Denial of Summary Judgment Based on Federal Qualified Immunity Is 'Final Appealable Order'

Summerville v. Forest Park, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6280.
Hamilton App. No. C-090708. Judgment of the court of appeals reversed, and cause remanded to the court of appeals.
Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Brown, C.J., and Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-Ohio-6280.pdf

(Dec. 27, 2010) In a decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a court order denying a motion for summary judgment filed by a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision that asserts federal qualified immunity from claims brought under Section 1983 of the U.S. Civil Rights Act is a “final” order subject to immediate appeal pursuant to Section 2744.02(C) of the Ohio Revised Code.

The Court’s 4-3 majority decision, authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor, reversed a ruling of the 1st District Court of Appeals. R.C. Chapter 2744 generally exempts political subdivisions (cities, counties, townships, school districts, etc.) and their employees from civil liability for negligent injuries they may cause to third parties during the lawful performance of their governmental duties. This immunity applies to claims that are based on state law, not those that allege violations of federal law. In 2003, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2744.02(C), which provides that a ruling or order of a state court that “denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this Chapter or any other provision of the law” is a final appealable order. R.C. 2744.01(D) defines the term “law” to include federal laws.

In this case, Leola Summerville of Forest Park, near Cincinnati, filed suit against the city of Forest Park, city police chief Kenneth Hughes and two city police officers, Adam Pape and Corey Hall, based on an incident in which the officers responded to an emergency call at Summerville’s home and shot and killed her husband, Roosevelt Summerville.

In her complaint, Mrs. Summerville asserted federal causes of action under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code for excessive use of force, deliberate indifference in failing to provide adequate medical care, and deliberate indifference in failing to adequately train the officers. She also asserted state law claims for wrongful death under Ohio R.C. 2125.01, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that they were entitled to immunity on the state law claims pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, and that Hughes, Pape and Hall were entitled to federal qualified immunity for the alleged violations of Section 1983. Qualified immunity is a federal doctrine and is not based on R.C. Chapter 2744. Under this doctrine, public officials, including police officers, who perform discretionary functions, are immune from liability for civil damages in a Section 1983 action if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, Pape and Hall on all of the state-law claims and the Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference in failing to provide adequate medical care. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Police Chief Hughes on all claims. The trial court denied summary judgment to Officers Pape and Hall with respect to Summerville’s Section 1983 claim for excessive force, and denied summary judgment to the city on the Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference in failing to adequately train.

The city, Pape and Hall appealed the portions of the trial court’s decision denying them summary judgment to the 1st District Court of Appeals asserting that because the trial court’s order “denied them the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability” it was final and appealable pursuant to R.C, 2744.02(C). Mrs. Summerville moved to dismiss the appeal relying on R.C. 2744.09(E). Pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(E), Chapter 2744 does not apply to civil claims based upon alleged violations of federal law. Mrs. Summerville argued that Chapter 2744, including 2744.02(C) and (D), were inapplicable because her claims were based on federal law, and therefore the trial court order denying summary judgment on those claims was not a final, appealable order. The 1st District granted the motion to dismiss without issuing an opinion. The defendants sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the 1st District’s dismissal of their appeal.

Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice O’Connor said the pivotal issues were (1) whether the two conflicting statutes could be reconciled while giving effect to both and (2) if not, which statute prevailed.

She wrote: “R.C. Chapter 2744 governs political subdivision immunity. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), orders denying political subdivisions or their employees the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability under any provision of law are final, appealable orders. R.C. 2744.01(D) defines the term ‘law’ to include federal laws.

“R.C. 2744.09 sets forth exceptions to the applicability of R.C. Chapter 2744. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(E), the chapter does not apply to civil claims based upon alleged violations of the federal constitution or statutes. R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2744.09(E) conflict inasmuch as the former specifically applies to immunity allowed under any provision of law, including federal law, while the latter precludes application of the chapter to civil actions premised on alleged violations of federal law.”

“Pursuant to R.C. 1.51, ‘[i]f a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.’ R.C. 1.52(A) provides: ‘If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails.’ We have already determined that a conflict exists between R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2744.09(E). R.C. 1.51 requires that initially, we attempt to reconcile the statutes, if possible, in order to give effect to both.”

“By virtue of the definition set forth in 2744.01(D), R.C. 2744.02(C) expressly applies to the denial of immunity under federal law. At the same time, R.C. 2744.09(E) forbids the application of the chapter (including R.C. 2744.02(C) and 2744.01(D)) to civil actions based on federal law. These statutes cannot be reconciled and applied so as to give effect to both. Accordingly, we must continue with the analysis under R.C. 1.51 and R.C. 1.52.”

“R.C. 2744.02(C) is both the more recent and the more specific statutory provision. R.C. 2744.02(C) was enacted in 2003. ... R.C. 2744.09(E) was enacted almost two decades earlier in 1985. ... Further, R.C. 2744.09(E) generally states that the chapter does not apply to any civil action based on alleged violations of federal law; by contrast, R.C. 2744.02(C) specifically provides that an order denying a political subdivision or its employee the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability under any provision of law (including federal law by virtue of R.C. 2744.01(D)) is a final, appealable order. Pursuant to R.C. 1.51 and R.C. 1.52, as the more recent and specific statute, R.C. 2744.02(C) prevails. Accordingly, a trial court’s decision denying a motion for summary judgment in which a political subdivision or its employee sought qualified immunity from claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C). ... The court of appeals erred in dismissing the officers’ appeal. Accordingly, we reinstate the appeal and remand the cause to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.

Chief Justice Eric Brown entered a dissent, joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Judith Ann Lanzinger, in which he disputed the majority’s holding that R.C. 2744.02(C) and R.C. 2744.09(E) cannot be reconciled, and therefore the later-enacted and more specific of the two statutes must be followed.

He wrote: “I recognize that there is a tension between these two statutes, but unlike the majority, I do not find these two statutes irreconcilable. A reasonable construction of these two statutes would be a harmonizing construction, under which an order denying immunity may be appealed immediately under R.C. Chapter 2744 or any other provision of law, except those provisions expressly exempted from the chapter by R.C. 2744.09(E). Accordingly, R.C. Chapter 2744 and its procedural dictates do not apply to civil claims based upon alleged violations of federal constitutional or statutory law. This reading is reasonable, harmonizes both statutes, and avoids the majority’s resort to a rule of statutory construction that renders the language of R.C. 2744.09(E) meaningless.”

Contacts
Lawrence E. Barbiere, 513.583.4200, for the City of Forest Park and Officers Adam Pape and Corey Hall.

Marc D. Mezibov, 513.621.8800, for Leola Summerville & Estate of Roosevelt Summerville.