Medina County Courthouse

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Ohio Supreme Court Clarifies Handling of Cases Reversed for Improper Post-Release Control Application

2008-1255. State v. Singleton, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-6434.
Cuyahoga App. No. 90042, 2008-Ohio-2351. Judgment affirmed.
O'Donnell and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer and O'Connor, JJ., concur in the judgment, paragraph one of the syllabus, and the portion of the opinion addressing the retrospective application of R.C. 2929.191 but dissent as to paragraph two of the syllabus and the portion of the opinion addressing the prospective application of R.C. 2929.191.
Lundberg Stratton and Lanzinger, JJ., concur in paragraph two of the syllabus but dissent from the judgment and paragraph one of the syllabus and would instead reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that R.C. 2929.191also applies retrospectively.


Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-Ohio-6434.pdf

(Dec. 22, 2009) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that in order to correct criminal sentences that do not properly impose a term of post-release control, the state’s trial courts: 1) must conduct de novo sentencing hearings for offenders who were sentenced before July 11, 2006; and 2) must follow statutory resentencing procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 for offenders whose sentences were imposed on or after July 11, 2006, the effective date of the statute. The Court’s lead opinion, written by Justice Terrence O’Donnell, affirmed a decision of the 8th District Court of Appeals.

In November 2000, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas accepted guilty pleas by Jason Singleton of Cleveland to charges of felonious assault and rape. On Dec. 21, 2000, the court sentenced Singleton to a term of imprisonment of 10 years for rape consecutive with a term of seven years for felonious assault, and notified Singleton of five years of post-release control. However, at his sentencing hearing, the court failed to notify Singleton that for a violation of post-release control, the parole board could impose a prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed on him. And in its written sentencing entry, the court referenced only the possibility of five years of post-release control, and did not specify that the parole board could impose an additional prison term of up to one-half of his prison sentence for a violation of post-release control.

Effective July 11, 2006, the General Assembly adopted H.B. 137, which included several amendments to the state’s criminal sentencing statutes and enacted a new section, R.C. 2929.191. The new provision permits trial courts that discover an offender’s original sentence was defective because it did not include a properly imposed term of post-release control to correct that error by giving notice to the offender, the prosecutor and the state corrections department and conducting a hearing at which the court makes a nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) entry in its journal properly imposing post-release control and notifying the offender of the maximum term of reincarceration to which he will be subject if he violates conditions of post-release control.

In October 2006, Singleton filed a motion in the trial court seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas and obtain a new trial. He argued that by failing to properly inform him about the mandatory term of post-release control to which he would be subject, and the consequences of violating post-release control, the trial judge had not met the statutory requirements for accepting a guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, and Singleton appealed. The 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate the guilty pleas, but vacated Singleton’s sentence as contrary to law because the judgment entry in his case improperly imposed a discretionary rather than a mandatory term of post-release control. Relying on Supreme Court decisions that required de novo resentencing (a complete new sentencing hearing) when an offender’s original sentence was found to be void, the 8th District remanded Singleton’s case to the trial court and ordered it to conduct a complete new sentencing hearing.

The Cuyahoga County prosecutor appealed the 8th District’s ruling to the Supreme Court. He argued that the General Assembly intended R.C. 2929.191 to apply retrospectively, so that trial courts could immediately begin utilizing the new statutory procedure in all resentencings conducted on or after July 11, 2006 – including the resentencing of offenders whose defective sentences were imposed before R.C. 2929.191 took effect.

In today’s majority decision, Justice O’Donnell noted that, because no statutory mechanism to correct a sentence that failed to properly impose post-release control existed prior to July 2006, the law applicable to sentences imposed prior to that date is case law, including several decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
“In the absence of a statutory remedy,” wrote Justice O’Donnell, “we recognized that a sentence that failed to properly impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control was contrary to law when imposed. ... When a sentence is a nullity, it is as though it never occurred. ... Accordingly, we directed trial courts to conduct a de novo sentencing. R.C. 2929.191 purports to authorize application of the remedial procedure set forth therein to add postrelease control to sentences imposed before its effective date. We recognize the General Assembly’s authority to alter our caselaw’s characterization of a sentence lacking postrelease control as a nullity and to provide a mechanism to correct the procedural defect by adding postrelease control at any time before the defendant is released from prison. However, for sentences imposed prior to the effective date of the statute, there is no existing judgment for a sentencing court to correct. H.B. 137 cannot retrospectively alter the character of sentencing entries issued prior to its effective date that were nullities at their inception, in order to render them valid judgments subject to correction. Therefore, for criminal sentences imposed prior to July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control, the de novo sentencing procedure detailed in decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio should be followed to properly sentence an offender.”
On the other hand, Justice O’Donnell wrote, prospective application of the statutory resentencing procedure in R.C. 2929.191 to correct sentences imposed on or after the effective date of that statute is consistent with the legislature’s stated intent “to protect the residents of this state from the consequences that might result if the state is forced to release without supervision offenders who have been convicted of serious offenses and imprisoned, solely because the offenders were not provided notice of the fact that the law always requires their supervision upon release from prison.”

“Interpreting R.C. 2929.191(C) to apply the corrective mechanism provided in R.C. 2929.191 prospectively gives the statute effect and furthers the General Assembly’s stated intent in passing H.B. 137,” wrote Justice O’Donnell. “It also preserves the constitutionality of H.B. 137 against a separation of powers challenge by requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing to add postrelease control to the offender’s existing sentence. ... Thus, prospective application of the corrective procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191 preserves both the judicial role of imposing punishment and the executive role of carrying out that punishment.”

Justice O’Donnell’s opinion was joined in its entirety by Justice Robert C. Cupp. Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Maureen O’Connor concurred in judgment and in the portion of the lead opinion syllabus holding that R.C. 2929.191 cannot be applied retrospectively, but dissented from the lead opinion’s syllabus and discussion addressing the prospective application of R.C. 2929.191.

Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton and Judith Ann Lanzinger concurred in the syllabus holding that R.C. 2929.191 may be applied prospectively, but dissented from the portion of the syllabus and lead opinion holding that the statute may not be applied retroactively.

Justice Pfeifer entered a separate opinion stating that because the appeal in this case involved only an offender whose sentence was imposed before R.C. 2929.191 was enacted, the lead opinion’s discussion of prospective application of the statute is contrary to the Court’s policy against issuing advisory opinions on issues not specifically before it: “The majority answers a question that is of no relevance to the instant case and places that answer in the syllabus,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. Justice Pfeifer also stated that “by its own terms, R.C. 2929.191 limits its application to sentences imposed prior to the statute’s effective date.”

In his analysis, the legislature intended R.C. 2929.191 to apply only retrospectively, as a procedural tool to facilitate the prompt resentencing of then-current inmates who might otherwise complete their prison terms before being resentenced, and thereby avoid post-release supervision and control to which they should be subject. Pfeifer wrote that the intent of H.B. 137 was to make basically irrelevant any postrelease-control sentencing errors made after the effective date of the statute. “For the General Assembly, the prospective application R.C. 2929.191 was never a consideration.” Chief Justice Moyer and Justice O’Connor concurred in Justice Pfeifer’s dissent.

Justice Lanzinger entered an opinion, joined by Justice Stratton, in which she 1) concurred with the holding in the second syllabus paragraph that R.C. 2929.191 applies prospectively to defective sentences imposed on or after July 11, 2006, 2) dissented from the portion of the syllabus and lead opinion holding that the statute may not be applied retrospectively to offenders who were sentenced before July 11, 2006; and 3) stated that she would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand Singleton’s case to the trial court for resentencing using the simplified procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.191.

Justice Lanzinger noted her dissents from earlier decisions of the Court holding that sentences lacking a properly imposed term of post-release control are “void.” She wrote: “The majority continues to apply flawed precedent to sentences imposed before the effective date of R.C. 2929.191 in spite of the General Assembly’s intent. Section 5(B) of H.B. 137 plainly states that the new enactment, which abrogates those decisions and provides a method of correction for all sentences, is intended to ‘apply to all convicted offenders ... regardless of whether they were sentenced prior to, or are sentenced on or after, the effective date of this act.’ ... R.C. 2929.191 now provides an additional means by which sentences lacking mandatory postrelease control can be corrected – not by imposing a new sentence or by subjecting the convicted offender to additional discretionary punishment, but by fixing what amounts to a clerical error that omitted a mandatory portion of the sentence. ... I believe that the amendments to R.C. 2929.19 and the enactment of R.C. 2929.191 represent an attempt to return logic and order to this area of the law and that R.C. 2929.191 should be applied both retroactively and prospectively.”
Contacts

T. Allan Regas, 216.443.7800, for the state and Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office.
Stephen P. Hardwick, 614.466.5394, for Jason Singleton.

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