D. Ricks of Akron, Ohio entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth degree felony. Mr. Ricks also agreed to forfeit to the State the sum of $95.76, which the State claimed were proceeds from drug trafficking. Judge Kimbler accepted the no contest plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Ricks on September 30, 2010. Mr. Ricks remains out on bond pending sentencing.
Christi L. Leprevost of Strongsville, Ohio, entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of Trafficking in Drugs within the Vicinity of a Juvenile, a fourth degree felony. Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set sentencing for September 23, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Ms. Leprevost's bond pending sentencing.
Deaire D. Ricks of Akron, Ohio entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth degree felony. Mr. Ricks also agreed to forfeit to the State the sum of $95.76, which the State claimed were proceeds from drug trafficking. Judge Kimbler accepted the no contest plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Judge Kimbler will sentence Mr. Ricks on September 30, 2010. Mr. Ricks remains out on bond pending sentencing.
Judge Kimbler Decision Published by Ohio Supreme Court
Judge Kimbler's decision in the case of Citibank v. Kovach, 157 Ohio Misc.2d 24, 2010-Ohio-3055, has been published by the Ohio Supreme Court and will appear in the Ohio Miscellaneous Reports. The Ohio Supreme Court has published 61 of Judge Kimbler's decisions in the 24 years he has been a judge. That number includes opinions written both as Wadsworth Municipal Court Judge and as a Judge of the Medina County Common Pleas Court. You can read the Citibank v. Kovach decision by clicking here.
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Sterling Man Pleads Out to Stealing from Sterling Jewelers
Corey A. Zoss of Kaufman Avenue in Sterling, Ohio, entered a no contest plea to one count of Theft, a third degree felony, in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Monday, August 9, 2010. Mr. Zoss is charged with taking jewelry from Sterling Jewelers in an amount equal to or exceeding $100,000.00 but less than $500,000.00. Judge Kimbler took the no contest plea, found Mr. Zoss guilty, and then ordered a pre-sentence investigation. The sentencing will take place on September 30, 2010. Judge Kimbler also continued Mr. Zoss's bond.
Medina Man Pleads Guilty to Robbery
Lucas D. Carter of Jackson Street in Medina, Ohio, entered a change of plea to one count of Robbery in Judge Kimbler's court on Monday, August 9, 2010. Originally Mr. Carter was charged with two counts of Robbery. Count I was a second degree felony and Count II was a third degree felony. The State moved to dismiss Count I in exchange for Mr. Carter entering a guilty plea to Count II. Following the dismissal of Count I, Mr. Carter entered a guilty plea to Count II. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Carter's bond and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing is set for September 23, 2010.
Cleveland Man Enters Plea to Breaking and Entering
William J. Robinson of Lansing Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Thursday, August 5, 2010, and entered a change of plea to one count of Breaking and Entering, a fifth degree felony. Judge Kimbler took the no contest plea; ordered a pre-sentence investigation; and revoked his bond. Judge Kimbler then remanded Mr. Robinson back to the Medina County Jail pending imposition of sentence. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on September 16, 2010.
Brunswick Man Pleads to Drug Trafficking Charges
Shane A. Griffin of Revere Court in Brunswick, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's court on Monday, August 9, 2010, on two charges of Drug Trafficking. Both charges involved the drug hydrocodone. In one count Mr. Griffin was charged with Trafficking in a Controlled Substance and in the other count he was charged with Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the Vicinity of a Juvenile. The first count is a fifth degree felony and the second count is a fourth degree felony.
Mr. Griffin entered a plea of "no contest" to each charge and waived the taking of any evidence by the court. Judge Kimbler then found him guilty and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing is set for September 16, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Griffin's bond until sentencing.
Mr. Griffin entered a plea of "no contest" to each charge and waived the taking of any evidence by the court. Judge Kimbler then found him guilty and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. Sentencing is set for September 16, 2010 at 8:30 am. Judge Kimbler continued Mr. Griffin's bond until sentencing.
Spencer Woman Changes Plea to Receiving Stolen Property Charge
Kelly Lafferty of Liberty Street in Spencer, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Monday, August 9, 2010 Although Ms. Lafferty was indicted for a fifth degree felony of Receiving Stolen Property, the State offered to amend the charge to a first degree misdemeanor provided she entered a guilty plea. Ms. Lafferty agreed and Judge Kimbler took the change of plea. Judge Kimbler then ordered a pre-sentence investigation and will impose sentence on September 23.
Lodi Man Changes Plea to Sex Charges
Linton B. Auble of LaVista West in Lodi, Ohio, appeared in Judge Kimbler's courtroom on Monday, August 9, with his attorney. As Judge Kimbler read the three charges of Gross Sexual Imposition to him, he entered a plea of "no contest" to each charge. Each charge alleged that the victim was under the age of 13 at the time of the offense.
Prior to taking the change of plea, Judge Kimbler explained to Mr. Auble that each charge is a third degree felony and carries a possible prison sentence of one year to five years. Each charge is also a Tier II sex offense. This means that Mr. Auble will have to register as a sex offender for 25 years, with in person verification of his residence every 180 days.
After taking the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on September 23, 2010. Due to an ongoing medical problem of Mr. Auble's, the State did not seek revocation of his bond. Mr. Auble will remain on bond until September 23.
Prior to taking the change of plea, Judge Kimbler explained to Mr. Auble that each charge is a third degree felony and carries a possible prison sentence of one year to five years. Each charge is also a Tier II sex offense. This means that Mr. Auble will have to register as a sex offender for 25 years, with in person verification of his residence every 180 days.
After taking the change of plea, Judge Kimbler ordered a pre-sentence investigation by the Medina County Adult Probation Department. Judge Kimbler will impose sentence on September 23, 2010. Due to an ongoing medical problem of Mr. Auble's, the State did not seek revocation of his bond. Mr. Auble will remain on bond until September 23.
Monday, August 09, 2010
Judge Collier's Criminal Docket for August 9, 2010
Medina County Prosecutor Dean Holman reports that the following defendants appeared in Judge Collier's court for criminal cases on Monday, August 9, 2010:
Floyd Henderson, 54, of Borden Street in Youngstown, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. His vehicle was ordered to be forfeited to law enforcement.
Daniel O’Neill, 30, of Exchange Park Drive in Medina, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Mitchel Osborn, 31, of Royal Crest Drive in Seville, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $1,100 in restitution to his victim.
Colin Wojdacz, 29, of Seville Road in Seville, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony.
Candy Brandenburg, 21, of West Tallmadge Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
Sherrie Hawkins-Smalls, 41, of Beverly Hills Drive in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to the following charges: two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine and one count of Possession of Cocaine, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 20.
Beth Oiler, 23, of 24th Street NW in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
David Supple, 30, of Martin Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
Floyd Henderson, 54, of Borden Street in Youngstown, was sentenced to two years of community control sanctions on one count of Possession of Cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. His vehicle was ordered to be forfeited to law enforcement.
Daniel O’Neill, 30, of Exchange Park Drive in Medina, was sentenced to six months in prison on one count of Possession of Drugs, a fifth-degree felony.
Mitchel Osborn, 31, of Royal Crest Drive in Seville, was sentenced to five years of community control sanctions on one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. He also was ordered to pay $1,100 in restitution to his victim.
Colin Wojdacz, 29, of Seville Road in Seville, was sentenced to one year in prison on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony.
Candy Brandenburg, 21, of West Tallmadge Avenue in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Processing of a Drug Document, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
Sherrie Hawkins-Smalls, 41, of Beverly Hills Drive in Brunswick, pleaded guilty to the following charges: two counts of Trafficking in Cocaine and one count of Possession of Cocaine, all of which are fifth-degree felonies. Sentencing is scheduled for September 20.
Beth Oiler, 23, of 24th Street NW in Barberton, pleaded not guilty to one count of Illegal Manufacture of Drugs, a third-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
David Supple, 30, of Martin Road in Akron, pleaded not guilty to one count of Theft, a fifth-degree felony. A jury trial is scheduled for November 15.
Judge Kimbler Probation Violations for August 5, 2010
On Thursday, August 5, 2010, Judge Kimbler had eight defendants scheduled for hearings on complaints filed by the Medina County Adult Probation Department that they had violated the terms of their supervision. Judge Kimbler made the following dispositions regarding the alleged violations:
Brandon D. Schultz of Medina, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. He was sentenced to seven days incarceration in the Medina County Jail, with credit for seven days served. His supervision continued and he was moved from the Mental Health Docket to intensive supervision. He was ordered to obtain a valid Ohio driver's license within 90 days.
Robert H. White of Medina, Ohio admitted that he violated the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 120 days in the Medina County Jail with credit for 35 days served. At the conclusion of his jail sentence his supervision is terminated.
Andrew G. Wallace of Columbus, Ohio, admitted that he violated the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 27 days in jail with credit for 27 days served and continued his probation in Franklin County.
Anthony E. Grayson of Barberton, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 90 days in jail with credit for 34 days already served. Upon completion of his jail sentence, his supervision is terminated.
Michael A. Depew of Medina, Ohio, asked for a one week continuance of the hearing on his probation violation. Judge Kimbler granted the request and set a new date of August 13, 2010 at 8:30 am.
Thomas Townsend, Jr., of Medina, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 30 days in jail and gave him credit for 20 days served and continued his supervision.
Jack E. Lemon of Chippewa Lake, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to two years in prison on Count I, Burglary and one year in prison on Count Two, Theft, the prison terms to be served consecutively for a total of three years. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 120 days served in the county jail pending sentencing.
Matthrew Britt, who has no known address, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler ordered him taken into custody to be evaluated for placement in the Lorain County Community Based Correctional Facility and to be transferred to that institution if accepted; following release from the Lorain County CBCF, Judge Kimbler ordered that Mr. Britt be put on intensive supervised probation by the Medina County Adult Probation Department.
Cody L. Jones of Burbank admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler ordered that he perform an additional 30 hours of community service; that he re-engage with the Medina County Adult Probation Department's Counselor; and that he begin the Berea Children's Home and Family Service Program by August 20, 2010.
Brandon D. Schultz of Medina, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. He was sentenced to seven days incarceration in the Medina County Jail, with credit for seven days served. His supervision continued and he was moved from the Mental Health Docket to intensive supervision. He was ordered to obtain a valid Ohio driver's license within 90 days.
Robert H. White of Medina, Ohio admitted that he violated the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 120 days in the Medina County Jail with credit for 35 days served. At the conclusion of his jail sentence his supervision is terminated.
Andrew G. Wallace of Columbus, Ohio, admitted that he violated the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 27 days in jail with credit for 27 days served and continued his probation in Franklin County.
Anthony E. Grayson of Barberton, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 90 days in jail with credit for 34 days already served. Upon completion of his jail sentence, his supervision is terminated.
Michael A. Depew of Medina, Ohio, asked for a one week continuance of the hearing on his probation violation. Judge Kimbler granted the request and set a new date of August 13, 2010 at 8:30 am.
Thomas Townsend, Jr., of Medina, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to 30 days in jail and gave him credit for 20 days served and continued his supervision.
Jack E. Lemon of Chippewa Lake, Ohio, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler sentenced him to two years in prison on Count I, Burglary and one year in prison on Count Two, Theft, the prison terms to be served consecutively for a total of three years. Judge Kimbler gave him credit for 120 days served in the county jail pending sentencing.
Matthrew Britt, who has no known address, admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler ordered him taken into custody to be evaluated for placement in the Lorain County Community Based Correctional Facility and to be transferred to that institution if accepted; following release from the Lorain County CBCF, Judge Kimbler ordered that Mr. Britt be put on intensive supervised probation by the Medina County Adult Probation Department.
Cody L. Jones of Burbank admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his supervision. Judge Kimbler ordered that he perform an additional 30 hours of community service; that he re-engage with the Medina County Adult Probation Department's Counselor; and that he begin the Berea Children's Home and Family Service Program by August 20, 2010.
Sunday, August 08, 2010
Disciplinary Cases Set for August, 2010
You can click here to read a list of all the cases that have been set for hearings by the Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline for attorneys in August.
Medina County Adult Probation Report for July, 2010
Ms. Veronica Perry, Chief Probation Officer for the Medina County Adult Probation Department, reports that Judge Collier and Judge Kimbler made the following assignments and referrals to her department in July:
Ten defendants were assigned to intensive supervision with each judge assigning five.
Twelve defendants were assigned to general supervision. Judge Collier assigned 4 and Judge Kimbler assigned 8.
Eleven defendants were referred to the Probation Department's community service program. Of those 11, Judge Collier referred one and Judge Kimbler referred 10.
Eighteen defendants were ordered to report to the Probation Department as a condition of their bonds. Judge Collier ordered 8 defendants to report and Judge Kimbler ordered 10 defendants to report.
Judge Kimbler referred one defendant to the Department to see if that defendant qualified for the intervention in lieu of conviction program.
Judge Kimbler granted intervention in lieu to one defendant.
Three defendants were referred for an investigation regarding whether their convictions could be expunged. Judge Collier referred one and Judge Kimbler referred two.
Judge Kimbler put one defendant on his mental health docket.
Ten defendants were assigned to intensive supervision with each judge assigning five.
Twelve defendants were assigned to general supervision. Judge Collier assigned 4 and Judge Kimbler assigned 8.
Eleven defendants were referred to the Probation Department's community service program. Of those 11, Judge Collier referred one and Judge Kimbler referred 10.
Eighteen defendants were ordered to report to the Probation Department as a condition of their bonds. Judge Collier ordered 8 defendants to report and Judge Kimbler ordered 10 defendants to report.
Judge Kimbler referred one defendant to the Department to see if that defendant qualified for the intervention in lieu of conviction program.
Judge Kimbler granted intervention in lieu to one defendant.
Three defendants were referred for an investigation regarding whether their convictions could be expunged. Judge Collier referred one and Judge Kimbler referred two.
Judge Kimbler put one defendant on his mental health docket.
Saturday, August 07, 2010
Foreclosure Chart for Judge Kimbler's Courtroom
The chart below shows the number of foreclosure actions assigned to my docket for 2008, 2009, and the first six months of 2010. As you can see, during the first six months of 2010 there has been fewer foreclosures assigned to my docket than during 2009 with the exception of March. This decline could reflect a slowly improving economy, the success of the Federal government's program to have lenders rewrite mortgages, or some combination of the two. The chart was prepared by my Administrative Assistant Linda Gerberich. Click on the chart to get a bigger view.
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